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In Indonesia, each political party has a security task force charged with protecting 
party members, ensuring orderly meetings, and providing security and logistics at 
gatherings.  However, these satgas parpol are associated more with intimidation, 
militarism, and carrying weapons than with ensuring the peace.  This thesis explains 
the role of satgas parpol through a historical perspective. It also examines how that 
role has changed in Yogyakarta since 1998.     
 
Chapter one discusses other cases of political violence in the Philippines and Thailand 
to assemble a list of prerequisites for political violence within Southeast Asia.   By 
comparing satgas parpol with groups in the Philippines and Thailand, I argue that the 
prerequisites for the violence are the same in all three countries:  a state that cannot or 
will not stop political violence, sponsors who buy and use thugs, and young men 
willing to take employment as thugs.  In the three countries, the organizations and 
sponsors are different, but the structure is the same.  Having constructed a theoretical 
framework, the thesis looks more closely at political party militias in Indonesia. 
 
The next chapter discusses the history of the relationship among satgas parpol, the 
political parties, and the state, and satgas parpol since Reformasi in Yogyakarta, 
Indonesia.  Satgas Parpol originated in Revolutionary era militias.  These early 
militiamen were a mix of opportunists and idealists; but almost all were young.  The 
legacy of these militiamen was a youth consciousness among Indonesian young 
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people, characterized by the youths belief in their duty to involve themselves in 
politics, with violence if necessary.  This youth consciousness explains much of the 
appeal of satgas parpol membership and organizational élan. 
 
The sometimes violent thuggery of satgas parpol is also due to the repressive 
political climate of Suhartos Indonesia (1965  1998).  During this time, the 
government allowed no political debate and no criticism.  Thus, to Indonesians of the 
1960s, 70s, 80s, and 90s, politics were a dangerous activity.  The satgas parpol of the 
emasculated opposition parties saw themselves as brave patriots fighting a dangerous 
battle against bad government. 
 
The third chapter shows that since 1998 in Yogyakarta, satgas parpol are much less 
violent than in the rest of the country.  This is due to Yogyakartas special political 
climate characterized by the Sultanate, the Universities and civil society.   
 
The fourth chapter shows that satgas leaders in Yogyakarta have made serious efforts 
to end violence in their city, but that problems with weapons-carrying and thuggery 
still exist.  
 
This thesis concludes that for each party, the satgas are commanded differently; some 
are under the control of parties, some are not.  However, they will not be disbanded, 
but they may become simple logistics committees or an ornamental honor guard, not 
real security.  Furthermore, politicking in the Philippines and Thailand show us that 
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elections in newer Southeast Asian democracies need not be violent; in fact, 
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Imagine this scene: the Indonesian city of Yogyakarta, 1999, in the heady, early days 
of the Reformasi movement that had just kicked an aging, corrupt, autocratic Suharto 
out of office after 33 years. At an intersection along Jalan Malioboro, a busy shopping 
street for locals and tourists, theres some kind of gathering with music, lights and 
cooking.  A group of activists espousing liberal causes such as homeless persons 
rights and anti-militarism are having an all-night rally.  Theyre cooking, listening to 
music, networking, and collecting clothes for distribution to the poor.  In the dark of 
night, a bright light swings across the crowd.  The activists hear a vehicle engine.  A 
car turns toward them and speeds at the crowd.  People run, and the car slams into 
their cooking braziers, knocking them down, and starting a fire that ruins everything 
at the rally: banners, clothes, musical instruments, papers, everything.   No one is 
injured or killed, but the rally is over and the activists have been scared.    
 
The next day, an account appears in the newspaper (Jawa Pos, May 20, 1999).  The 
rallys ruin was no accident.  In fact, someone quite openly takes responsibility for it: 
the head of security for a political party, the PPP.  The man, Syarif Hidayat, says he 
had his men attack the rally because area residents complained of the noise and the 
sidewalks being blocked.  He felt responsible for ensuring peace in the neighborhood.  
 
People like Hidayat are members of groups called satgas parpol.  It means political 
party task forces and comes from Indonesian SAtuan Tugas PARtai POLitik.  
Semantically, satgas is a slightly negative word; it means task force.  Satgas 
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Gegana is the anti-terrorist unit of the police, for example.  The armed separatists of 
Irian Jaya are often called satgas by their opponents1.    
 
Each political party in Indonesia employs one or more satgas.  They are generally not 
organized nationally very well; their members tend to be men with local concerns.  
Satgas are not party armies; they are not organized or disciplined enough to be 
compared to an army.  It is better to characterize them as bands of paramilitaries that 
work for a political party.  Generally, they wear matching fatigues, berets and boots, 
in military style. Their job is to provide security.  This may mean crowd or traffic 
control at political rallies or body guarding candidates.  However, as we see in the 
example above, their actions go far beyond logistics.   
 
Satgas have been noted for their use of intimidation, violence, or coercion to control 
political behavior or political events in public.  Their methods can include simple 
exhortation, but may also include battery, arson, threats, stone-throwing, and 
extortion.  Usually their practices do not include outright murder or assassination, 
though accidental deaths are common.  They also may use martial arts or generally 
have some small arms among them, such as machetes or knives. 
 
To get a better idea of what satgas do, its best to have some examples from the area 
under study:  Yogyakarta.  First, during the 1999 and 2004 elections, excessive street 
campaigning was to be outlawed and parties were to have followed strict 
                                                        
1 Throughout the paper, I will use satgas for satgas parpol when the context is clear.  
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campaigning schedules so as to minimize their chance of conflict.  For example, 
when cadres of different parties accidentally (or purposely) meet each other 
campaigning, they can sometimes pick fights with each other and cause injuries 
(Chew, 1999; Reuters June 1, 1999).  Apparently just the sight of another partys t-
shirts at ones campaign rally can cause a fight.  Or being alone in the wrong 
neighborhood can earn a beating (KR May 19, 1999). In March 1999, a 16-year-old 
Megawati supporter who strayed into the wrong neighborhood in Yogyakarta was 
beaten to death (Shari 1999). These are not security guards; obviously there is more 
to what the satgas do.  
   
In 1999, Indonesias president was elected by parliament, and the parliament elected 
Abdurrahman Wahid, rather than Megawati, the candidate whose party got the most 
votes.  On that day, October 20, 1999, Megawati supporters broke into riots all over 
the country.  In Yogyakarta, a house belonging the Speaker of Parliament was set on 
fire (England 1999), presumably because they felt the presidential result was 
inappropriate and the Speaker had not done enough for their candidate. To stir up 
more trouble for their opponents, cadres of one party sometimes put on t-shirts of 
another party and run amok; and can get beaten up when they are found out 
(Kedaulatan Rakyat [KR] June 4, 1999).  This kind of impersonation leads to more 
violence when the offended party is not satisfied.  Satgas of one party, for example, 
will claim that they will catch the provocateurs themselves if the police are 
unable to capture them (KR January 1, 2000).  Satgas are willing to take the law 




The satgas are quite uncontrollable; they take sides in inter-party politics and fight for 
their faction.  So, satgas parpol do not just fight other parties satgas.  They fight 
among themselves.  In March 2001 in Yogyakarta, the PDI-P held an internal election 
for a local branch chairman (Tempo July 15, 2002).  Voting irregularities were 
alleged.  The party satgas, supporting the loser, at first, peacefully, appealed to 
officials in Jakarta for clarification.  Yogyakarta party officials then called a meeting, 
and forced the satgas leader to come.  At the meeting he was mobbed to death by 
another faction of satgas for supporting the wrong faction (Tempo March 26, 2001).  
Whether the Yogya PDI-P officials actually meant to kill the satgas leader or just beat 
him is unclear.     
 
Furthermore, known gangsters have lead at least two of the parties satgas.  Yorrys 
Raweyai, a man accused of running illegal gambling and smuggling rings and 
torturing a man to death in 1993 was the head of a Golkar-related satgas, Pemuda 
Pancasila for many years during the 1990s.  Perhaps the Golkar connection was why 
he was arraigned but never convicted.  In 2000, Megawati appointed Eurico Guiterres 
head of her partys youth wing, the Banten Pemuda.  Guiterres is a Timorese 
convicted for leading anti-independence militias into East Timor from the West and 
assisting the Indonesian army with its 1999 massacre there.   
 
In my interviews with satgas leaders in Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta and Kotagede, 
2004), they all claim that they do keep the peace primarily, and that their positive 
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efforts are unseen and unrecognized.  Wagstaff (1999) gives an example of satgas in 
Ujung Pandang stopping a clash between the police and an anti-Golkar mob.  
However, Wagstaffs example is a bit disingenuous because satgas started the trouble 
that brought the mob into the street.  The point is, however, that satgas have a very 
negative image.  No one says they like satgas, not even the parties that use them.  
They are seen as thugs, hoodlums and even murderers. 
 
Local satgas leaders, however, know that elections are partially a festival, a party 
atmosphere, a pesta demokrasi, as it is known in Indonesian.  One of the Yogya 
satgas leaders told me that it is granted that young people will take to the streets and 
fight if they are very dissatisfied with the political situation (Arief, Yogyakarta:  July 
2004).  He said that satgas must deal with that reality and just try to keep young 
people as calm as possible.   
 
In these examples, we see some interesting characteristics of the satgas.  Clearly, they 
are not just private security guards.  They feel they should do the work that many 
people associate with the state, with police: i.e. quieting rallies.  However, they go 
beyond that, sometimes enforcing some kind of law of their own, for the benefit of 
their political party.  Then, there is the use of low level violence, running a car 
through the rally, threatening beatings, ransacking offices.  These are not proper 
methods for police or private security.  These are the methods of organized crime and 




In my study of satgas, I have three aims.  First, I want to explore the origins and 
history of these groups.  Satgas in specific periods of time have been studied, but I 
have not yet seen a comprehensive story of the evolution of satgas, save Ryters 
(1998) case study of Pemuda Pancasila.  So I will investigate the origins of satgas 
parpol.   
 
Second, I want to understand why parties have satgas.  Pundits and citizens of 
Reformasi Indonesia regularly call for satgas to be disbanded (JP November 12, 
2002; Ibid, April 12, 2001).  However, the parties always decline to do so.  I will 
inquire if parties are unwilling or unable to disband the satgas.   
 
Third, I want to study the changes in the satgas especially since Reformasi.  As of 
2004, when I interviewed satgas leaders, they said that post-Reformasi satgas must 
give up violence and mend their public image.  To that end, the satgas are initiating 
reforms of their own organizations aimed at socializing their members. 
Literature Review 
 
To understand the prerequisites of this political violence, it is useful to compare 
Indonesia to two of its neighbors in the region, Thailand and the Philippines, as well 
as studying literature on Indonesia itself. 
 
Political thuggery is not unique to Indonesia. In Southeast Asia, satgas are 
comparable to the chao pho (godfathers) of Thailand and the anti-Communist militias 
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of 1980s Philippines. For analysis of chao pho, I relied on Ruth McVeys work.  Her 
2000 book discussing the subject is Of Greed, Violence, and Other Signs of Progress.  
In the introduction, she argues that though elections in Thailand are rife with vote 
buying and voter intimidation, the violence is becoming more and more limited to the 
gangsters who are supposed to deliver the votes, and the voters themselves are 
increasingly being wooed by money rather than threats.  If elections are not going to 
be decided on evaluation of issues, it is, indeed, progress if elections can at least 
deliver some financial relief to the people.  Daniel Arghiros 2001 study of grass-
roots politics in a Thai province and Mulders 1994 treatise on Thai political values 
provided concrete examples of vote-obtaining practices.  In the Philippines, reports 
from Human Rights Watch (1990) and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 
(1988) provided in shocking detail the ways in which anti-Communist vigilantes in 
the Philippines killed, threatened and were funded and recruited.  Kerkvliet and 
Mojares (1991) study of two communities outside of Manilia detailed political 
interaction in the community level.  
 
Collins (2002) short but excellent analysis of violence in Indonesia blames 
Indonesias New Order (Orde Baru, Orba 2) government of 1965 to 1998 for 
creating the conditions for political violence which continue today.  Use of 
paramilitaries by the authorities, the role of paramilitaries in the republics history 
(played up by Orba), and Orbas failed justice and enforcement systems created the 




For the background of violent politics in Indonesia since the Revolution, several 
authors provide excellent reportage and analysis.  For the revolutionary period, Kahin 
(1952), Cribb (1991), Lucas (1991), and Anderson (1972) have written about 
different areas of Java and the independent militias during that time.  All authors 
comment on the role of younger people in these militias and their sense that they, the 
militant youth, played a special role in the Revolution. Anderson coined the phrase 
pemuda [youth] consciousness to describe this sense of élan. 
 
Moving from the Revolution to the 1960s and 1970s, Leo Suryadinata (1982, 1998) 
and Daniel Lev (1966) provide political analysis.  Several other scholars such as 
Ward (1974), Utrecht (1980), van Dijk (1977), and Hering and Willis (1973) 
documented Orba elections.   
 
Moving into the 1980s and 1990s, some scholars began to look at the mechanisms of 
violence in Orba Indonesia.  Sidels (1995) study of Jakarta and Robinsons (1995) 
study of Bali discuss exactly how private militias in those areas worked for and 
against the Indonesian state.  Van der Kroef (1985) wrote an early analysis of the 
mysterious killings of criminals by criminals in 1982 and 1983.  Ryter also 
incorporates analysis of the mysterious killings in her article on her case study of 
the history of one satgas parpol.  Furthermore, studies of urban kampongs  small 
 
2 Throughout this thesis, as Indonesians do, I will use Orba to refer to the Indonesian government of 
Suharto, from 1965 until 1998. 
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neighborhood wards within a city  undertaken in Yogya by Sullivan (1992) and 
Guinness (1986) help to explain everyday political interactions in a city.   
 
After Orba, Nordholt (2004), Hadiz (2003), and van Dijk (2004) have written about 
the continuities of violence even after Reformasi.   Bertrand emphasizes that the 
proliferation of private security groups in Indonesia and the problems with the 
national police has led to a blurring between the two groups, and the growth of a class 
of professional enforcers who can work on either side of the law.  However, these 
studies are a bit general; they do not focus on satgas parpol per se.   
 
Very little work has yet been done on post-Reformasi satgas beyond reportage.  
However, Philip King, an Australian academic, wrote a short article in Inside 
Indonesia (2003) discussing how satgas affected the 1999 national elections; he 




To answer my research questions, I used the secondary sources listed above as well as 
memoirs, newspapers, NGO reports, novels, and primary sources in my research.  
Foreign papers and wire services such as the Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) 
and the Agence France-Presse (AFP) are indispensable for the Orba period when 
Indonesian papers were highly censored.  After Orba, I was able to consult 
Indonesian national papers such as Tempo, the Jakarta Post (JP), and Kompas.  I also 
11 
 
used local papers such as the Jawa Pos (Jawa), Suara Merdeka (SM), Suara 
Pembaruan (SP), and two Yogya Papers, the Kedaulatan Rakyat (KR), and Bernas.   
 
Furthermore, I undertook fieldwork in Yogyakarta, Indonesia (see maps, p. 1) in June 
2004, during the first round of Indonesias presidential election.  Yogya is a medium 
city, with only about 400,000 residents in the city, on the south coast of the densely 
populated island of Java.  Contacts at Gadjah Mada University were able to introduce 
me to local satgas leaders and a police representative for interviews.  Furthermore, as 
a large population center, Yogya was a mandatory stop on all presidential candidates 
campaigns.  And when the candidates come for a visit, supporters and satgas come 
out too.   
 
Thus, I spoke with the informants with whom the organizations wanted me to speak  
their spokesmen.  Indeed, at each interview, I was faced with well-spoken, well-
educated leaders.  Some were even used to press interviews.  I asked them about the 
histories of their organizations, their activities, the difference between their role 
during Suhartos era and now, and the differences between the 1999 and 2004 
elections.  They were uniformly friendly, down-to-earth, and likable.  They explained 
away their bad reputation as actions of a few wild cadres. 
 
However, from newspapers and simply talking to other Indonesians, I saw the other 
face of the satgas.  Indonesians spoke of traffic jams, young men in uniforms, noise 
and fright.  They believe the satgas are all thugs and petty criminals at least.  This 
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certainly has some truth.  They believe that all satgas always carry weapons.   
Certainly many carry weapons (KR March 7, 2000).  Ordinary Indonesians want to 
stay out of the street when these wild people are having campaign rallies.  No one 
wants to risk getting caught in a violent situation.  The press and the public almost 
universally abhor the satgas. 
 
I had also hoped to observe campaigning in Yogya, but I never saw any.  Street rallies 
or large public gatherings were only allowed on the weekends.  Furthermore, 
campaigning was scheduled so that each party would have a different week for 
campaigning in each region, and one week of my fieldwork fell during the 
campaigning week of the PPP, reputedly the most violent party in the country.  
However, they were doing so badly in the polls, they cancelled campaign activities.  I 
did, however, happen to visit Bataam, a small city of immigrants in Riau, during the 
parliamentary campaigning and saw trucks full of wild supporters and decorated cars 
 that truly looked like the pesta demokrasi.   
Thesis Structure 
 
Chapter one will discuss the prerequisites of violence in Southeast Asia. In other 
words, I will explain that this violence is able to happen at the intersection of elite 
sponsorship, (young) men willing or forced to work as thugs, and a state that is 
unable or unwilling to control the violence.   These points were drawn from a 
comparison of the Philippines and Thailand with Indonesia.  Furthermore I will 
discuss the general characteristics of the violence and its proximate manifestations in 
Indonesia.  Chapter two will explore the history of political militias and paramilitary 
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toughs in Indonesia from the Revolution until 1998.  Chapter three focuses on the site 
of my fieldwork, Yogyakarta, and the violence and political parties there.  Chapter 
four gives the results of my fieldwork  highlights from my interviews, and an 
analysis of how satgas seem to have changed between Orba and 2004, and why 
parties use them.  The last chapter draws together all the threads of my research to 
answer my three research aims, and offers a few predictions and reflections.   
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One can find many explanations for political violence in Indonesia. I will introduce 
the concept of political violence, its causes and it characteristics.  I will use a 
comparative analysis to examine the structural prerequisites of political violence.  The 
Indonesian case shares some characteristics with other countries, especially in 
Southeast Asia.   So, I will compare low-level electoral violence in Thailand and the 
Philippines in order to point out the similarities which we will see with Indonesia.  
However, in Indonesia, political violence has its own proximate causes which will be 
discussed in the last part of this chapter. 
Low Level Political Violence 
 
In most political systems, there is competition for power, in a broad sense.  In 
parliamentary democracies, parties broadcast their fight with each other for political 
power.  Even within authoritarian systems, different factions struggle for control, 
though the machinations may be kept quiet, within palace walls.   
 
In political systems featuring contention for power, we see that sometimes this 
contention can lead to violence.  By violence I mean anything from intimidation, 
through destruction of property, beatings, assassinations, or outright rebellion.  This is 
a wide definition, and under it we see that just about every place in the world 
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experiences or has experienced some violence due to political competition becoming 
too fierce. 
 
Indonesia shoulders a bad reputation for politically-motivated violence.  Outsiders 
assume that all of Indonesia is a dangerous place riven by fighting and somehow 
dominated by wild people in the street or leaders with no sense.  That is what we see 
on CNN, but of course it is not the truth.  While Indonesia has some problems, it is 
not unique in the world for this, much less is it unique in Southeast Asia. 
 
This thesis will focus on the lower end of the spectrum of violence, what I will refer 
to as low-level violence.  I wish to understand the agents of and motivation for this 
low-level violence.  In Indonesia, this takes the form of street brawls, rowdy 
demonstrations, intimidation, and attacks on the private property of, or threats 
against, ones opposing partisan.  It is always done in groups.  This violence does not 
engulf whole cities.  It is not nationally organized as an armed rebellion of any sort.  
And, it is spurred by social or economic, rather than ideological, motives.   
Structural Prerequisites for Low-level Political Violence 
 
Looking at instances of low-level political violence, I notice three factors which are 
conducive to this violence: first, an open political arena; second, significant numbers 
of citizens who feel marginalized or disenfranchised; third, sponsors to organize and 
fund the violence.  I believe that the confluence of all three of these factors increases 
a countrys chance of experiencing low-level political violence.  This list is likely not 
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complete for all situations, and I doubt all cases could easily be fit into this scheme.  I 
especially think that the third condition, a financial sponsor for the violence, may be 
specific to Southeast Asia.  Nonetheless, I think these three factors are important to 
the discussion of political violence, and certainly are critical in the Indonesian case.  
Therefore, I will first discuss examples of these three factors and how they contribute 
to political violence.   
 
This framework of prerequisites owes much to Collins 2002 essay on violence in 
Indonesia.  She discusses all forms of public violence, including religious and ethnic 
fighting.  She believes that there are four structural causes of this violence:  the failure 
of the judicial system under Suhartos regime, paramilitary youth traditions, the use 
of paramilitaries by the military, and suppressive labor policies (Collins 2002: 584).  
The first three problems contribute to political violence, but the last refers to class-
based violence.  Her point is fine, but refers strictly to class-based violence; I do not 
think low-level political violence as I am studying is based on class struggle.  Her 
first three points relate more to political violence: a state that cannot or does not 
enforce its laws, un- or under- employed people willing to work as thugs, and 
sponsors organizing paramilitary groups.  I believe that these three factors may be a 
framework for explaining political violence in many countries.   
 
Before moving on, it is important first to rebut the vague argument that Indonesia 
simply has a culture of violence.  Collins (2002: 582) blames political parties and 
elite patrons for the twin problems of violence and insinuations of a culture of 
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violence. For example, paramilitary youth groups sponsored by political elites tend 
to avoid responsibility by pointing to an Indonesian culture of violence.  The use of 
paramilitary groups also threatens the security of ordinary citizens, who become 
fearful of political engagement (Collins 2002: 604).  This is a perfect indictment of 
the motives of the sponsors.  Elites, such as generals and politicians blame problems 
on culture so as to win support for their own hard-line or reactionary policies.  They 
let trouble happen, or even encourage trouble, so as to be the one to solve it.  So, it is 
important to rebut the idea that Indonesia has a violent culture.  Instead, sponsors of 
violence are using that particular argument to shore up their own positions.  Now, let 
us look at some of the structural prerequisites of political violence.     
Admission into the Political Arena 
 
Publicly contentious politics grow in a place either where they are embraced, such as 
in liberal democracies, or in countries that may not want contention but are not strong 
enough to control them, such as in weak states.  To illustrate this, imagine the 
political arena as an actual arena.  Some states open the doors to the public, to 
anyone who wants to participate, there is space for everyone.  Some governments 
have strictly controlled admission; one has to be invited in, or buy an expensive 
ticket.  Some arenas are very small, once a few are inside, the doors are closed.  Or, 
most interestingly, sometimes, when the management or his security guards are 
incompetent, people break into the arena and change the rules. They literally seize 
political space. The point is that a state will not have political violence if its arena is 
very small, or has very few visitors.  Some states feel that political violence may be a 
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problem, so they curb it by having a small arena and shutting people out of it.  Under 
those regimes, there is so little political space that the people are uninterested in or 
barred from politics.  In those regimes, there is no political violence.   
 
However, once the arena is open to more people, or if the people push their way in, 
sometimes these contentious politics can spawn some violence.  As in my first 
example:  1991 Hungary.   
 
After the fall of the authoritarian Communist regime in Hungary, civil and political 
society was suddenly free from state control.  People could organize for any cause 
and reason they saw fit.  Indeed, in the first few years after the end of Communism, 
Hungarians witnessed the blooming of many parties and groups that have not 
survived until today.  One such luckily long-gone group was the Nationalist Youth 
Association (NIS) of Hungary (Kürti 2003). 
 
The NIS was the youth wing of an ultra-nationalist, racist, and neo-fascist political 
party called the Hungarian Peoples Welfare Association.  Under the previous 
authoritarian regime, such opinions would have been banned, as it were.  And the 
generally unemployed and disaffected youths who filled the ranks of the NIS would 
have had to find some alternate, state-sanctioned passe-temps.  But as it was, this 
nationalist party aired its hateful opinions, blaming Hungarys problems on Jews and 
Roma; extolling some Nazi-propaganda-esque past that they had dreamed up.  And 
the NIS members got involved in defacing property and brawling in the streets with 
19 
 
other parties members.  When not involved in political activities, the NIS members 
often involved themselves in petty crime and in offering security and bodyguard 
services.  In general, they were thugs, who, in a freer political climate were able to 
meet each other, find solace in others of like political mind, and also work for their 
sustenance together.  This free association could never happen in an authoritarian 
regime. 
 
So we see that, perversely, one precondition to low-level political violence is some 
degree of political freedom.  This is not an argument against political freedom; we 
cannot punish all people for the misdeeds of one; we cannot plough under the garden 
just because of one weed.  No, it is only to say that low-level political violence must 
have some free soil in which to grow; it cannot spring from a barren rock. In the 
Indonesian case we will see that the germination, and later the growth of satgas 
parpol is related to the times when Suharto or some of his cronies allowed them some 
space.   
Marginalized or Disenfranchised people 
 
One of Kürtis important observations about the NIS was that the members were all 
young, had some education and skills but were mostly unemployed; hence they were 
disaffected, felt marginalized and had little prospect of remunerative employment.  
These are the people most likely to get involved with political violence: those getting 
nothing from their current system.   Obviously, disaffection is a major cause of 
rebellion, but by disenfranchised or marginalized people in this context, I mean the 
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actual existence of numerous young, unemployed but savvy men (so far I have not 
heard of a female involved in this) who feel desperate enough for employment that 
they are willing to be the foot soldiers of a cause, and brawling in the street.   
 
Let us look at Sri Lanka to demonstrate marginalization leading to political violence.  
Sri Lanka is a case of rather extreme political violence, but still it is an illustrative 
case.   I am not going to discuss the Tamil  Sinhalese divide in Sri Lanka.  Rather, I 
will look at a somewhat lesser known struggle: that of a coalition of vernacular-
speaking Sinhalese from southern Sri Lanka and their contention with the central 
government in Colombo. Coomaraswamy (1996) argues that these vernacular-
speaking Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, felt so isolated from decision-making that they 
began a violent chapter in their political struggle with the center. 
 
When Britain left Sri Lanka, it left its former colony with a new parliamentary 
system.  While the system has undergone some changes and not always run smoothly, 
Sri Lanka has always been a relatively open society in terms of political space.  In Sri 
Lanka, the majority ethnic-religious group is the Buddhist Sinhalese.  The country is 
divided by civil war, completely excluding Hindu Tamils from the central 
government.  Thus, the national government is controlled by an elite of English-
educated Sinhalese based in Colombo.  However, government employment practices, 
university places, and commercial success came to be dependent on a good grasp of 
English, which alienated many vernacular-educated Sinhalese from southern Sri 
Lanka.  When lobbying the government for fairer employment and educational 
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practices, for more funds for English education and other requests did not work, some 
Sinhalese youth favored violence against the government.  The youths behind the 
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, Peoples Liberation Front) in the 1980s, were 
generally among the best educated in their communities.  However, they had little 
chance for wider success in the country because of the English language policies.  
They felt marginalized so much that they were willing to fight for a cause.  If 
everyone in a country is middle-class, well fed, and feels they have a chance to 
improve their lot, they will not fight.  However, those who are unsatisfied are those 
who are on the street. 
 
Indeed Neher and Marlay (1995: 8) note further that the widening gap between rich & 
poor of course fuels class-hatred.  The have-nots feel shut out of a system that 
enriches others disproportionably.  I can see that looting a store or attacking a rich 
mans house could be cathartic.  However, this political violence under discussion is 
not primarily class based, because it is mostly employed against members of ones 
own class, rather than against elites property.  Besides this, Guinness (1986) and 
Sullivan (1994) both noted in their studies of Yogya working class kampungs a lack 
of class consciousness.  Thus I do not agree that class feeling incites political 









Thus far, in my examples on Hungary and Sri Lanka, the people fighting are fighting 
vaguely for an ideology, but in many cases, especially in Southeast Asia, ideology 
shares space with other factors in political thinking.  Southeast Asian politics are 
often characterized by personality-based parties rather than ideology-based ones.  In 
this work, I will not focus on ideology; I will simply say that politics are more than 
ideology.  Public personalities are of great importance for winning votes or 
legitimacy in Southeast Asia.  Durga/Umaya, a novel by Indonesian author Y.B. 
Mangunwijaya (2004) describes the Indonesian peoples love for Suharto himself, not 
necessarily his policies.  Plenty of stories abound about people feeling an affinity for 
Sukarno that they could never feel for Suharto.  Further examples of personality-
based politics are also seen in some of the female leaders of Southeast Asian politics.  
Aung San Suu Kyi of Burma, Megawati of Indonesia, and Corazon Aquino of the 
Philippines all owe at least some of their success to deceased male family members 
with whom they are believed to have an affinity.  These women have individual 
merits and demerits of their own, but they also owe a part of their rise to the other 
heroic politicians with whom they are associated in the public mind. 
 
These personality-driven politics, when they spawn violence, are different from the 
cases already discussed; the people may be fighting for pay, because of allegiance 
owed to a patron or a boss, but generally, they are not fighting for an ideology.  
Before we move into the discussion of Southeast Asia proper, I want to discuss two 
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examples of fighting not for ideology from two states somewhat similar to Southeast 
Asia: India and Sri Lanka. 
 
India, like Sri Lanka, has a relatively open political space and certainly many poor, 
disenfranchised people.  It also has vote-buying and electoral intimidation, as 
discussed by Banerjee (1996).  He argues that this kind of thuggery can be traced to 
the states increasing propensity toward monopolization of power at the Center 
(which agitates the internal contradictions to danger-point) (Banerjee 1996: 82).  Put 
simply, the Indian states economic policies have favored certain sectors, areas, 
cultures, and in short, people.  Thus, it has, by centralization, created haves and have-
nots, and Indian political violence has become basically class conflict. 
 
To help ensure their privileged position, it is a given that Indian political elites often 
employ thugs to ensure the correct choice on peoples ballots, especially in the 
countryside, as discussed by Banerjee (1996).  This electoral violence is quite similar 
to that of the satgas parpol in Indonesia.  Like in Indonesia, the elites representatives 
on the ground use carrots of handouts but also sticks of threats.  So in India, we see 
the intersection of (1) a state that cannot enforce its laws against violent contentious 
politics (and thus may have thugs in its political arena), (2) disenfranchised men 
working as thugs, and (3) employers that pay to used these underworld methods of 
control.  There are lots of have-nots that need employment, and lots of sponsors that 




In Sri Lanka, like in Indonesia and India, it is given that political parties employ 
militias and toughs.  Coomaraswamy (1996) has interpreted this as one barrier to 
womens entry into Sri Lankan politics; women are less likely to have been involved 
in the mans world of thuggery.  If ones male opponent can be threatened with a 
beating, a female opponent can be threatened with rape, as documented by 
Coomaraswamy (1996).  In cases like these, no great ideological debate divides the 
womans party and the rival party which threatens her; Coomaraswamy (1996) is not 
discussing any Tamil/Sinhalese division.  This is just a specific example of a threat 
used against a political rival.  In fact the female politician in question later joined the 
party that had made the rape threat against her.  These threats are real but seem to be 
a part of business rather than a desire to destroy the other one and her political idea.    
Following the wishes of ones employer or boss drives the thugs in these Indian and 
Sri Lankan examples.  As we look more closely at political violence in Thailand, the 
Philippines, and Indonesia, we will examine more closely this interesting relationship 
between thug and employer.   
 
Structures in Southeast Asia 
 
So far we have looked at three conditions that seem to go along with political 
violence, namely: a state with an open or breached political arena; poor, marginalized 
people willing to work as political thugs; and finally, a sponsor for the violence.  Now 




Discussing political violence in Thailand and the Philippines will help us to see 
further distinguishing characteristics of these actions in the region and will illuminate 
the similarities and differences between these two countries and Indonesia.  I will first 
briefly relate the situations of political violence in Thailand and the Philippines, then I 




From 19733 until 1986, the Philippines was a military dictatorship under President 
Ferdinand Marcos. In 1986, he was popularly deposed from power in favor of a 
democracy under Corazon Aquino, the widow of former president Ninoy Aquino. 
 
From the late 1970s on through the 1980s, the Philippines faced a growing 
Communist insurgency calling itself the New Peoples Army (NPA).  The NPA 
was fighting for control of the country and actually dominated thousands of villages, 
collecting taxes, and organizing local administration.  As a guerilla group, the NPA 
fought a bloody guerilla war.  Their murders, violations of human rights and the 
laws of war have been documented by Orentlicher (1990) and the Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights (1988).   
 
The Philippine Armed Forces and rich elites intensely opposed this rebel movement, 
and meant to fight it ruthlessly.  Captured NPA fighters could expect no better 
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treatment from the law than they had shown to their own enemies.  This had worked 
well for the Army until 1986.  Corazon Aquinos new liberal democratic regime of 
1986 soon enacted laws and signed international treaties banning torture and cruel 
punishments.  With Aquinos new government also came expectations of cleaner 
police and military.  No longer would security forces be free from moral constraints 
as they had been during Marcos dictatorship. 
 
So, the Philippine army and elites still meant to fight the NPA but at the same time 
avoid the scandal of the illegal methods they meant to use.  So they formed a plan to 
eradicate Communists: they formed anti-Communist militias of common civilians.  
The army surreptitiously armed these militias and elites kicked in their share of pay 
and loot. 
 
The national government, Ms. Aquino especially, likely opposed the formation of 
civilian militias (Lawyers 1988).  However she ended up announcing government 
support for militias that were unarmed and did not force membership.  Even if Manila 
opposed the formation of militias, they were quite powerless to stop it given that their 
own representatives, the Armed Forces, followed their own dictates rather than the 
dictates of their supposed bosses.  The army broke into the political arena  and the 
Philippine government was too weak to keep this violent group from making trouble. 
 
 
3 Marcos had been elected to the presidency in 1965 and again in 1970, and later declared martial law and 
finally brought in a constitution tailored to his rule in 1973.   
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One can understand the Armys and elites rage and frustration about an insurrection 
in their own country.  But unfortunately, the methods they used involved a terrible 
human cost. 
 
As an example, the most well-known vigilante group is Alsa Masa of Davao, formed 
in 1986.  Nothing was more important to the birth of [Alsa Masa] than the abusive 
behavior by the Communist New Peoples Army (Lawyers 1988: 1).   This is 
understandable in the face of the NPAs atrocities.  However, the Philippine Army 
encouraged this trend of civilian vigilante groups, protected militias and sometimes 
organiz[ed] vigilante groups where none had existed (Lawyers 1988: 1).  Other 
groups under different names, but documented with names of Army officers who 
protected them were found in Negros Occidental, North Cotabato, Cebu, Leyte, 
Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga Del Sur.  These are all places in the south, far 
from Manila.    These vigilante groups dispensed their kind of justice at their own 
whims.  This is a classic story of breakdown of law and order.   
 
The members of vigilante groups such as Alsa Masa, 4K, and other similar 
organizations are characterized as undisciplined, untrained thugs (Orentlicher 1990: 
47).  By the mid 1980s, many of them had previously or concurrently worked for the 
Philippine Armys shady and bloody Philippines Constabulary  quasi-military, 
semi-private self-defense unites originally organized to fight the Communist Huk 
Rebellion and later Muslim insurgencies in the south.  We will meet men like these 




In 1988, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights documented several recent cases 
of the military putting bounties on the heads of wanted men.  The civilian militias, 
basically untrained, and given their targets (sometimes real NPA members, 
sometimes not) returned several times with the actual heads of murdered men.  
Sometimes the real target had been killed.  Sometimes innocent men that looked 
like the targets were killed.  In the former case the military claimed a victory and the 
militiamen got their money.  In the latter cases, the army sent the militiamen and their 
heads away with orders to cover up the murder.  Vigilantes are also documented 
hiding in military barracks from local police trying to arrest them on suspicion of 
murder.  Many of the Filipinos who take part in these extrajudicial killings are so 
marginalized that they are willing to do this work. 
 
However, not all members wanted to join the militias; the militias are also known for 
forced recruitment.  To broaden their financial base, support, and probably image in 
the eyes of their patrons, the local militia leaders often forced men to join their group.  
Each household in a barangay (neighborhood4) will be required to pay dues, perhaps 
put up one member of their household as a militiaman or face violent consequences.  
This is nothing but extortion.  Certainly this has nothing to do with ideology  this is 
simply local militia leaders trying to get more followers and become more powerful 
in their own right.   
 
                                                        
4 The Indonesian equivalent is kampung.  
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The Lawyers document several cases of intimidation.  For example, a man in 
Misamis Occidental suspected of being an NPA sympathizer was abducted, beaten, 
and disfigured (Lawyers: 100).  In Negros Occidental militiamen strafed the house of 
a farmer, killing some of his family.  The farmer himself was taken to the hospital the 
next day and was attacked again, in the hospital (Lawyers: 39).  So the goons and 
thugs can be a proxy force for the state or the police  the same, we will see, as in 
Indonesia. 
 
No adherence to abstract ideas like capitalism or freedom drives this violence: it 
grows in the intersection of a too-weak government that cannot keep order in its 
political arena, disenfranchisement  people who cannot remove themselves from this 
violent atmosphere, and the presence of powerful elites fueling the fight. 
 
As for violence directly related to the election, the Philippines has a sad record.  
Votes are known to be for sale so much so that many people look forward to the 
financial windfall of election times.  However, not all votes are won by positive 
reinforcement.  From January 12 until May 24 1992 election violence took 104 lives, 
wounded 105 people and resulted in 5 kidnappings (PDP, 24 May 1992, quoted in 
Sidel (1995: 148).  These crimes were spread among enforcement of illegal 
monetary transactions (such as vote buying and bribery), intimidation or elimination 
of unsympathetic voters, candidates, and election officials, and actual physical 
interference with the voting (Sidel 95: 148).  Not only do the goons and thugs work 
as state proxies against the NPA; they also work for political candidates.  It is 
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interesting to note also that they also work as private security guards  the same, we 
will see, as in Indonesia. 
Thailand 
 
In Thailand too, we see examples of people rallying, sometimes violently, to a 
political (read: patrons political) cause in a space where there are disenfranchised 
people to work, elites to employ them, and a government uninterested in or unwilling 
to stop them.   
 
Since 1973 Thailand has been transitioning from a country ruled by the military 
toward a more democratic system.  Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Thai national 
politics were a battle between the old guard of military rulers and the new generation 
of businessmen.  The military rulers stressed order and development; the businessmen 
stressed faster development.  This is certainly not to say that there is a strong 
movement for liberal democracy by the Thai people.  Quite the contrary.  Rather, 
contentious politics have been established in Thailand because of the strength of 
business elites vis-à-vis military elites.  These business elites want the military out of 
the government so that the businesspeople can govern themselves.  And, of course, 
the businesspeople contend among themselves.  Hence, the politics are contentious, 
but the factions are not defined by ideologies, they are more rival gangs clustered 




Thailand is no exception to the culture of clientelism operating in parts of Southeast 
Asia. Mulder (1994) explains Thai conceptions of authority and McVey (2000) 
discuss the political manifestations of these perceptions and beliefs in rural Thailand.    
In traditional areas of Thailand, not in anonymous cities, Mulder explains that Thai 
people believe that 
 
[K]eeping society in good order is definitely the task of the government, culminating in a 
personalized leader, a man of prowess capable of dominating the external world.  He 
enforces desirable order, and what is good for him, as a father, should be good for all.  It 
is, therefore, loyalty to him, and the collectivity he stands for, that is far more important 
than law as a means of maintaining good order.  Consequently, the seeking of patronage 
defines political behavior, while the group  nation, state, region, country, and people  is 
seen and defined in moral rather than in legal terms.  (Mulder 94: 167) 
 
In this analysis, order, harmony among the subjects or family members is the goal.  
A man that can ensure that harmony is the law because he brings the greatest benefits.  
The other people who also follow ones own patron, who believe in his prowess, 
become ones own nation or people or family.   When Thai people think of the 
external world, the world outside of their own family compound, they look for a man 
that will bring order to that external chaos just as a good father organizes a family.  
So for their part, people look for a man of prowess to follow and that mans word 
becomes law.    The men of prowess themselves look for patrons, and a hierarchy of 
patrons is thus built from every village to the Prime Ministers office. 
 
The word for these men of prowess in the Thai provinces are chao pho, godfathers.  
The chao pho can be a local figure or can be head of large business enterprises.  The 
chao pho is generally a businessman and runs businesses for which one needs 
licenses or concessions: logging camps, or liquor distribution, for example.  As such, 
he will have little competition, and almost always oversteps his limits to make more 
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money illegally.  Or, his business may be completely illegal.  In the provinces, those 
who run illegal gambling dens, casinos or underground lotteries are known as chao 
pho (Chantornvong 2000: 56).  In either case, of a mixed licit and illicit operation, or 
of a completely illegal business, a chao pho must have protection.  There is no idea of 
the government enforcing contracts any more than the American government police 
enforcing Mafia deals.  So, a team of toughs is a necessary accoutrement for a chao 
pho to scare away competition.  During election time, chao phos can employ their 
toughs in the political field as well.  Chantornvong (2000) mentions that Thai people 
periodically read of people shot down in business-related disputes around election 
time and know that it is something to do with chao pho.  Arghiros (2001) relates 
having seen in 1999 a local political candidates father going around from door to 
door in a village twirling a pistol on his finger and reminding citizens to vote for his 
son. 
 
However, in Arghiros example above, the candidates father also gave about 10 
days wages to each citizen during his visits.  It is this monetary exchange that 
exemplifies the changes in Thailand from coercive political violence to simple 
monetary transactions.  This is an important point to which we will return at the end 
of this work.   
 
Table 1:  Prerequisites of Political Violence in Southeast Asia 
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The next chapter will outline in detail the structures that allow the growth of satgas 
parpol in Indonesia.  But first, I want to discuss the main similarities between political 
violence in the Philippines and Thailand in order to highlight and foreshadow 
similarities we will see in Indonesia.   
Characteristics of Political Violence in Thailand and the Philippines 
 
So far, I have argued that in the three Southeast Asian cases I have examined, 
political violence has at least three structural prerequisites.  First, unobstructed 
political space; second, disenfranchised men who are willing to work as thugs; third, 
a boss or patron to sponsor these thugs.   
 
However, there are a few more common characteristics between Thai and Philippine 
political violence that we will also see in the next chapter on Indonesia.  I will discuss 
these commonalties here.  They include lack of coherent political ideology among 
cadres, the declining importance of the patron-client relationship in favor of money-
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based exchange, similar respect for thugs among some citizens, and common 
experience with rising expectations of democracy. 
The Lack of Ideology 
 
In the Sri Lanka example above (p. 22), I mentioned a female politician that later 
joined a party that had previously made rape threats against her. Coomaraswamy 
(1996) suggests that because the womans previous party shrank away, she joined the 
bigger party so that she could still be involved in politics and push her political 
agenda.  Apparently there was no big difference between her old party and her new 
one  perhaps neither had a strong guiding principle.  In any case, she found the 
second party gave her space enough anyway.  So, in that example, one does not enter 
a party because she believes in its ideology  it does not have one anyway.  Many 
people, like her, join or support a party for non-ideological reasons.  I think this 
concept can apply to the Philippines and Thailand also.  In our two sample countries 
so far, politics is not about ideology, its about other material gains or opportunities. 
 
In the Philippines I mentioned that men (not women) were often forced to join the 
anti-Communist militias.  In my opinion, an ideologically based group cannot 
logically force people into their beliefs.  If an anti-Communist militia approaches a 
suspected NPA cadre and forces him to join the anti-Communists, that seems 
illogical; it seems like inviting an infiltrator into ones organization.  However, in day 
to day life, it is doubtful that many NPA-sympathizers have a firm grasp of what is 
meant by Communism in theory, much less what happens in practice.  Among NPA 
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members, very few got thorough political training (Orentlicher 1990).  Much less 
would someone uninterested in Communism at all have a thorough knowledge of it.  
Instead, I suggest that group membership is based on pragmatism and personal 
experience.  If a person had suffered at the hands of the government or the NPA, that 
would dictate ones political preferences, I believe.  If one force or the other is taking 
over ones village, why not join the winning side, if you are indifferent to both 
ideologies? 
 
This happens in Thailand as well.  Generally the large political parties cannot readily 
be distinguished from each other.  They all have similar guiding principles: pro-
business and pro-development.  They are generally all lead by tycoons.  They are 
person-centered parties.  Arghiros (2001) relates that during his fieldwork in Thailand 
in the mid and late 1990s, the people in the villages he observed were not well 
informed about the different candidates anyway.  They tended to vote for whomever 
the temples abbot recommended or anyone who was said to be a great benefactor. 
 
Thus, it seems that for many people, political or electoral choices are made based on 
advice from local notables, or even just based upon joining the winning side.  In 
Indonesia, we will see that some people involved in political violence switch sides. 
Decline of Patron clientelism 
 
The notion of benefaction or great donators is an important one in many facets of 
Southeast Asian culture.  However, students of Southeast Asia will notice that I have 
carefully avoided using the term patron-client relationship in this discussion of 
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politics.  This is because some studies (Sidel 1995, Kerkvliet and Mojares 1991) 
show that when it comes to elections, the classic patron-client relationship is being 
replaced by strictly economic exchanges.   
 
A patron-client relationship is a partnership between two people of different classes: a 
poorer person and a better-off person.  The well-off person provides material goods to 
his partner in exchange for respect and deference.  A client may ask his patron for 
advice, physically protect his patrons interests, or lend his support on the patrons 
projects. 
 
Patron-client ties are said to be an important social relationship in Southeast Asia.  
Neher and Marlay (1995), for example, emphasize the importance of patron-client 
ties.  They argue that patron-client ties are the very foundation of society and politics 
all over Asia (Neher and Marlay 1995: 15).  That is a broad statement, but the rest of 
their article qualifies it.  They use a broad definition of patron-client relationships that 
includes even cooperative relationships between near-equals.  They also believe that 
as societies become more urbanized, patron-clientelism declines (Neher and Marlay 
1995: 16).  I do not argue that patron-clientelism is dead; but I do believe we see 
evidence of its decline.   
 
Though patron-client relationships may have been important in politics in the past, or 
may still be important in other areas of life, I believe that in Thailand and the 




In the past, electoral violence may have been explained by patron-client relationships; 
that the clients of big men would willingly fight each other or threaten villagers at 
their boss command.  However, Sidel (1995) and Kerkvliet and Mojares (1991) 
argue that patron-clientelism is being replaced with simple impersonal payoffs.  This 
is easier for the payer, and more beneficial for the payee.   
 
Sidel (1995) argues that in the Philippines, electoral intimidation is definitely on the 
decline.  Kerkvliet and Mojares (1991) fieldwork in a growing town outside of Cebu 
City collaborates this. According to their research and interviews, their towns have 
not had real patrons since the 1950s.  Instead, as towns grow more economically 
diverse, grand patrons have disappeared to be replaced by liders (from English 
leaders).  This term is used to refer to a leadership exercised for specific ends such 
as mobilizing people for undertaking a project or supporting a candidate (Kerkvliet 
and Mojares 1991: 65).  Each lider is thought to influence 30-50 voters, in a non-
coercive way.  The liders group is usually his or her family, neighbors, or colleagues.  
In their article, Kerkvliet and Mojares mention a lider who is a teacher.  Hardly a 
thug, and hardly someone who can dispense favors like a patron.  Furthermore, 
parties may hire election season campaigners or election-day wranglers, but they are 
moving away from thugs.      
 
This example indicates that, as towns become more economically diverse and, indeed, 
better protected and better educated, thuggery will not work anymore.  Kerkvliet and 
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Mojares (1991: 67) mention that many of their informants haughtily said that 
landlords could no longer tell them how to vote.  This is not to say that Philippine 
elections are not for sale; indeed they are.  Its only to say that the sellers of their vote 
now know their value. 
 
Arghiros (2001: 259-260) makes a similar argument for Thailand  that actually the 
idea of working for ones patron is on the decline, and furthermore that even 
intimidation is on the decline  because monetary transactions are the easiest and 
most beneficial for all parties involved.  The villagers and chao pho and candidates 
know this.  This is not to say that the concept of reciprocation is on the decline.  On 
the contrary, it is because people have accepted money that they then feel that they 
should fulfill their part of the contract  delivering the vote that they have sold.   
  
Patron-client ties are said to be an important concept in pre-Dutch, pre-Islamic 
Javanese political ideas. Anderson (1972: 34-35) elaborates on and explains this idea.  
In Javanese thought, a patrons power is determined by the number of followers, or 
anak buah, that he has.  Liddle (1996: 82), however, further suggests that patron-
clientelism is not as much a part of Indonesian or even Javanese culture as it is used 
by elites to reinforce their position in society.  He suggests that the supposed 
clients, the poor people do not actually believe in the special status of the 
relationship, but only pay it lip service to gain its benefits.  Whether everyone 
believes in the propriety of the patron-client relationship, I believe it still exists in 
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Indonesia, though perhaps we will soon start to see signs of decline as we have in the 
Philippines and Thailand. 
 
Given these examples, I would say that patron-client relationships are not the cause of 
electoral violence in Southeast Asia.  Patron-clientelism in this sphere is declining  
this traditional relationship in Indonesia may be replaced by class solidarity or 
capitalism.  I feel it is being replaced in Indonesia.  Overall, I think electoral violence 




The history of a countrys governmental institutions can also contribute to politics 
becoming violently confrontational.   
 
Anderson (1996) compares the elections in Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia, 
and finds a common thread:  each country experienced possibilities for democratic 
government, only to see them destroyed.  In the countries, the unfulfilled expectations 
fuelled a final, ground-breaking rupture with non-democratic regimes.  In each 
country, governments held non-democratic national elections; that is, the motions of 
an election in which real politics were not debated; votes were bought or otherwise 





 Generals in Thailand in the 1970s and 1980s, Marcos in the Philippines from 1976 
through 1986, and Suharto during the New order all used participatory democratic 
forms, but did not implement the spirit of people participating in government. 
However, since their respective periods of undemocratic rule, Thailand, the 
Philippines, and Indonesia have had different success with democratic rule.  Thailand 
has been the most successful, with the Philippines and Indonesia far behind.  
Anderson (1996) argues this was caused by Thailand having long had a native, stable, 
strong bureaucracy in contrast to Indonesia and the Philippines.  Thailand had built up 
strong state institutions long before the people were involved in governance.  
Anderson believes that there are good historical reasons for thinking that it is hard to 
build such a state after the spread of mass electoralism (Anderson 1996: 30-33).  
Citizens, once they have gotten the magic vote expect all good things to follow 
from it.  They have become enfranchised citizens and they expect their country to 
suddenly work like a long established democracy.  They have high expectations 
which are not fulfilled.  Even in a system with perfect elections, people can, 
Anderson argues, still feel quite disappointed when change doesnt come.  Imagine 
systems that still have a long way before even the elections and campaigning become 
ideal  the citizens of those systems feel doubly disappointed in the democratic 
process.  And this can be a source of instability.   
Respect for Thugs 
 
It is also interesting to note that though thugs are a source of misery to Southeast 
Asian citizens, they also inspire some kinds of respect and fear. We have already seen 
how Filipinos have been pressed into anti-Communist militias, for example.  
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However, Guinness (1986: 100) notes that in Ledok, a kampung in Yogyakarta jago 
(thug) is a term of scorn among working-class and middle-class people but a term of 
respect among the poorest people.   
 
In the Philippines, many people in Davao City respect the Alsa Masa for standing up 
to the larger threat of the NPA.  The militias are the lesser of two evils.  Besides that, 
militia members all over the Philippines are seen to flout the law and never get 
punished.  They even get paid.  They often have tattoos and are sometimes believed 
to have magical powers.  They are also from the people.  These are not distant, 
strange elites.  These are members of their own class, who, though they may do some 
bad things, are still powerful people, to be respected.   
 
In Thailand also, the people are said to believe that power comes from ones innate 
abilities and whether it is used well or badly, it must be respected.  Thai people also 
see that the savviest chao pho become the wealthiest (Mulder: 1994).  If they use 
uncouth methods, that is just part of their exercise of power.  Chao pho are not 
thought to be very benevolent. 
 
So we see some respect for the power and financial rewards for thugs in the 
Philippines and Thailand.  We will see the same trend in Indonesia.  
 
Thus far, I have outlined some of the structural prerequisites for low-level political 
violence, To wit, wide entrée into the political arena, the presence of thugs willing to 
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do this work, and a patron to sponsor it. I noted examples of these structures in the 
Philippines and Thailand.  We will see the same structures in Indonesia.  I have also 
looked at three aspects of vigilante groups that foreshadow what we will see in the 
future study of Indonesia: the actors are not driven by ideology, and the citizens in the 
countries have endured periods of governments that promised democracy, but never 
fulfilled their expectations of political participation.  I have also argued that 
traditional patron client relationships are declining in the countries under study, but 
that among the poorest classes, respect for thugs remains.   
 
These structural preconditions and common aspects are excellent to study, but we 
must also look at the more proximate causes of political violence in Indonesia.  The 
unique manifestations of Indonesian political violence include weaknesses in the 
police force, the lack of trust in the police, the concomitant growth of private security 
groups, and the youth consciousness. 
 
Proximate Causes of Political Violence in Indonesia 
 
 
In each country, political violence has different proximate causes.  In the Philippines, 
political violence was directly caused by the threat of the NPA, and by financial 
rewards offered to anti-Communist militias.  In Thailand, political violence is linked 
to business, where businessmen employ thugs and use them for protection, but in 
political campaigns also.  In Indonesia, the specific proximate causes of violence 
include: difficulties related to the police, a youth consciousness, and lack of 
political space during Orba.   
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Security:  a Public or Private Issue? 
 
In Indonesia, party satgas do jobs associated with the police or with private, 
professional, independent security companies, such as body guarding and crowd 
control.  This is because the police and the people do not have a good relationship, so 
people turn to private, semi- or un- professional security.  
 
In Indonesia, the police (Polri) are beset with two major problems:  lack of 
manpower, and lack of public trust in them.  These problems lead people to solve 
problems among themselves.  Even if the police were available, Indonesians 
generally do not trust them.  Indonesias police have a bad record of corruption from 
Orba.  They are not considered neutral.  Thus, people try to avoid the police.   
 
In 1989, Jakarta had one police officer for every 1000 population (Nordholt 2002: 
60); the ideal ratio is 1:500.  The Polri realize this ideal is a long way off, and in 2004 
one of their goals is to reach a 1:750 ratio throughout the country (Republik Indonesia 
2004).   
 
However, many citizens do not trust Polri anyway.  Guinness mentions that kampung 
dwellers are reluctant to call in the police to settle local disputes; these outside 
agencies attempt to affix blame, award damages, and in so doing leave irreconcilable 
divisions in the community (Sullivan 1986: 159).  The residents believe in solving 
their own problems without outside intervention or undue loss of face for anyone.  
Furthermore, the residents of the kampung may feel that outside forces such as city 
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employees, police or officials bring nothing but restrictions on life.  Kampung 
attitudes hardened into hostility toward . . . municipal authorities (Guinness 1986: 
172).  City officials only came to the kampung to make raids or try to enforce 
building codes.  The kampung residents had no interest in that kind of interference.  
In that way, it may be seen that the people do not count the police as allies.   
 
Under Orba, during the 1980s, many people in the judicial and prison systems could 
be bought.  Law-abiding citizens got tired of criminals so easily walking free, and 
hence, many actually supported a government massacre of criminals that took place 
in 1982 (Nordholt 2002: 59).   Polri was so corrupt that people were no longer safe 
from crime.  Some were glad that Suharto decided to have the criminals killed.  
(Though police reform would have been ideal instead).  This massacre, the Petrus 
killings, will be discussed in more detail below.  Suffice it to say here that normal 
people knew their judicial system was for sale and it disgusted them.  No less than 
Yorrys Raweyai, a known gangster and former head of a Golkar-related satgas said 
about extortionist hoodlums The existence of hoodlums totally depends on the 
security forces; only a clean security force could stop their operations" (Basrie, 1997).  
Raweyai basically equates the police with gangs of hooligans by claiming that the 
police are unclean.  But he was correct; Orba police especially were known to be very 
corrupt.   
 
In Indonesia, one sees men in a variety of quasi-police uniforms; these are different 
kinds of private security guards.  As Nordholt (2002: 60) argues, police to population 
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ratios in Indonesia are so low that businesses and neighborhoods had no choice but to 
hire private security. According to Bertrands study (2003), these quasi-police are 
untrained and unprofessional.  And yet they have the right to detain someone (as best 
they can) and turn him over to the Polri.  And, of course, the best security guards are 
those that are intimidating, and know something about the underworld.    
 
Bertrand (2003) has studied three quasi-police forces in Indonesia and believes that 
the existence of professional enforcers contributes to the problem of thuggery and 
violence in the country today.  I believe he has a good point.  So let us take a look at 
his categories of professional enforcers.   
 
First, he discusses the Hansip, private persons hired by a neighborhood to patrol the 
area at night.  Hansip are paid directly by the neighborhood residents.  If a resident 
does not want to pay, he is made to pay.  Next, Bertrand discusses Satpam, men 
that patrol private commercial buildings and receive some funding from the police, 
and some from the occupants of the buildings.  Finally, he discusses Kamra, 
officers that, under the New Order, patrolled public places and received minimal 
funding and training from the police.  These officers were hired to keep order in East 
Timor in 1998-9 (Siboro, 2002). The lack of training and professionalism among 
these quasi-police forces contributes to public situations getting out of hand.  
Bertrand recounts a story of Hansip beating a developmentally disabled man to death 
when he could not understand their questions.  Up to 40,000 temporary Kamra hired 
for the 1999 election protested so vehemently when their work was over that the 
government was forced to hire them full time permanently.  His research shows that 
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many of these particular 40,000 were gangsters from Medan and Surabaya.  I think 
this example illustrates the nature of satgas; under trained, armed, thuggish, and not 
quite controllable.   
 
Nordholt also points out the connection between official and unofficial security 
forces.  He discusses a common situation whereby the gangs of thugs-cum-security 
guards are actually managed by retired police or army officers (Nordholt 2002: 60).  
However, of course, the thugs, who are also the ones behind local crime basically 
create their own market; they cause crime and insecurity, then get hired to stop it.  
This is nothing but officially-sanctioned extortion.  The managers, as people with 
connections to the regime, also hired out their gangs for other services, including 
strikebreaking (Nordholt 2002: 60).  It is no wonder that Indonesian citizens do not 
generally trust the police.   
Pemuda Consciousness   
 
Another aspect of political violence in Indonesia is the fact that it is practiced by 
youth; this may be because of a pemuda consciousness as explored by van Dijk 
(2002) and Anderson (1972).  Youth groups contributed to the success of the 
Revolution, of the PKI massacre, and other historical moments.  Thus, argues van 
Dijk (2002), many youths feel that fighting for the country is somehow, part of the 
role of a heroic Indonesian pemuda.  I think van Dijks factors are important in 
explaining the political violence perpetrated by youths in Indonesia.  The idea that 
one is partaking in an exciting, historical tradition may make the pemuda feel they are 
justified in violence. Van Dijks article, The Realms of Order and Disorder discusses 
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gang violence among older schoolchildren in Jakarta.  However, the parallels between 
this schoolchildrens violence and political violence are striking, and are pointed out 
by van Dijk himself.  Van Dijk emphasized two factors to explain schoolchildrens 
violence and youth political violence (2002: 84-82).  The first is the sheer excitement 
of participating in loud motorcades, attacking ones enemies, and destroying property 
in the name of ones cause (be it the honor of your school or your political party).  
Younger kids see their older brothers and sisters letting loose like this and look 
forward to their turn.  In 1988, the MPR outlawed children under 17 participating in 
campaign rallies as an attempt to curb violence (van Dijk 2002: 84).  This policy, 
even if enforced could only do a limited amount of good anyway; there are plenty of 
young people to fill their streets.     
 
Van Dijk (2002) argues that all these factors above are not the only causes of pemuda 
violence.  He mentions theories of socio-economic inequality, fast economic 
development, latch-key kids, and breaking of traditional life-patterns as contributing 
to the violence.  Though these issues are important van Dijk argues that the examples 
of other youth (whether older siblings, peers, or youth of the past) account for more 
of youth violence.  I do agree with van Dijk that the violence cannot be explained 
simply by socio-economic means. Indeed, Anderson (1972) also discusses a pemuda 
consciousness in his study of elections.  Politically-minded youth see themselves as 
fulfilling a historical role. 




Orba Indonesia was a country with very little room for political debate; thus, at the 
times when some public expression was allowed, it could be explosive. Liddle (1996) 
agreed in 1996 that the Orba was a stable regime, but founded on a weak groundwork 
of developmentalism.  Suharto, in public propaganda, emphasized consensual forms 
of decision-making as being inherently more peaceful. In Liddles opinion, Orba was 
legitimate in the eyes of most Indonesians because of the concrete improvements in 
their lives in the previous 30 years.  The regime had developmental legitimacy in 
contrast to democratic legitimacy.  The forms of democracy were just a useful 
fiction (Liddle 1996: 1).  The fiction of democracy in Indonesia was built upon a 
foundation of developmental success.  However, because developmental success is 
uncertain and fragile, any state based on developmental legitimacy has an inherent 
weakness, an Achilles heel.  Surely enough, less than a year after Liddles article 
appeared, the Asian currency crisis hit Indonesia, and less than a year after that, the 
Orba had been overthrown from within.  So, having a consensual, as opposed to 
confrontational form of government, is no insurance against violence.  If a state can 
maintain developmental legitimacy rather than democratic legitimacy for very long, it 
must be an exceptional case, rather than the rule.   
 
Human Rights Watch (1992) also supports the theory that political rights (meaningful 
voting and opportunities to enter government) and human rights (freedom from 
torture, unjust imprisonment, freedom of movement, protection from famine etc) 
must necessarily go together.  Without political rights, human rights are only granted 
at the whim of a non-representative ruler.  The authoritarian country has no checks on 
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it to keep it from abusing its citizens.  It is only an open regime with checks and 
balances that can start to protect all groups in society.   Though a closed political 







This chapter has demonstrated that low-level political violence in Southeast Asia has 
at least three preconditions: freedom for thugs to operate, either due to a weak state or 
to a permissive state; second, the violence needs a sponsor in the form of sponsors or 
leaders, this is not a kind of movement from below; third, the militias and gangs must 
have foot soldiers in the form of unemployed young men, conscripts, or young 
gangsters.    When all three conditions are in place, we may see low level political 
violence. 
 
In Southeast Asia, these groups of thugs and the violence they do have several things 
in common.  First, they are usually driven by motives rather than ideology, such as 
fear, need for employment, or desire to be a tough guy.  Political education is not a 
priority among these political gangs.  Next, if a countrys government has raised 
expectations of democratization, but the democratization never came, or did not fulfill 
peoples hopes, that can lead to the kind of malaise that makes people cynical about 
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politics and possibly receptive to using violence.  Next, in each country, the thugs 
seem to enjoy a lot of prestige from the awe and fear of regular citizens.  His tattoos 
and flashy style help add to this image.  Finally, it is important to note that patron-
clientelism, long an explanation for all kinds of relationships in Southeast Asia is not 
a cause of political violence.  In Thailand and the Philippines, patron-clientelism is in 
the decline, being replaced by capitalistic exchange.   
 
Finally, I introduced the proximate manifestations of political violence in Indonesia:  
Orbas allowing private paramilitaries to function so widely that they rival the police, 
a class of non-police private enforcers, the pemuda consciousness that pulls many 
young men toward extreme participation in politics, and Orbas suppression of 
political expression that led some to turn to violence in lieu of other avenues. 
 
This chapter has raised a sort of theoretical framework for explaining the 
prerequisites of political violence, and its characteristics.  By making a comparison of 
Indonesia and two of its neighbors, I have started to answer how and why satgas 
flourish in Indonesia.  The next chapter will detail historical development of satgas in 








I have argued that violent contentious politics have the most chance of arising in a 
political situation characterized by some open political space, disenfranchised persons 
who are willing to fight in the name of politics, and a sponsor for the groups.  This 
chapter focuses specifically on violent contentious politics during the period of the 
Republic of Indonesia.  I will trace the history of private groups doing violence in the 
name of politics, and some of the characteristics of such groups from 1945 until 1997.  
These characteristics include violence as a youth phenomenon, the difficulty of 
controlling these groups and the lack of very precise political programs in their 
minds.  The groups under focus here agitate for a political reason, be it for a political 
party, independently, or for the government.   We will see satgas of all three:  of 
political parties, of the government, and independently-acting ones.  This section 
concerns all of Java, with a focus on Yogyakarta where possible, until the fall of 
Suharto in 1998.   
Pre-Independence Era 
 
Indonesia, being a vast archipelago, does not admit of easy organization.   Indeed the 
idea of Indonesia encompassing what it does today was not born until the 20th 
century.  In pre-15th century Indonesia, Hindu kingdoms rose and fell with time and 
ruled islands and parts of islands with no sort of political unity among them.  In the 
1400s, the influence of Islam, and later of Islamic rulers, grew, though no one 
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established a Sultanate covering the whole archipelago.  Throughout Indonesia, at 
least a veneer of Islamic belief has been spread.  In certain places such as Aceh and 
East Java, Islamic beliefs are especially strong and important in everyday life. By the 
17th century, Europeans began to come to Indonesia for spices, and the islands of 
todays Indonesia were eventually colonized by the Dutch.  Dutch control advanced 
slowly toward the interior of these islands; this was a protracted process, not even 
completed by the turn of the 20th century.  
 
For 40 years before the Japanese invasion of 1942, independent political organization 
among Indonesians was minimal.  Only a very few Dutch-educated Indonesians knew 
or cared much about concepts like nationalism (Reid 1974: 3), though all Indonesians 
knew what exploitation by the Dutch was.  However, religious based organization 
was more common.  The two most important religious groups for the political future 
of Indonesia were founded before 1943: Muhammadiyah in 1912 and Nahdatul 
Ulama in 1926.  Muhammadiyah was founded in Yogyakarta as a modernist Islamic 
organization.  It promoted purer practice of Islam (as opposed to the syncretic Islam 
widely practiced in Java).  Muhammadiyah also helped answer the demand for 
modern Dutch-style education by opening elementary schools wherever they 
established an office.  Nahdatul Ulama (NU), founded in East Java, and still strongest 
there, was a more conservative organization which promoted traditional Islam as it 
had long been practiced in Java.  It too promoted wider education, but through the 
traditional pesantren, local Islamic schools.  Though neither of these organizations 
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formally tried to enter politics or undertake mass action (Reid 1974: 5), they were a 
place in civil society for Indonesians to gather completely outside of a Dutch world5. 
 
An important exception however, was the Communist party.  Before the Japanese 
invasion, the Communist Party was already strong in Indonesia. It was universally 
popular among intellectuals, and was the strongest in Asia until its suppression in 
1927 (Reid 1974: 6).  The party in Indonesia, the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia), 
attempted a revolt in Java in 1926 and was beaten and banned the next year.  
However, it was not wiped out completely.  For the next forty years, underground 
Communists would still be active in Indonesia, and would have a strong political 
party after the Indonesian Revolution.     
The Japanese Occupation 
 
During World War II, the Japanese quickly defeated the Dutch in Indonesia.  With 
them they brought rhetoric entirely different from that of the Dutch.  They 
demonstrated the weakness of the Dutch and told the Indonesians of Asian 
supremacy.  However, the Japanese were as cruel masters as the Dutch. The Japanese 
claimed that they did not want to be colonizers like the Europeans.  Instead they 
had a vision of a Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere in which all nations of Asia 
would work together for greater glory, wealth and development.  Though their 
propaganda did not say so, the greater glory, wealth, and development would be for 
                                                        
5 For an excellent dramatization of early 20th century, politics, change, organization and life in Java as 
experienced by a young, introspective Indonesian, see Pramodeya Anata Toers Buru Quartet.   
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Japan.  The other countries would be free in name only.  They would have an illusion 
of freedom but actually be subservient to Japan.   The Japanese  
 
appeared to feel that they could exploit the resources of Indonesia for 
the benefit of their war effort without having to make concessions to 
Indonesian nationalism . . . speedily the Japanese were disabused of 
this idea (Kahin 1952: 103).    
 
The Japanese used Javanese resources while the people went without.  As this 
situation became worse and Javanese became more and more hostile, the Japanese 
began to worry about Javanese antipathy and insurrectionary potential. 
 
To get more cooperation from the Indonesians, the Japanese leaders co-opted 
nationalist leaders, such as Sukarno, who would be the first president of independent 
Indonesia, to propagandize for modernization under Japans guidance.  However, 
by the end of 1943 it was obvious that the nationalists used by the Japanese were 
accomplishing considerably more for the Indonesian nationalist movement than it 
was for the Japanese war effort (Kahin 1952: 110).  Sukarno for example, was using 
the platform given to him by the Japanese to emphasize nationalism rather than to talk 
very much about the glory of Japan.   So, the nationalist movement gained strength in 
Indonesia during the Japanese occupation despite the fact that Japan only wanted to 
allow puppet independence. 
 
To help ease their military burden, the Japanese began to train paramilitary forces in 
the islands (always with Japanese officers in the higher echelons).  These paramilitary 
forces would have two objectives: internal policing, and self-defense against the 
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Allies.  The Japanese organized several paramilitary groups in Indonesia for self-
defense.  The most important was Peta (the Pembela Tanah Air [the Fatherland 
Defense Force]), of which the junior officers were Indonesian (Kahin 1952: 109).  
Many of these junior officers would become revolutionary leaders within two years. 
 
However, by 1944, the Japanese knew the war was not going well for them.  They 
realized that they would soon be driven out of Southeast Asia.  They stepped up 
organizing youth conferences to discuss independence (Anderson 1972: 53).  The 
Japanese continued training Indonesian paramilitaries and stepped up their 
propaganda about a free Indonesia.  However, by July 1945 the Japanese were 
running out of time, and Indonesia had not been allowed to declare its independence 
yet.  The Japanese surrender came more quickly than anyone thought it would.  In 
August 1945, just when the committees had been prepared for planning 
independence, the Americans dropped the two atomic bombs in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, and orders came down from the Emperor to surrender.  As part of the 
surrender terms, the Japanese were obliged to keep the peace in their occupied 
territories until the Allies arrived to take control.  The Japanese could not then in 
good faith encourage an Indonesian declaration of independence. 
 
True, the Japanese commanders did not feel able to overtly encourage independence, 
but they obeyed the letter of the law only, not its spirit.  One would imagine that 
perhaps some of the individual Japanese thought of this as some revenge on the 
Allies; some definitely, such as Rear Admiral Tadashi, and perhaps Admiral 
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Yamamoto himself, supported Indonesian independence if Dutch rule was the 
alternative.  In any case, men such as these did not really do all they could to prevent 
Indonesians taking over their own government in August and September 1945 
(Anderson 1972: 44).  They put up only token resistance to Indonesians taking control 
of their own country.  Then on August 17, 1945 the nationalist leaders, Sukarno and 
Hatta, made their declaration of Indonesias independence.   
 
I think it is best to trace violent politics in Indonesia since 1945 because this is the 
first year in modern times that (some of) Indonesia was free from foreign suzerainty 
and that Indonesians began to work toward a modern, unitary government of their 
own design.  Though there are traditions and ideas about warriors, rebels, and toughs 
that date from even before Dutch times, I believe that 1945 was the first year of 
contentious politics driven by modern ideas, and as such, is the appropriate place to 
begin my survey.   
Introducing the Actors 
 
 
First, I shall introduce the actors we will meet. We will start with the preman.  This 
comes from the Dutch vrijman, meaning an Indonesian free man -- not tied to 
any particular plantation or place.  The term has gone through many permutations, 
most not respectable (Ryter 1998).  It is a man (always a man) who probably does not 
have a steady legal job, who may be a drifter, and who is on the margins of society.  
Preman make up the ranks of many criminal gangs. His occupations may include 
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running parking lots, regulating traffic for money, collecting debts, being a bouncer6, 
being a security guard or making book7 -- all technically nonviolent work.  But all 
work where a show of force is helpful.   Preman may also do outright violent work, 
such as extortion, or intimidation-for-hire.  Of course the line between intimidator 
and debt collector is thin, especially in a country with a very low police-to-
population ratio (see p. 43). He may extort money from local businesses, but he will 
protect his clients from other extortionists.   He will collect outstanding debts for his 
clients. He will take care of problems that the police should, but dont, handle.   
 
A related term is politik premanisme, meaning politics characterized by thuggish, 
rough, violent preman-like behavior.  
 
The preman should be distinguished from the jago.  A jago is a traditional figure in 
Indonesia.  He is a village tough guy.  He could be employed in marginal 
professions such as being a pimp or a professional gambler, like a preman8. He and 
the preman may both have tattoos as example of their toughness (Sullivan 1986: 101; 
Siegel 1998).   However, the jago has special knowledge.  He generally knows 
Indonesian martial arts  pancak silat, or has magic powers  ilmu, or both.  He 
generally has a group of younger male followers, called anak buah.  According to 
Anderson (1972), the jago may be a bit of a wanderer, or he may have a school 
teaching his esoteric practices.   
                                                        
6 The bouncer is the big man that stands at the door of a nightclub, brothel, etc and screens people before 
letting them in, or kicks them out if they fight while inside.   
7 This is being a bookie:  someone who takes bets on anything people wish to bet on:  sports, election 




Now, for groups, the first to know is pemuda.  Pemuda literally means youth, 
collectively.  In political terms, it means youth movements; their members should be 
below about 35.  In modern pemuda groups, most of the members are students or 
former students, that is to say, people with a good bit of formal education (see 
Kristiansen 2003, Boileau 1983: 89).  They are generally local groups, but can 
coordinate on a regional basis also.  Pemuda are characterized by their use of fiery 
rhetoric, their desire for action, their unaccountability, their pemuda consciousness, 
and sometimes their use of low-level violence.  In a way, they are heroes for their 
uncompromising stances, but in another way, they are villains for their 
destructiveness. 
 
Next are the laskyar.  These are also local groups pushing for political change, but 
with an Islamic ideology.  Their ideas run a spectrum from complete Islamization of 
Indonesia, to simply laws based on more Islamic principles.  They may have 
members of all ages, and are usually led by a kyai, a Muslim leader generally in 
charge of a pesantren (Islamic school).  The kyais closest students are also known as 
his followers, his anak buah.  At times, radical laskyar groups may espouse violence 
also.    
The Indonesian Revolution: 1945 - 1949 
 
 
8 For an account of the jagos in one Yogya kampong, see Sullivan (1986: chapter 4). 
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So, to return to the story.  On August 19, 1945, after the declaration of independence, 
the Peta was disbanded by the Japanese at the request of a faction of Indonesian 
nationalist leaders.  These nationalists, such as Suharto and Hatta, believed that the 
use of these Japanese-trained troops by the independent Indonesian state would 
compromise their countrys bargaining position vis a vis the Allies.  Leaders like 
Sukarno and Hatta were insistent that the only way to win independence was through 
negotiation with the Dutch, and they did not want to have any troops that the Dutch 
could criticize as Japanese-influenced.  The dissolution of Peta is important.  These 
demobilized troops were the members of the first militias.  Younger Indonesian 
officers who wanted to fight for independence but lacked an army to join  
 
returned to their home areas and began to recruit local pemuda, 
whether from the Peta or the Heihō or from the Seinendan and other 
paramilitary youth organizations . . . the mass of rural and urban 
pemuda who had been mobilized in . . . Peta, Heihō, and other 
organizations started to flow out over the dykes these structures had 
once formed . . . the decline of military power brought about their 
dispersion into myriads of smaller or greater pools of militarized and 
semi politicized youths (Anderson 1972:  106-108).    
 
Militarized and semi politicized are the key words here.  The pemuda members 
did not generally have a good grasp of political principles, processes or tactics.    
These youths had heard about nationalism through Japanese filters.  They had new 
ideas about political organization.   
 
The Japanese political style, then, presented the youth of Java with a 
new mode of political life and action that by sheer contrast implied a 
radical critique of the values and political ideas that Dutch rule had 




They were also trained in basic guerilla fighting techniques.  And they believed that 
their élan was just as important as their weapons and training.  They had been trained 
with something of the ideas of the kamikaze, and with the lust for merdeka9. 
 
These were the first violent pemuda in the modern sense, and Anderson (1972) argues 
that they indeed steered the Indonesian Revolution at least through 1946 with their 
demands for action and their refusal to negotiate.  It was, in fact, pemuda elements 
from Jakarta that kidnapped a cautious Sukarno and Hatta on August 16, 1945 and 
forced them to declare Indonesias independence.  While the two were never 
threatened with physical violence, they were taken to a village, held incommunicado, 
and made to acquiesce to the will of the pemuda and the people.   
 
So, the independence of the Republic of Indonesia had been declared in 1945  by a 
Sukarno and Hatta literally held hostage by pro-war Republican elements and 
uncompromising pemuda.  These two Indonesian founding fathers had preferred a 
negotiated, peaceful independence from the Netherlands.  Many other Republicans 
wanted to avoid fighting.  But by the end of September, throughout Java, bands of 
Republican radicals began to prepare themselves for armed struggle.  Generally under 
the leadership of jago, former Peta officers, students, or simple gangsters, these bands 
gathered weapons and materiel to fight the return of the Dutch.   Their members were 
the semi politicized and militarized urban and rural proletariat; people hit hard by 
shortages and unemployment.  They also included preman. They were often able to 
                                                        
9 Merdeka means freedom, and was a greeting and rallying cry of Revolutionary Indonesia.   
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get Japanese arms because the Japanese supported them anyway. Most of these 
militias were left-leaning, socialist or Communist.  It seemed to be granted that the 
new Republic would reject western-style capitalism.  They were truly the vanguard of 
the Revolution.  
 
In Jakarta, for example, the Jakarta militias of the independence period were full of 
petty criminal types: jagos and preman, for example.  Their story is fully documented 
in Robert Cribbs classic Gangsters and Revolutionaries (1991).  Cribb explains that 
criminal elements participated in the war for independence around Jakarta. Jakarta 
was allied-held and the site of independence negotiations.  In early 1946, pro-war 
militia and laskyar made a strategic retreat from Jakarta.  Neither Indonesian nor 
Dutch leaders wanted militias in the city, so the militias left, cutting the city off from 
the country.  They held these positions around the city for months.  They wanted to 
protect the countryside from the Dutch, but also wanted to keep an eye on their own 
leaders and be able to attack Jakarta if necessary.  Laskyar and militia leaders took 
over positions of local civic authority in the countryside.  In the struggle, these men 
(and women!) were gaining legitimate prestige as Republicans.  They hoped they 
would retain this prestige after the war.   
 
So far, this is positive, but it is important to know that the militias did not work only 
for freedom.  Profiteering and smuggling were rife; the militias basically controlled 
food supplies into the city and preferred to trade rice for weapons.  Surely most 
legitimately supported the war effort, but they also had plenty of profits in hand, and 
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hoped that their revolutionary services would be recognized and that they would 
have a more respectable place in post-war society.  They hoped to keep the positions 
of authority that had taken over in the ground around Jakarta.  But please note, they 
did not overlook momentary gain for the chance at greater gain after the war.  In 
Cribbs (1991) argument, this desire for respectability and a position in the legal 
world drove most of the preman who chose to join the Revolution.   
 
In Andersons (1972) study concerning pemuda all over Java, he emphasizes the role 
of the young people that joined the Revolution not for any hope of personal gain 
specifically, but because they wanted to fight for merdeka.   Again, the groups he 
surveyed were all of the left or Islamic.  In his Java in a Time of Revolution Anderson 
(1972) studies the role of the pemuda in the struggle from 1944 until 1946 especially 
with respect to government and cabinet crises caused by the revolutionary pemuda.  
Anderson sees this time as a struggle between the older nationalist leaders such as 
Sukarno and Hatta, who favored diplomas versus the pemuda who favored 
perjuangan10.   
 
By 1946, even though negotiations with the Dutch continued, the Indonesian 
government knew well that it needed an army and worked toward organizing one.  
They allowed informal paramilitary units to join the army, often together with and 
under their leader.  So in this way paramilitary leaders could get a position of 




Now that we know the background of youth and paramilitaries in revolutionary 
Indonesia, we must now look at the ways in which they have and have not contributed 
to the organization, actions, and image of satgas parpol today.   
 
First, the idea of a radical vanguard of youth in politics was born, and has been 
idealized and put into the pantheon of Indonesian history.  Anderson notes that  
 
on the Indonesian side, a whole literature of glorification attests to 
an exultant consciousness of the sudden emergence of youth as a 
revolutionary force in those critical times. . . [but] for the Allies as 
well as the Eurasian and Chinese communities, the once innocent 
word pemuda rapidly acquired an aura of remorseless terrorism 
(Anderson 1972: 1).   
 
Yes, pemuda are violent, but they are also admirable as revolutionaries, especially in 
Indonesian eyes.  Incidentally, twenty years later, Suharto would play up the role of 
pemuda in the Revolution, in order to deflect glory from other leaders.  So the idea of 
youth fighting for politics is something generally established and accepted among 
Indonesians.   
 
If youth are fighting, it also happened in the revolutionary times that jago and preman 
joined the struggle, not generally for any ideology beyond freedom  and perhaps 
hatred for the Dutch.  We have seen that in Jakarta, paramilitaries, pemuda, and 
laskyar protected and confined the city for mixed reasons. Coast (1952) also notes, 
 
10 Perjuangan translates as struggle and meant fighting for immediate freedom, ending negotiations, and 
giving no concessions to the Dutch.  
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incidentally, that other, more criminal groups used the name of pemuda, conflating 
the two in the minds of the public.  Just after the end of World War II, before the 
Dutch in Java were released from their internment camps, Couch relates that  
 
some purely criminal gangs using the pemuda name . . . carried 
out a series of horrible and insensate raids on these camps, and 
hundreds of men  and women and children  were butchered and 
tortured.  Hatta and Sjahrir did their best to stop such insanity.  But 
the average Indonesian remained unrepentant, where the Dutch 
were concerned, deeply suspicious and ready to fly into violent 
action on any provocation, imagined or real (Coast 1952: 16)11. 
 
 Some pemuda and preman, paramilitaries and laskyar fought for revenge. The point 
is that youths attacked and massacred Dutch prisoners; these same youths could 
have also been some of the ones that were heroes fighting for the Republic.  In any 
case, while revenge is not a personal good per se, its not an ideology either, and 
this lust for revenge, I believe, helped drive the more bloody actions of the 
paramilitaries.  Normal Indonesians were capable of becoming violent where the 
Dutch were concerned.  This frustration worked itself out in violence in the name of 
merdeka. 
 
This desire for revenge is a sentiment that certain partisans of any revolution will feel 
against the enemy.  Perhaps once one has felt such hate, the idea of righteous hatred 
can be passed down as a legitimate emotion for a few generations and maybe 
transferred to other enemies, political enemies.  This element of remorselessness 
                                                        
11 But take Couchs statement with a little disbelief; he was an Englishman who dedicated himself to 
the Republics cause and became a blockade runner and Foreign Ministry official for the fledgling 
Republic.  He would likely not have believed anything too negative about his favorite cause. 
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characterized more radical pemuda that worked with preman elements.  It was quite 
usual for preman and students to work together in paramilitary bands in any case.  
Each group learned from the other. 
Disparate Paramilitaries 
 
Another characteristic of the paramilitaries that we still see in the satgas of today is 
their uncontrollability.  Paramilitary units were small enough that their leaders were 
agreed upon by the members, and looked at as a father figure rather than a 
commander.  And the members would not listen to anyone but their father; but at the 
same time, their leader held control at the members own pleasure.  Abdul Haris 
Nasution observed that  
 
in such circumstances, the bapak [father] held a power position 
vis-à-vis his superiors.  He could not be transferred.  Nor was he 
willing to carry out orders which he opposed.  Moreover, in the 
long run, many such bapak simply became the executors of their 
subordinates wishes (Nasution 1955: 154-55, quoted in Anderson 
1972: 236).    
 
For example, when the Indonesian government wished to arrest Tan Malakka, a 
popular Communist intellectual, for his opposition to its program in 1946, they had 
no problem doing it.  He did not have guards or personal paramilitaries to protect 
him.  However, Anderson (1972: 328-329) argues that some of Tan Malakkas 
partners were not arrested because they controlled paramilitaries which the 
government dared not antagonize.  So paramilitaries loyalties were on a rather 




John Coast (1952), writing about his experiences in revolutionary Yogyakarta makes 
special note of the pemuda as revolutionary fighters.  Coast notes their stubborn, 
fanatic, seething spirit . . . Made up of patriotism, of nationalist, and anti-foreign 
feeling, of a desire to show the world that they were not inferior beings, their spirit 
had in it something of bravery, but also a considerable amount of viciousness and 
undisciplined nervousness (Coast 1952: 132).  The pemuda are not well-organized, 
and often act without a great amount of forethought, each trying to show his fervor 
for independence.  Admired by his countrymen, but also a bit frighteningly 
unpredictable.  I believe these words could equally be applied to the satgas of 1999.   
Satgas Ideology during the Revolution 
 
In revolutionary Indonesia the forces driving paramilitary fighters would have been 
class conflict, practices and ideas inherited from the Japanese, desire for position or 
glory, and ideology.  Like the satgas of today, the paramilitaries were not governed 
by a patron-client relationship.  Just as today, political violence during the Revolution 
was not due to a patron-client relationship in which the patron funded clients to do 
things for his own glory. The relationship paramilitary fighters of their commanders 
can be characterized as a father-child relationship, or even as a teacher-student 
relationship.  This is not the traditional patron-client relationship in which the 
junior partner provides labor and glory to the senior partner in return for material 
goods or favor.  As noted above, in practice the relationship among paramilitaries was 
more like an ideal Soviet organization; one in which the leader is chosen from and 




For class conflict, an observer contemporary to the Revolution, notes that in Solo, the 
pomp of the rivalry between the royal houses of the Susuhunan and the 
Mangkunegoro became so rich and disgusting that the feeling of respect and 
obedience, of awe and service to the ruler on the throne began to diminish 
(Dwidjosugondo 1954[?] quoted in Anderson 1972: 351).    This is definitely not in 
line with the usual argument that Javanese blindly adore their nobility.  In the 
Residency of Pekalongan in October 1945, pemuda and laskyar briefly overthrew 
local priyayi and bupati12 because these rulers, in the Dutch and Japanese eras were 
the conduits through which the people were oppressed.  In fact, three regencies in 
northern Central Java are famous for having been very rebellious against the upper 
classes in their area.  Lucas (1991) narrates these October 1945 events, the so-called 
Peristiwa Tiga Daerah (The Three Regions Affair).   The people hated their rulers for 
collaboration, and finally ran them out of town.  These rebellions were ended quickly 
once the government stepped in, but they are evidences of class conflict.   
 
But let us inquire more closely about the paramilitaries ideology.  It was actually 
quite superficial.  Sutan Syahrir, a notable Indonesian nationalist and no great friend 
of slow negotiation himself, observed that while the Revolution in its early stages was 
driven purely by the idealism of the youth,  
 
the present psychological of [the] youth is deeply tragic.  In spite 
of their burning enthusiasm, they are full of confusion and 
                                                        
12 Priyayi are the educated upper middle class in Java; Bupati were local leaders with much day-to-day 
power over Javanese peasants, and the heads of the kabupaten (see table 3, p. 175) 
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indecision because they have no understanding of the potentialities 
and perspectives of the struggle they are waging.  Thus their vision 
is necessarily very limited.  Many of them simply cling to the 
slogan Freedom or Death (Sjahrir: 1968, quoted in Anderson: 
1972: 193).   
 
Most of the paramilitaries had rather more limited formal education and did not have 
a program beyond freedom, hatred of the Dutch, and in most cases, love for Sukarno. 
 
As far as the revolutionaries went, while subjectively their intentions might be good, 
objectively their actions were harmful and dangerous (Anderson 1972: 390).  For 
example, all Indonesians wanted to be rid of the Dutch and win physical control of 
their own country as soon as possible, but kidnapping nationalist leaders and 
massacring Dutch prisoners went too far.  In a revolution, it is acceptable to be 
violent, but some actions are so radical they are counterproductive.  Such is generally 
one stage of a revolution.   
 
So far I have highlighted paramilitary action during the revolutionary period as a 
youth phenomenon without precise ideological goals, and not under the control of 
anyone above a local level.  Now I will look at the role of political paramilitaries 
through 1965. 
 
Political Paramilitaries, 1950 - 1965 
 
When Indonesia finally gained its independence from the Dutch, the power of the 
pemuda and laskyar had waned, atrophying from lack of leadership.  Again, these 
69 
 
were still local, rather atomic groups.  The next major period in Indonesian political 
history would be a period of parliamentary democracy lasting from 1950 until 
Suhartos coup of 1965.  During part of this period, Anderson (1972: xiii) lived in 
Indonesia studying the pemuda and gave him the idea that an identifiable pemuda 
consciousness existed.  So let us explore this pemuda existence. 
Party Organization 
 
From 1950, Indonesia had a unicameral parliamentary government.  Its house was the 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (Peoples Representative Assembly [DPR]).  Its members 
were directly elected by the people.   
 
However, many people were dissatisfied with the slow or nonexistent improvements 
in their lives.  Parties proliferated and cabinets rarely lasted a full year.  There were 
four major parties.  First, the NU, based on the Naduhatul Ulama, the largest Muslim 
organization in Indonesia, and oriented toward traditional, locally-influenced Islam.  
The second was the PNI, the Partai Nasional Indonesia.  This was a nationalist, 
secular party which liked to associate itself with Sukarno through the shared ideology 
of nationalism.  The third was the PKI, the Partai Komunis Indonesia, an 
internationally-affiliated Communist party.  The fourth was Masjumi, a modern-





By 1957, the military was becoming fed up with political bickering.  Government 
business was deadlocked by uncooperating parties in the Parliament.  Parliamentary 
democracy was not the dream people had imagined.  Even the parties were fed up.  
The Army13 convinced the parliament to declare martial law in 1957.  The Army took 
martial law seriously and began taking over bureaucrats jobs all over the 
archipelago, and nationalized and took over Dutch-owned businesses.  (This is, 
incidentally, the time from which major armed forces involvement in business dates.) 
They believed that they themselves, the heroes of the Revolution could do a better job 
at governing.   
 
Sukarno himself, also tired of deadlock, was formulating ideas about a new form of 
government that would use the best elements from liberal democracy, Communism, 
and Indonesian practices. Politically, he formed the concept of functional 
groupings.  In Bahasa Indonesia, this is Golongan Karya, and literally means 
functional groupings, ones function being ones job or defining role.  In his 
concept of golkar, functional groups, peoples role in politics would not be 
channeled through a party, but rather through their group.  This is difficult to 
explain, but easy to illustrate.  Sukarno had a list of between 20 and 30 major 
functional groups, such as labor, peasants, businessmen, women, artists, 
religious leaders, armed forces, and youth.  Each citizen would be a member of 
his or her appropriate golkars organizations.  In this scheme, when a citizen wanted 
                                                        
13 In the Indonesian context, interservice rivalry was intense to the point where the services did not work 
toward the same political goals.  In this thesis, when I say the Army I mean strictly the Army.   ABRI  
(Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) means all of the Armed forces.   
71 
 
to involve himself in politics, he would go through his golkars political channels.  
There would be no competing political parties.  The parliament would have a set 
number of seats for each golkar, and each golkar would elect its representatives.  
Under this theory, the golkars would ultimately be united under one large government 
organization, the capital-G Golkar.  In fact, Golkar would be officially founded in 
1964, and really be put to use in 1971.        
 
This theory appealed to the military because they would have guaranteed 
parliamentary representation as an organization.  As an important, primary functional 
group, the Army saw itself leading the nation through its organized, rational control 
of politics.  Three of the four main parties acquiesced to this idea.  Only PKI, the 
most modern, organized, ideology-based party objected to the abrogation of 
competitive politics.  Succinctly, Lev notes that each party was not so much 
defending the political system which sustained it as trying to protect its own position 
in whatever system happened to emerge (Lev 1966: 228).  So, in 1959, during a 
period of martial law, Suharto decreed a return to the strong-presidential system of 
the 1945 Constitution and with a pliant parliament and helpful military started the 
period of Guided Democracy which he hoped would eventually end in a golkar 
system.   
 
The military, while not threatened by the private gangs and militias left over from the 
Revolution, did try to co-opt them as a way to get Army control over social groups.  
The Army thought it should somehow organize other aspects of Indonesian life as 
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they planned to organize and rationalize political life.  At this time, parties already 
had internal functional groups of their own, such as the PKI womens branch, or 
NU youth, for example.  The youth groups of all political parties plus some other 
student organizations were invited by the Indonesian Army to join a front 
organization, the Youth-Military Cooperation Body.  The name sounds strange, but 
this was not a recruitment drive.  Lev points out that the purpose of the cooperation 
body was to loosen the parties grip on these functional groupings and to bring 
them instead under the Armys wing (1966: 65).  This was simply a move on the 
part of the Army to weaken political parties.  This scheme did not succeed; the 
officers running it were supposedly politically incompetent.  By the next year, 
political parties had removed their youth groups from the cooperation body. 
 
By 1958, each political party employed satgas parpol, though that name had probably 
not yet been coined.  Instead the satgas were simply youth organizations.   Each 
party may have employed different satgas in different regions; satgas were not 
nationally organized very well.  But, the most important satgas were the PNIs 
Pemuda Demokrat, Masyumis GPII (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia [Indonesian 
Islamic Youth Movement]), the NU partys Ansor14, and the Communist partys 
Pemuda Rakyat (Peoples Youth).   
 
One can understand the one aspect of the independence of satgas vis a vis the parties 
by looking at their organizational histories  some satgas predate the parties.  The 
                                                        
14 Ansors etymology is unclear; it may be a proper name. 
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satgas tended originally to be youth organizations that attached themselves to parties 
for ideological reasons. Pemuda Ansor was founded in 1934, as the NUs security 
guard, long before NU got into politics (Suryadinata 1998: 62). Golkars satgas in 
West Java, the AMS (Angkatan Muda Siliwangi [The Siliwangi Young Generation]) 
was founded in 1966 by youths influenced by the Armys Siliwangi division (Boileau 
1983: 87).  They attached themselves to Golkar because they agreed with Golkars 
vision of modernization and government without parties.    
 
So, with this background, let us explore the continuities between satgas of this period 
and the militias of the Revolution.   
 
Part of the satgas existence, I will argue, is lack of party discipline.  Or, more 
positively, independent thinking even within a party.  The parties generally could not 
make their satgas follow orders.  This is logical if one of the characteristics of satgas 
is youth.  (In extreme cases that we will see later, satgas will sometimes attack their 
own party facilities.) Lev (1966: 102) hints of the independent thinking of youth in 
late 1957.  The youth wings of parties would question their elders; their acquiescence 
to military leaders, their grasping for office.  They were not answered.  In this period, 
I have not found any examples of youth violence against their own party.  However, 
1950 to the early 1960s was a (physically) calm period of Indonesian politics; not 




There were also apparently independent thugs.  Technocrats opposed to the Armed 
Forces take-over of Dutch businesses found themselves harassed by roaming youth 
groups who regarded themselves as acting for Sukarno (Lev 1966: 35).  These 
particular thugs were not associated with a party.  They had simple loyalty to 
Sukarno.  In 1956-1957, tough and lawless youth groups roamed the cities; in 
Jakarta, some of those who had fought in the Revolution rallied to Sukarno . . . 
devoting themselves to harassing his opposition (Lev 1966: 50).  These more 
independent groups likely had some thug and preman elements.   In the future, youth 
groups would espouse more of these thuggish actions.   
 
However, Lev (1966: 1) notes that Guided Democracy is explicitly authoritarian; 
political suppression. . . [had] accelerated since 1957, with the government attempting 
to maintain a tight rein on an increasing number of activities. Sure enough, the 
parties would atrophy further, but at least for a brief while, their subsidiary 
organizations would not.  The parties, consumed by jockeying for position in Jakarta 
wasted themselves and became more willing to listen to central authoritarian 
command. 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, each political party was surrounded by subsidiary 
organizations that were not suppressed during Guided Democracy.  These subsidiary 
groups under each party would be the same categories as functional groups: labor, 
peasants, women, students, or youth, just to name a few.  Though their political 
parties declined in importance in Jakarta and became mere figures, the organizations 
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remained somewhat vibrant.  In 1967, too soon after Suhartos coup and the PKI 
massacre to know their effects, Lev thought possibly the parties still-strong youth 
groups bent on democratization refusing to let multi-party competitive politics die 
would challenge Suhartos state (Lev 1967).  He believes that during Guided 
Democracy, the youth groups actually were more vibrant and dynamic than the 
parties because of suppression of the parties by the government, and the pliability and 
conservativism of the older generation of leaders.  In the end, of course, the youth did 
not challenge Suharto, but it is interesting to note that at least one well-regarded 
Indonesian observer thought it possible.     
Political Violence for and against the New Order, 1965-1997 
 
Guided Democracy continued for about 8 years, until 1965, when the military took 
over direct rule of the country, transitioning to the sole leadership of General Suharto.  
During this period, the government shrank the number of political parties by coerced 
consolidation or setting high requirements for recognition as a party, for example.  
This was also the golden era for Golkar.  Satgas parpol remained active when 
possible.  However, in addition to being employed by political parties, we will begin 
to see the same kinds of men employed by the government and the army to do those 
groups illegal violence.    
 
From 1965 until mid 1998 is referred to as the New Order (or Orba  ordre baru) in 
Indonesia.  During this time, the country had a thin veil of democracy provided by 
elections.  But the country was actually an authoritarian system run basically by 
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Army-oriented policies, headed up by General Suharto.   One of the important 
ideological features of Orba was dwifungsi (dual function).  Under the idea of 
dwifungsi, as articulated by General Abdul Haris Nasution, the Army had two roles: 
one was physical defense like a normal army.  The second role was that of overseeing 
or seconding civilian government.  The armed forces are a government structure 
parallel and equal to the bureaucracy.  The importance of dwifungsi would be taken 
for granted by the army and imposed upon civilian government.  The legislative 
branch of government also got a change.  In addition to the elected members of the 
DPR, there would be government-appointed functional group representatives.  Taken 
together, the DPR plus the appointed representatives were called the MPR, the 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (The Peoples Consultative Assembly).  This 
system of military-authoritarian rule would solidify in the 1960s and 1970s.  The 
1980s, the years of oil money and economic growth were probably its golden age.  By 
the 1990s, people were getting fed up with this strict rule, and in 1998, it would be 
deposed.   
 
Now, with this short background, let us examine Orba especially with respect to 
political violence.   
PKI Massacre 
 
For 8 years until 1965, the Indonesian parliament continued to languish and Sukarno 
continued to dominate the government.  Sukarnos government was based upon a 
supposed coalition of the three biggest political ideologies represented in parliament:  
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NASionalisme, Agama (religion), and KOMunisme; this cooperation was called 
NASAKOM.  Following NASAKOM was the politically correct thing in its day.  
Sukarno himself preferred a one-party Golkar system.  He was impressed with the 
one party systems of China and the USSR.  He felt that working with the socialists, he 
could achieve a Golkar system blending the best of western and Indonesian traditions.  
This lean toward socialism, however, antagonized more conservative elements in the 
government (Legge 1972: 374-375). 
 
In 1965, the PKI was the most ascendant party in Indonesia.  Many days the guards at 
the US embassy in Jakarta watched Pemuda Rakyat members spray paint anti-
American slogans on their walls and protest outside.  The uneasiness and political 
uncertainty of that year are the subject of C.J. Kochs Year of Living Dangerously.  
On October 1, 1965, Indonesia awoke to the news that seven of its top Generals had 
disappeared, that Sukarno had been removed from his home for his own safety, 
and that the country was under military rule.   
 
The mastermind, or at least the public face, of these events was a Lieutenant General 
Suharto. He let it be thought that the PKI had finally allied with Sukarno to take over 
the country, and that their first step was killing off Army leadership. Suharto painted 
himself and other younger officers as saviors of the nation.  Rumors and circumstance 
and the Army itself blamed the PKI for the Generals disappearances (and subsequent 
murders); however, it is rather more likely that Army officers set up the Communists 
so that they themselves could seem to rescue the country in a time of emergency. The 
78 
 
Pemuda Rakyat (the PKI youth group) were implicated by the Army Commander.  
Army officers felt disgusted at Indonesias political drift and economic stagnation.  
They also worried that the PKI was becoming too strong, too outspoken, and too 
close to Sukarno.  So, the Army clique with Suharto got the other generals murdered 
somehow (theories vary), and saved the country by taking the reins of the government 
and crushing the PKI, the scapegoats.   
 
By 1967, General Suharto was in sole charge of the country, but to consolidate the 
power of the conservative forces, Suharto launched a massive massacre against 
Communists.  Sukarno had been forced to resign, and the Army had annihilated the 
PKI  by causing the deaths of perhaps 1,000,000 people (Cribb, 2001) in the two 
years since 1965.   These people were PKI members, sympathizers, or perhaps just 
thorns in the side of the government.  However, notice I said the Army caused the 
deaths of hundreds of thousands of people.  The army did not personally kill so many 
people.  They were, strangely enough, reluctant to be seen breaking the NASAKOM 
troika.  But they did want to destroy the PKI.  So, the various religious and 
nationalistic groups accordingly, with the tacit approval of the army, launched a 
frontal attack on the party [PKI] (Sloan 1971: 67). So, youth groups and PDI 
members often killed PKI and sympathizers in Central Java, East Java and Bali 
respectively.   
 
First, let us look at Central and East Java.  Youth groups took part in the massacre.  
Ansor, the youth group of Banser, NUs militia, took part in this massacre.  As 
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enemies of so-called atheists, and, incidentally, a party demanding land reform and 
growing at the expense of the NU, this Muslim group, organized in units at pesantren, 
killed PKI, and suspected PKI.  Robert Cribb has collected eyewitness testimonies of, 
for example, an informant hiding in the country who saw Ansor youths decapitating 
PKI under the supervision of Army officers (Cribb, 1995).  Banser and Ansor also 
assisted and guided Army units looking for Communists and their sympathizers 
(Edman, 1987).  Perhaps Banser did this out of nationalism, or fear of atheism or 
communism.  Or, more darkly, perhaps some NU elites felt threatened by the PKIs 
growing influence among the people.  The NU today admits their role in the 1965-66 
massacres (Olliver, 2004); Abduramahan Wahid offered a public apology to the 
victims.  NU has spawned an NGO called Syarikat whose business is to investigate, 
document, and atone for Bansers role in the massacres15.  But Banser was not the 
only group involved in killing.   
 
It is documented in interviews and archives that the CIA supported the PKI massacre, 
and even shared intelligence on PKI members with Suharto.  However, Peter Dale 
Scott expands on the CIAs role: they also supplied training and aid to civic action 
groups  with the right political agendas (Scott, 1985).  The Indonesian Army handed 
weapons to civilians, both in Banser and in US-funded anti-Sukarno, anti-Communist 
action groups.   
 
                                                        
15 For more information on the reconciliation, see http://www.syarikat.org/ 
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An example of an action group would be the Mahasiswa Berjuang (Students 
Struggle) in West Java.  As early as October 5, 1965 they had attacked and burned a 
PKI office in Bandung (Boileau 1983: 87).  Interestingly, it is members of Mahasiswa 
Berjuang who would form a more active youth group, the AMS, who in 1967-68 
would became the satgas for Golkar in West Java as noted above (p. 73).   
 
In Bali, the PNI took part in killing their political rivals.  For this thesis, it is 
interesting that PNI satgas parpol were mentioned in interviews and newspaper 
articles about this time.  Drawing from 1966 articles and interviews he conducted, 
Jeffrey Robinson reports that  
the military encouraged armed anti-PKI vigilante gangs.  The 
most prominent and the most feared were the PNI-backed 
Tameng Marhaenis, bands of 8 or 10 men who roamed about 
dressed in black armed with knives, spears or firearms 
supplied by the military (Robinson, 1995: 300)16.   
 
Here, the military sponsored the violence but declined to do the brutality itself.   
 
The 1965-67 massacres were an example of private muscle in public employ.  This 
PKI massacre took place without evidence or trials17.  Suharto wanted to rid himself 
of a political threat and consolidate his own position.   As a thorough anti- 
Communist, Suharto might have genuinely believed he was doing the right political 
                                                        
16 Some interviewees report also seeing bigger gangs of 10-15 men.  Also, an alternative name of this satgas 
was Tamin Marhaenis.  Robinsons informants and sources differed about the name.   




thing by ridding Indonesia of the PKI.  He encouraged and allowed people to act on 
any prejudices or anger they might have had about Communists.  These untrained 
civilians did act on their own prejudices, fear, and greed.  The point to remember is 
that the state armed untrained civilians to do illegal, extrajudicial work; and also, that 
the violence spun out of Suhartos personal control.  We will see the same trend, in 
mercifully paler shades when we study the political violence of today.   
 
Some Communists that survived this massacre, however, would be out for vengeance.  
In many villages close to razed PKI villages, the inhabitants lived in fear of reprisals 
should all the PKI not have been finished off.  This is yet another step in the cycle of 
violence.    
 
The massacre of the PKI does not fit the general pattern of political violence because 
it was so severe, so murderous.  Yes, the violence was done in many cases by youth 
groups, but this time it was done with a specific, though negative, political program.  
That it spun out of control is obvious to most observers, but to the Army of 1965, the 
massacre may have reached just the proportions it wanted.  Its hard to say then 
whether this violence was out of control of its creators.  This was an extreme case and 
is not electoral violence in any case.  However, it is an important period in satgas and 
political history.   




By 1969, Suharto felt secure enough to schedule an election for 1971 which, in the 
end, would be marked by some incidences of political violence.  The DPR had not 
been changed since the Cooperation Cabinet appointed by Sukarno in 1960.  For 
the 1971 elections, one hundred of the 460 seats in parliament would be appointed by 
the government.  The DPR plus the appointed representatives would make up the 
MPR.  Ten parties contested the elections.  The number of parties had dwindled due 
to atrophy, Sukarnos meddling in parties and engineering their splits and demise, the 
outlawing of Masajumi, a big Muslim party, and of course, the extermination of the 
Communist party.  The most important participating parties were the PNI, NU, the 
Muslimin, and Golkar.  Golkar, being the umbrella for all functional groups, was 
not called a party, but it had all the same characteristics as a party, and for all 
practical purposes was a party, the government party18.     
 
By 1970, Suhartos government had almost finished the preparations that would 
ensure Golkars victory in 1971.  First, the Bapilu (Badan Pengendalian Pemilihan 
Umum [The Body for Managing the General Election]), was stacked with loyal 
cadres.  Pliable leaders headed all of the parties.  Physical force against rival parties 
was specifically outlawed. Civil servants were forbidden from being members of any 
political party, but necessarily were members of Golkar.  The Army and the 
government were in close alliance, and the dwifungsi system was well-entrenched.  
The police force had been subsumed under the Department of Defense.  Golkars and 
the Armys shared vision was that of pembangunan and keamanan  economic 
                                                        
18 For an excellent concise history of the development of Golkar, see Boileau, 1983 
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development and peace.  In their opinion, all dissent and politicking must be 
suppressed, the people must work and keep quiet, to ensure the number one priority 
of economic growth.    They would not allow any real free choice.   They would hold 
an election, but use the above-mentioned methods to ensure Golkar ballots.  The 
appearance of an election was important.   
 
Golkar and the Army needed rural votes, but against these country dwellers, whom 
Golkar considered too stupid to understand political arguments, they sometimes 
used intimidation to ensure votes.  Golkars number one public campaign tactic was 
sending entertainment and pop singers to the villages -- just as political parties still do 
today.  Golkar also promised development to all villages who voted for them.  But 
there was also some violent campaigning.     
 
For example, Golkar used intimidation to make members of other parties join them.  
These are only a few examples of their methods.  Golkar defaced a mosque in East 
Java with anti-NU slogans, for a mild example (Ward 1974: 166).  For an extreme 
example, a new word was coined, diBulelengkan.  It comes from Buleleng, a city in 
Bali, and literally means to be Buleleng-ized, and figuratively means to be forced 
into an organization.  In that city, hundreds of PNI members decided en masse to join 
Golkar; it is said because Golkar released former PKI to wreak revenge on PNI (Ward 
1974: 44).   Ward also documents some intimidation he witnessed in villages in East 
Java (whose names he disguised).  In one village, water was denied to rice farmers 
who declined to join Golkar.  An unrecalcitrant PNI member was arrested on flimsy 
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grounds and paraded around town to intimidate others.  Golkar (as well as NU and 
PNI) employed bromotjorah, bands of gangs and hooligans traditionally based in East 
Java, to intimidate rivals.  This is an interesting example of a completely non-political 
criminal gang being hired for political work -- truly hired muscle, not overzealous 
youth (Ward 1974: 170-171).  This, to me, is a blend of financial and political 
motives coming together in political violence. 
 
Ward also argues that some of Golkars leadership supported violent, illegal tactics.  
Ward cites a Golkar internal document called Memenangkan Pemilu untuk Golkar, 
Winning the Election for Golkar by Sukardjono, the Resident of Madiun.  In 
Wards translation, Sukardjono argues that Golkar is  
 
duty-bound to seek power by winning absolute victory in the 
coming election in order to develop the country. . . we may 
become rather rough; let us be clever but uncivilized; let us put 
pressure on people, frighten people, and behave as if possessed by 
the devil(Sukardjono 1971, quoted in Ward 1974: 73).    
 
However, in the press, as parties still do today, excesses are blamed on excesses 
and overacting on the overzealousness of local cadres, rather than on party policy 
(Ward 1974: 51).  The activities of satgas in 1955 did not have a decisive effect on 
the election, but in 1971, the violent cadres of Golkar played a part in convincing 
voters to vote yellow. 
 
Just because Golkar wanted to use coercive tactics did not mean they always had 
smooth relations with their youth groups.  As noted above, the AMS was a politically-
oriented youth group, formed before Golkar.  In 1966-1968, the AMS leadership 
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warmed to Golkars ideas, and set themselves up as Golkars youth allies in West 
Java.  Boileau (1982: 87 - 93) made a study of AMS and Golkars relationship in 
1977.  AMS had routinely criticized Golkar for materialism, dropping leaders from 
Jakarta rather than choosing local leaders, and not having grass-roots contact with the 
people.  From interviews and witnessing meetings, Boileau concluded that AMS felt 
that Golkar, by 1977, had become too status-quo oriented and were actually 
underutilizing their radical youth allies.  Though up to half of AMS funding came 
from Golkar, they were not silent followers.  This, again, shows the independent 
thinking and unpredictability inherent in youth or satgas groups.   
 
Ansor, the NUs youth group, also likely engaged in violent politicking.  In the tense 
atmosphere, a rumor started that Ansor had planned to kill Golkar supporters and had 
prepared holes for bodies of Golkar activists in Malang (Ward 1974: 107).  Of course 
the NU denied this; the rumor was probably sowed by Golkar.  But nonetheless, given 
Ansors recent record during the 1960s I would have believed Ansor able to massacre 
Golkar cadres if they had wanted to.  Ward alludes to a vague pamphlet printed by 
The Indonesian government listing intimidation, violence, and even murder 
perpetrated by Ansor against Golkar cadres (1974: 108).  Perhaps such a government 
document is not a reliable source, but I believe Ansor to be capable of violence, and 
the report likely contains a kernel of truth.  Besides that, the fear caused by such 
believable rumors is a problem in itself.  Ansor may also have used violence against 
NU defectors to Golkar to extract money (Ward 1974: 110).  Ward said he had 
heard of Ansor extracting money from NU defectors, but unfortunately he gives us 
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no further details or documentation.  However, given the history of Ansor, I find 
these allegations believable. 
 
Though the PNI was at a low ebb, with the death of Sukarno and an internal split 
between right-wing and left-wing members hampered party activities.  In the late 
1960s though, the PKI youth had still been rowdy.  In 1966, PNI youth stormed 
Brawidjaja University, accused the professors of not being loyal enough to the 
Revolution, and of being too rightist.  They also harassed university students that had 
not joined their organization (Ward 1974: 112).  The PNI needed supporters.  
However, I believe that forced conversion is not the way to get dedicated followers.  I 
believe the appearance of solidarity was more important to PNI youth.  Threatening 
someone may get immediate results, but not long term commitment.  But this 
emphasis on the small world of the university does, however, show the youths 
limited agenda and skill.   
 
So we see the role of the militant youth in 1971.  Its involvement was not in the same 
league as youth involvement in 1945.  Indeed, outright violence, as opposed to 
intimidation, was not comparatively widespread.  Using Andersons 1972 analysis of 
1945 (as I have done in this thesis), Ward argues that if the short-lived pemuda 
Revolution epitomized the upsurge of local, spontaneous, and anti-authoritarian 
elements, Golkars triumph was the exact opposite, that of organization, order, 
discipline, and hierarchy (Ward 1974: 180).  Golkars control of government 




 Though intimidation at the kabupaten19 level of government did 
undoubtedly sway scores of unattached or undecided voters to 
come out in support of Golkar. . . coercion or intimidation by itself 
[sic] could not explain the magnitude of Golkars electoral 
success in 1971 (Hering and Wilis 1973: 15).  
 
 The parties, especially Golkar practiced violence and intimidation, but these were not 
the decisive factors in vote-getting.   
 
So 1971 was not characterized by much pemuda action; the New Order was a time for 
the people to keep quiet and let the government do its work.  When PNI youth in 
1972 dared protest a Suharto pet project for a public park representing Indonesia in 
miniature, General Sumitro called the protests encouragements to subversive 
elements! (Ward, 1974: 196).  The New Order had no time for frivolous debate.  
Their idea was that the people had voiced their opinion in 1971, so no more need be 
said; the mandate was in place. 
 
The next time the electorate would make a choice would be 1977; this election is 
most notable for the first appearance of the modern Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, 
(The Development and Unity Party [PPP]).  Until today, they have the reputation of 
being the most unruly, violent party.  Their reputation is violence is worse than that of 
Golkar.  However, I believe this may be because the people expected the worst from 
Golkar anyway, and had hoped for better from opposition parties.   
 
                                                        
19 For a chart of local government hierarchy, see table 3 (p. 175) 
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After the 1971 elections, the government forced what opposition was left into two 
parties.  They were the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (the Indonesian Democratic Party 
[PDI]), based on nationalist and Christian parties and centered on the skeleton of the 
PNI.  The second was the PPP, a Muslim party, whose biggest component was former 
NU party members.  The government pressured party leaders into these alliances by 
arguing that Indonesia needed less political division; that parties must be sacrificed 
for keamanan and pembangunan  peace and development.  By 1972, these unions 
had been achieved.   
 
The union of the Muslim parties had the negative effect of driving radical Muslim 
opposition to the government underground.  Whereas before 1972, there were small 
Islamic parties that supported the peaceful transformation of Indonesia into an Islamic 
state, after 1972, the only Muslim political voice was that of the PPP.  And the PPP, 
as an officially pliant party, had no space for such beliefs.  Thus, anyone that believed 
in radical Islamic politics was left out and went underground.  Some of them, of 
course, became violent radicals, even allying with radical leftists. Utrecht (1980: 20) 
argues that these groups were an important, though sometimes dangerous, voice 
against Suharto.  It is this strange mix of violence and Islam that would characterize 
the PPP of the 1980s.  Maybe these underground groups still had contact with the 
party, at least on a local level.   
 
Golkar reused and intensified the same violent tactics it had employed in 1971.  
Golkar (correctly) felt that their most dangerous competitor would be the PPP.  They 
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knew that its constituent members were better organized than those formed into PDI.  
Throughout Java, but in East Java especially, PPP supporters were harassed and 
attacked by Golkar youth groups, the police, or thugs hired by Golkar.  Utrecht 
(1980: 31-33) lists a few of these violations.  Offices and homes of PPP supporters 
were looted.  A child was taken hostage until his family joined Golkar.  The police 
shot PPP members in different places, and some died.  Thugs beat up people 
attending a PPP meeting.  In Bali, Golkar was especially hard on the PDI, destroying 
houses, and attacking more than 1,000 people, killing some.  I would think that in all 
of Indonesia, this kind of violence among all parties altogether probably counted less 
than 5,000 victims, including property crimes; it was not the most pressing problem 
of the day.  But nonetheless, it is a phenomenon we will continue to see.  And we 
have seen so far that this violence is not always perpetrated by overzealous party 
members, but sometimes simply by hired thugs.   
 
The PPP also was charged with violent campaigning.  Golkar lodged complaints 
about PPP kidnapping its members in West Java.  Golkar is said to have submitted 
four books of PPP violations to the Minister of Internal Affairs. In Yogyakarta, 
youths from the PPP-affiliated IAIN Sunan Kalijaga20   were accused of throwing 
stones at female Golkar members, resulting in a few being hospitalized.  The same 
day in Yogya, April 12, 1977, PPP thugs attacked members of a KORPRI (Korps 
Pegawai Republik Indonesia [Civil Servants Corps of the Republic of Indonesia  an 
organization obligatory for Civil Servants to Join]) unit and injured three (van Dijk 
                                                        
20 An upper-level school 
90 
 
77: 30).  Golkar party documents also report their meetings being interrupted, their 
cadres being attacked, kidnapped, and even a few murders in other parts of Indonesia 
(van Dijk 1977: 31).  Though many of these incidents were simply reported or 
heard of by van Dijk and recorded in his study, the numbers of stories show that 
there was violent campaigning, even if there was another side to every story.  Each 
party claimed self defense or retaliation, and went on with their violence, despite 
pledges and laws against it.   
 
Students tried to block Suhartos reelection as president in 1978 in street parliament 
protests, but failed.  Until 2004, Indonesian presidents were elected indirectly, by the 
MPR members, as in a Parliamentary system.  The presidential election of 1978 
would take place after the MPR was convened in 1977.  Tens of thousands of students 
protested, but to no avail.  Suharto answered with the closure of universities and 
forbidding the press to cover student activities (Utrecht 1980: 44).   Pemuda was 
still active, but they faced an increasingly assertive Suharto. 
 
In 1977 election, violence was not the deciding factor in Golkars victory.  Golkars 
victory  
 
should be explained more in terms of the political structure rather 
than the means employed by some individual leaders.  The fact that 
the government bureaucracy, KORPRI, was part of Golkar and that 
the military also sided with the functional group guaranteed 




Control of media outlets, of the election commission, of campaigning schedules and 
of the police guaranteed Golkars victory.  The violence that occurred was 
unnecessary, and even criticized by some Golkar cadres such as General Widodo 
(Suryadinata 1982: 30).  Older, and hence, probably more conservative thinkers saw 
the futility of violent campaigning, but could not really stop it.     
 
In the mainstream press (JP, 19 May 1999) and in the opinion of some scholars such 
as Nordholt (2002), 1982 was the first election in which satgas in their present part-
criminal, part-political form emerged.  However, my arguments so far show that there 
was satgas activity before that.     
 
Indonesia witnessed electoral violence again in 1982, but this time, there were more 
deaths.  The election was supposed to be peaceful and orderly.  Golkars election 
machine was fine-tuned and Suharto felt in control of his government.  Election laws 
had been revised to shorten the campaigning period and give local authorities more 
power to prohibit mass campaigning. Also, Suharto had delivered some concrete 
economic growth via oil money. At the time, Suharto was not portrayed as he would 
be 15 years later as a thief and cheat.  Indonesian citizens were not thought to be very 
dissatisfied.  However, the violence released in the 1982 campaign season would 




Continuing its decade-long decline, the nationalists, PDI, was not very vocal or 
assertive during the 1982 campaign.  The party was weakened by internal splits; the 
marriage of unlike parties was not a smooth one.   
 
In the months before the May election, tensions between Golkar and PPP grew and 
erupted. Awanohara reports that before the campaign period, the parties and the Army 
had decided that election contestants should play a greater role in policing rallies and 
that [government] security forces would maintain a low profile (Awanohara 1982).  
Not only does this acknowledge the fact that political parties already had security 
teams of their own, but also that the police and army were unpopular with the people.  
It is no coincidence that the same article reports that Indonesias Defense and 
Security Minister at the time, Mohammad Jusuf, was a proponent of a more 
professional and politically neutral Abri.  In 1982, there was something of a rift 
between Abri and Suharto; hence, I believe, with their ununited front, potential for 
political violence.   
 
The worst incidents in the 1982 election were riots at two massive Golkar rallies in 
Jakarta in March and April. At both events, it seems that PPP members attacked 
Golkar meetings.  (Though Nordholt [2002: 55] says that many people he spoke to 
also thought this disturbance could have been a Golkar internal wrangle using Golkar 
cadres dressed as PPP supporters.)  Frustrated with this chaos, the government issued 
orders that rioters should be shot on sight.  Altogether fifteen people lost their lives 
and around 150 people were injured just at these two rallies.  In contrast, a 1,000,000 
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 participant PPP rally in Jakarta ended peacefully (FEER, Apr 30 1982).  Smaller 
incidents in other cities including Yogyakarta were reported. In fact, the election 
security chief, Admiral Sudomo, admitted that at least eight of the campaign deaths 
were caused by warning shots fired by the Army (Suryadinata 1982: 52).   About 
sixty people were thought to have died during and due to the 1982 election (FEER, 
April 2, 1997). Though the Army seems to have been the biggest perpetrator of 
electoral violence, examples like this explain why PPP satgas have such a bad 
reputation; their own rallies went well probably because of protection, but they 
attacked Golkars rallies.  That being said, attacking Golkar per se did not decrease 
the PPPs popularity in Jakarta (where they were strongest); rather, it was the PPPs 
wildness which intimidated many people.    
 
Golkar used PPPs wildness against it in campaigning.  Golkar realized that urban 
voters, at least, were disgusted with electoral violence.  So Golkar began to campaign 
in Jakarta on a national unity platform.  the Golkar government capitalized on the 
affairs [of March and April 1982] to condemn violence and national disunity . . . 
while implicitly blaming the PPP for the riots (Suryadinata 1982: 60).  This 
campaign worked in Jakarta, at least, where in 1982 Golkar would beat the PPP at the 
polls.  Overall, however, it does seem that some parts of Golkar tried to leave behind 







In 1983, though predictions of Suhartos eminent retirement came more frequently 
Suharto again was comfortably re-acclaimed president.  And he decided to attack the 
problem of petty crime.  However, he used methods that remind me of the 1965 PKI 
massacre.  Keep in mind that Suharto let private persons actually massacre PKI 
members during the 1960s.  Presumably, Suharto thought the method worked well.   
So he used private muscle again in 1983 to 1985, to end this problem with petty 
crime. Suharto began to persecute and kill ex-convicts.  Perhaps he thought this 
would be an appropriate solution to petty crime.  Siegel points out that Suharto may 
have felt he could acquire a folk reputation for some sort of awesome power by 
killing so many people (Siegel 1998).  In any case, Suhartos actions in the early 
1980s would have an impact on todays satgas.    
 
Barker (2001) argues the connection between the 1983-1985 massacre and the satgas 
of today by the mechanics of Suhartos purge.  First, Suhartos security forces drew 
up secret lists of ex-convicts and suspicious characters in 1983 and 1984.   The 
existence of the list, though not the names on it, were publicized.  If one had ever had 
a minor brush with the law and worried that their name was on this list, they had to 
report for surveillance  and were often put to work killing the criminals that declined 
to report.  The state handled its petty crime problem, but the petty criminals left 
living obviously had very few employment options.  They were unable to return to 
crime, and often employers declined to hire ex-convicts.  A lot of these men fell into 
                                                        
21 PEmbunuh misTeRiUS (Mysterious killings)  
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semi-legal security work, as preman.  Ryter (1998) agrees that indeed, the Petrus 
killings changed underworld organization in Indonesia.  She classifies the criminals 
that got killed as gali-gali.  She argues that these gangs of wild kids were broken 
up, many of their members killed, and the criminals that had turned to work for the 
state she classifies as preman.  These preman often went to work in security services 
loosely affiliated with the police.   Outright crime became a difficult and dangerous 
way of life; people in this marginal line of work were better off moving a more gray 
area of work; preman-ism.  However, instead of exposure to police reforming the 
preman, it often lured the police toward the freer and easier methods of the preman. 
 
The army began the Petrus killings, the massacre of criminals by the army or the 
armys agents in Yogyakarta in early March 1983.   
 
This area was and is not any the more crime ridden than other 
areas in Java (and certainly not as heavily urbanized), and so the 
reason for its becoming the testing ground of the first Petrus 
campaign remains unclear (van der Kroef 1985: 748).   
 
We still are not sure of the reason why Petrus was first started in Yogyakarta. 
 
These preman gangs have grown and today most of the members have never been in 
jail; nor are they dedicated criminals, according to Kristiansen (2003).   Instead, they 
are unemployed youth with no other job prospects  so they join gangs.  However, 
Beazley notes that street boys and young men in particular, are  
 
presented by the state and the media as a defilement of public 
space, an underclass which needs to be eradicated, and as 
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'criminal.  The construction of this criminal image is exemplified 
by the use of labels in the press such as preman and gali-gali 
(Beazley 200: 476).   
 
These young men, surviving on the edge of society, sometimes turn to crime from 
lack of other options, but to classify the bulk of them as some kind of hardened 
criminals or mafia is an error.   
Late New Order Elections 
 
For the 1987 election, the Indonesian government again tightened campaigning 
restrictions, ostensibly to prevent violence.  Only eight outdoor rallies would take 
place in Jakarta; each would be limited to 50,000 participants.  Just two weeks into 
the campaigning, a clash between PPP and Golkar sent eight people to the hospital in 
Yogyakarta (The Sydney Morning Herald April 8, 1997).  However, the election was 
marked by far less violence than the 1982 election.  This may be because PPP was 
suffering from internal fissures (FEER April 23, 1987), and the PDI was too feeble.    
Perhaps opposition satgas, suffering from the parties disorder also lost focus (and 
funding).     
 
Another possible contribution to the calmness of the 1987 elections was the 1983 
death of Ali Murtropo, Suhartos top political fixer.  It is speculated that Ali Murtropo 
wanted to take charge of Golkar and succeed Suharto as president.  Thus, he was 
suspected of trying to split up Golkar from within and generally usurp things under 
Suharto.   He perhaps engineered the 1982 violence and the Golkar rallies. When 
Murtropo died in 1983, Abdurrahman Wahid, an NU leader and future Reformasi-era 
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president of Indonesia, hoped that with Murtropo would die a psychology of fear 
under which Indonesians had lived.  (Wahid in Kompas June 6, 1983, quoted in 
Nordholt 2002: 52).   
 
The 1992 election was yet even calmer than the previous one.  The campaign period 
was only 25 days long, and while lively, even entertaining, there were no obvious 
signs of acrimony between the contending groups (FEER June 25, 1992).  The rifts 
within PPP blunted its claims as an opposition party; before the elections, they 
endorsed Suharto for yet another presidential term.  Only a few cases of political 
violence were reported by the BPHPR22. In June 1992, PDI supporters besieged the 
Military Police headquarters in Bogor demanding release of three of their comrades.  
Scuffles broke out between the Police with Golkar against the PDI.  A few injuries 
were reported (BPHPR 1992: 19).  In Tangerang, West Java on the same day, PDI 
youths were attacked with knives and machetes by youth of unknown identity while 
idling after a PDI rally (BPHPR 1992: 15).  The BPHPR report cites other incidents, 
but all on the outer islands. To me, this shows that Golkar was continuing its strategy 
of less use of violence, especially in Java where communications are better and 
people are more knowledgeable about their rights in general.     
 
I would explain the quietness of the 1987 and 1992 elections in two ways:  economic 
prosperity and the effect of Petrus.  In these years, the country was relatively well-off.  
                                                        
22 BPHPR is the Body for the Protection of the Peoples Political Rights Facing the 1992 General Election 
[Badan Perlindungan Hak-Hak Politik Rakyat dalam Menghadapi Pemilihan Umum 1992].  It was an 




By 1987, the country was self-sufficient in rice, for example; and though there was 
still a large poor class, abject poverty  starvation  had been eliminated (FEER 
April 23, 1987).  In 1992, Michael Vatikoits reported a few vignettes from 
Yogyakarta:  a pedicab driver who did not know anybody who owns less than three 
shirts, and a woman who was glad to finally have a municipal water tap in her 
neighborhood (FEER, June 25, 1992).  This was a relatively prosperous time in Java; 
there was no question that Golkar would win the election; hence, it was quiet.  
Another contributing factor may have been the Petrus killings.  As grim as the ideas 
is, that massacre wiped out thousands of people living on the margins of society; the 
kinds of people that may have joined satgas for some sort of security.  This would be 
a good topic for further study.   
 
Before the next election in 1997, the Golkar would misstep in its handling of an 
incident with PDI.   
 
In 1996, the Suharto government would be challenged by the PDI and majorly lose 
face in its response.  One of Golkars tactics to divide its opposition was to take sides 
in PDI and PPP internal party rifts.  The government would only recognize the 
candidate of its choice, the more pliable one.  In 1996, Golkar tried this trick again.  
In 1996, the PDI chose as its chairwoman Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of 
Sukarno.  Her rival, Suryadi, objected to losing the chairmanship.  He and his 
supporters secretly appealed to the government for redress.  Suryadi and his 
 




supporters held a controversial party congress in Medan where he himself was elected 
chairman.  Megawati and her supporters refused to vacate PDI party headquarters in 
Jakarta, and the government stepped in to forcefully remove her23.   
 
The government used preman gangs and military dressed in civilian clothes to oust 
Megawati from her building.  PDIs own satgas and youths defended the office.  
Reportedly, Megawati sympathizers from all over Jakarta came to witness the melee, 
which grew into rioting against government buildings.  On both sides there were 
victims of beatings, and at least three deaths (AWSJ, August 1, 1996).  This event 
would be the first major crack in Golkars fortress.  From 1996 until after the 1999 
elections, political tempers became hot, and violence was a part of the struggle for 
and against Golkar.   
 
Clashes between Golkar and PPP youths filled the newspapers during the 1997 
campaigning period.  Again, satgas interrupted each others rallies, defaced property, 
and got into brawls.  Political scientists described it as the most violent New Order 
election for several reasons.  Cornelis Lay of Gadjah Mada University said in an 
interview with the Jakarta Post on March 15, 1997(b) that elections are supposed to 
be  
 
a peaceful alternative to violent coups detat, or revolutions, when 
people no longer trust their government. . . however, it [peaceful 
change] can hardly be achieved in Indonesia because its political laws 
do not allow it to happen.   
 
the MPR, but the MPR never acted upon it (BPHPR 1992: 1).  It was translated at Cornell in 1994.   




Lay refers of course to the fact that New Order elections were no real competition, 
just an exercise in reelecting Golkar.  He sees election violence as a symptom of the 
repression of debate.  Riswandha Imawan, a political scientist also of Gadjah Mada 
University emphasizes the social causes of violence in another interview with the 
Jakarta Post (May 15, 199b).  Imawan points out that the same youths often join 
different rallies, and that the motorcades are not part of the campaign but nothing 
more than an excuse for revelry.  He argues that the campaigners become violent 
because they are ultimately frustrated by limited access to education, negative 
experiences with rigid bureaucracy and unemployment.  Once in five years, the 
youths are allowed to vent their frustration through destruction with little chance of 
serious punishment.     In the same article, Darmanto Jatman of Diponegoro 
University adds a third point to the discussion.  He believes that for the youths, 
speeding on motorbikes or clinging atop the roofs of trucks and busses in a devil-
may-care manner gain peer approval.  They feel like theyre some kind of heroes.  
They are helping something, someone.  Certainly among young people, physical 
bravado is a good way to win peer approval and have fun.  It is part of the pesta 
demokrasi aspect of Indonesian elections.  And attacking the hated regime would 
also win accolades.  Jatman emphasizes that the desire to help the underdog is why 
PDI and PPP had so many active cadres.  However, unfortunately, it does not explain 




I argue that all three of these observers make valid points, but I think the biggest 
causes are those listed by Imawan: that disenfranchised youths used the libertine time 
of the campaign to let loose their frustrations.  In my opinion, political problems and 
economic problems must be present for campaign violence. If a person already has 
enough money, he is less likely to become a thug.  There must be economic problems 
so that there will be a class of actors with nothing to lose in a violent regime change.  
In fact, these disenfranchised people may hope to benefit from the change and get a 
better position in life, as the leaders of Jakartas Revolutionary militias.   If, however, 
most of the people are employed and part of the status quo, they will not take to the 
streets to change life.  It is the young and the unenfranchised who have nothing to 
lose.  At this time, there were too many unenfranchised people in Java.   
 
An interesting case in Yogyakarta will illustrate the grey area between illegal and 
legal work in security.  On May 5, 1997 a man living in Sleman, named Sudihardjo 
was killed.  The Jakarta Post (May 14, 1997) reports that he was a Golkar guard and 
had been implicated in an attack on a local PPP office.  The article quotes his son as 
admitting that his father was a bit of a thug.  According to the police in this article, 
Sudihardjo was a criminal killed in a gang conflict over a protection racket at a bus 
terminal.  The police said that no PPP supporters were under suspicion, though the 
article claims there was wide speculation that the PPP was behind the murder.  The 
PPP of course, denied involvement, saying that violence is unislamic and that they 
never get involved in violence.  However, an article in the South China Morning Post 
(May 11, 1997) about the same incident also states that the PPP was widely suspected 
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of a role in the murder.  This article calls Sudihardjo a gangster outright.  It quotes 
one of his neighbors saying that Sudihardjo was Golkars biggest thug on the south 
side of Yogyakarta, and that he worked for the PDI before that.   
 
Though the reports emphasize different aspects of the story, it is important to note 
this example of the intersection of the criminal and the satgas worlds.  Sudihardjo was 
not ideologically motivated; he moved between parties.  It was most likely, in my 
opinion, that he was simply a professional enforcer, and one or another aspect of his 
work made him a powerful enemy.   
 
A Short Case Study: Pemuda Pancasila 
 
The first satgas parpol, I argue, was Pemuda Pancasila (PP).  Pemuda 
Pancasila is almost as old as RI itself, and it has always had a satgas/preman element, 
but PP began doing political work before there were even competitive elections.  
Pemuda Pancasila was originally the youth wing of IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung 
Kemerdekaan Indonesia, or League of the Supporters of Indonesian Independence) in 
1961 (Ryter 1998: 140). This groups members were usually preman-types, and by 
definition, young.  Like the militia members during the war, many of these men were 
very poor, disenfranchised and had trouble finding honest employment.   Though 
being a member of PP was not full-time regular work, it was something patriotic and 
useful to do. Their goal was to promote Pancasila through work and efforts, and in 
return, get some economic or political protection.  One of PPs efforts was killing 
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communists for Suharto in Medan and Aceh in 1965.  Again, the government used 
private means to do illegal public work. 
 
Throughout the 1970s, they lay somewhat dormant. However, in about 1980, 
under the new leadership of Yapto Soerjosoemarno, the PP woke up.  Under their 
new leader, this organization of youth (read: disenfranchised youth), started to 
expand their work in the informal and semi-formal economy.   They did the work of 
well-organized preman.  In the 1980s, the members relied on the organization for 
entry into the formal labor market and access to the local administration (Ryter 
1988: 142).  That is to say, these preman had some little clout as members of an 
organization, and a chance at moving into formal, legitimate work.  For Ryter, the 
genius of the 1980s PP and its leader was the expansion of this somewhat apolitical 
organization into a personal tool for Suharto.  In effect, PP became a satgas parpol, 
for Suharto personally.  However, PP never had official ties to Golkar.  It would be 
unseemly for an organization of gangsters, thugs, debt-collectors, extortionists and 
bookies to be officially allied to Golkar.  It was a militant youth organization doing 
concrete work to defend and promote Pancasila.  But, during the New Order, their 
clients were always the Army, Golkar, or the Suhartos.   The PP worked as security 
agents to break up protests, to intimidate other political parties, and to intimidate 
voters. They have been found to provoke unrest so that they can quell it and be heroes 
(Ryter 1988: 147).    These private individuals were used to do illegal jobs for the 
government.  So, the state disliked them (as criminals), but found them necessary (as 
hitmen).  Among the people, no one liked satgas (as petty criminals), but sometimes 
found them necessary (as protection).  In return for their work, PP expected certain 
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concessions from the government, mainly, that their place in the informal or illegal 
economy remain undisturbed. 
 
In the last 18 years of the New Order, the PP was basically a satgas for hire to the 
regime.  In fact, PP became so entwined with Suharto that in May 1998, they were 
still supporting him.  They thought May 1998 would just be another small incident for 
Suharto.  Thus, when they were shown to be anti-Reformasi, they became 
unemployable.  Suharto was gone, and no new political party wanted to hire the PP as 
such.  Thus PP has gone back to its private organized crime and no longer works 
much in the public sphere.  However, many of its members have joined the satgas of 
other political parties, per Ryter.  Its not about political beliefs, its about a job.   
 
May 1998, the End of Suharto 
 
In the 1997 parliamentary elections, Golkar again won a majority, but as MPR 
prepared to sit, Indonesians were becoming more violent in demanding change.  The 
Asian currency crisis had hit Southeast Asia in July 1997.  Prices for necessities rose 
by 50 to 100 percent by March 1998, on the eve of Suhartos reelection.  While the 
people faced a drastic fall in their standard of living, Suharto and his family and 
cronies continued demanding partnerships in any profitable business, and winning 
government contracts.  This time the people would take no more of Suharto, and 
masses of protesting students took up posts outside of the MPR building in Jakarta.  




The students were the public face and the public heroes of 1998, but it was larger 
social, political, and economic problems that caused Suhartos downfall.  From the 
beginning of 1998, growing groups of students protested against Suhartos 
presidency.  From tens to hundreds to thousands of students protested, especially after 
Suhartos reelection by MPR acclimation in March.  Students were assassinated by 
the Army at Triatski University and in other protests.  Riots began against Suharto-
owned businesses. These riots also escalated into the notorious anti-Chinese riots, 
which may have been allowed by reactionary elements of the military. It is unlikely 
that middle-class students perpetuated this ethnic violence; it is rather more likely that 
the atmosphere of unrest was taken advantage of by people with anti-Chinese 
feelings.  But the chaos was the ultimate result of economic problems.  Undergoing 
hyperinflation and witnessing the KKN (corruption, kollusi dan nepotisme) of 
Suharto and his family, Indonesians could no longer take the abuse.  It is the students 
bravery that finally brought other dissidents into the open.  The students were joined 




In this chapter we have briefly looked at the role of violent political youth groups 
during the history of the Republic of Indonesia.  The violence is mostly perpetrated 
by the young for several reasons.  First, they generally have some education and thus, 
higher expectations.  However, in periods of slow economic growth, they may see 
few opportunities to join the working world and so vent their frustrations through 
political violence.  Another characteristic of the youth groups discussed here is that 
they are more impetuous and more interested in immediate change than their older, 
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more conservative allies.  This difference in approach also can lead to schism within a 
political group between the younger and older factions.  The older leaders sometimes 
have trouble trying to control their partners.  Furthermore, the violent youth groups 
rarely have a very precise political program.  They may be for functional group 
politics or against Communism, but they do not propose concrete policies. They 
rather act out during elections because it is a time when they can, when there is space 
for it.  Its not necessarily the politics that makes the youths fill the streets, but 
perhaps, rather, just an opportunity to go in the street and vent ones frustrations.   
 
In 1998 Yogyakarta, violence happened on a lesser scale, and one man lost his life.  I 
will discuss the period of Reformasi in the next chapter.  I will focus on satgas role 
and perceptions of themselves.  The opposition satgas saw themselves as 
revolutionaries and guardians of peace in Yogyakarta.  The Reformasi period is the 
focus of my field work and will be discussed in the next chapter.  The next chapter 








In the previous chapter, I traced the history of satgas in Indonesia from 1945 until 
1998 and discussed their characteristics.  Here, I will briefly outline the major 
political events in Indonesia after Orba.  Then, I will introduce the city of Yogyakarta 
and explain the importance of its history and institutions to political life in the city 
today.  After that, I will give a synopsis of the major political parties and explain 
which are most popular in Yogyakarta and why.   
Overview of National Politics  
 
Suharto stepped down from the office of the President of Indonesia in May 1998; as 
designed in the Constitution, the vice-president took over the office.  Suhartos last 
vice president was a technocrat named B.J. Habibie.   
 
During Habibies tenure in office, devolution regulations began to take effect in 
Indonesia.  Under Suharto each of the 33 Indonesian provinces had little local 
decision-making power.  Government was almost completely centralized in Jakarta.  
Provincial citizens, especially those from resource-rich areas, felt cheated out of 
revenue, and many citizens from all regions wanted more control over their local 
government.  Suharto, toward the end of his reign began to experiment with giving 
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budgetary autonomy to certain districts.  However, under Habibie, concrete 
regulations were made for devolution.   
 
Parliament passed devolution legislation, granting regulation-making powers to 
district and province levels.  These Parliaments are called respectively DPD-Is and 
DPD-IIs (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah [Regional Parliaments]).  Under this new power 
sharing, the local parliaments can pass regulations, with two important checks.  
First, the national government still takes care of foreign affairs and monetary policy.  
It also receives 40% of provincial tax revenues.  Second, regional regulations are 
less powerful than national law.  If the two come into conflict, national law always 
wins.    Devolution has changed the importance of local elections and perhaps the role 
of satgas.  As the place of power shifts from Jakarta to the provinces, provincial 
elections may be more contentious and characterized by violence, unlike during Orba.    
 
Despite some reforms made under Habibies watch, this man was very closely linked 
to Suharto and the government.  Though the people had gotten rid of Suharto, many 
were no happier with his lackey, Habibie.  Students and civil society protested for 
immediate elections instead of waiting until the next planned election.  Habibie 
finally gave into public pressure and called elections for 1999.   
 
The 1999 elections were quite open; the people had a chance to discuss issues, 
criticize ideas, or just vote for the candidate that had the most entertaining rally.  
Furthermore, the elections were marred by much less violence than the political 
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transition of the year before and by less violence than some Orba elections.  Budiman 
participated in election rallies in Jakarta just before the polling.  He was amazed at the 
protestors not vandalizing buildings or stealing snacks.  He noted party members 
giving each other rides and food  except Golkar.  Golkar cadres were not welcome in 
the public circle in front of the Hotel Indonesia.  Overall, Budiman said that he was 
 
very impressed with the sense of responsibility of the people 
during the campaign.  They demonstrated that when they were 
given freedom, they would take it seriously with a great sense of 
responsibility.  They were also very tolerant with their political 
competition except for Golkar. (Budiman 1999: 12) 
 
The 1999 election was still a parliamentary election; the president would be elected 
by a new parliament.  In those elections, the PDI-P got the largest number of popular 
votes and seats in parliament, with Golkar second, and three Muslim oriented parties 
next, and a host of smaller parties behind them (see table 2 p. 127).  However, once 
parliament sat, Muslim-oriented parties, in a grouping called the central axis allied 
to elect Abdurrahman Wahid, a cleric from the third-ranked party, as president on 
October 20, 199924.   
 
As might be expected, popular outrage exploded at this miscarriage of the popular 
vote.  Though the MPR was free to lawfully elect who they wished, people did not 
expect them to go against the popular vote (Prijosusilo 1999).  On the night of 
October 20, some Megawati supporters ran riot in Jakarta, torching the convention 
center and throwing Molotov cocktails (Richburg, 1999). The mob partially blamed 
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Amien Rais, the speaker of the MPR, for coordinating the axis that elected Wahid 
president (JP October 21, 1999).  In Surakarta (Solo), a mob attacked and looted the 
house of Amien Rais mother. To avoid trouble at Rais own house in Yogyakarta, 
around 70 members of satgas PPP and PAN guarded the house (Ibid.).  The satgas 
PPP members I interviewed in Yogyakarta about this incident said that they helped 
guard Rais house because they must overlook politics and do what they can to make 
the city peaceful.  The next day, Megawati was elected vice-president by the MPR; 
this, along with Megawatis calls for peace eventually calmed the mobs.  However, 
Wahids presidency would always be dogged by criticism.   
 
For almost the next two years, Wahid was Indonesias president.  However, his 
opponents criticized him for possible involvement in accepting illegal donations25, 
and for being somewhat erratic and a believer in mysticism.  Calls for his 
impeachment began as early as 2000, and by July 2001, two particular scandals, 
Buloggate and Bruneigate, pushed the MPR toward impeachment.  Though some of 
Wahids supporters made trouble, the violence in the street was nothing like that 
which accompanied his election in 1999 (JP April 28, 2001; ibid, May 31, 2001).  On 
July 23, 2001, Wahid was removed from the presidency and according to the 
succession rules in the Constitution, Megawati took over.  Megawati would be the 
Indonesian president for two and a half years.   
 
 
24 There are many books about these maneuverings  see ORourkes Reformasi, for example. 
25 For details of the most serious scandals, Buloggate and Bruneigate, see ORourke (2002: 388-391). 
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During her time in office, Megawati signed one piece of legislation important to this 
story:  electoral reform.  Until the 2004 election, on the national level, previously 
elections had been something like a proportional parliamentary system.  Each 
electoral district had a certain number of seats in national Parliament based on its 
population.  After one round of voting, the seats were divided among the parties 
based on the percentage of the vote they had received.  When parliament sat, it then 
elected a president.  However, under new regulations, the national elections take at 
least two rounds.  The first is a parliamentary election, again a party-list PR system.  
Based on the results of that election, each party that wins more than 5% of the 
national tally or at least 3 seats in the DPR is allowed to field a presidential candidate.  
After that, the party and the candidate select their own vice-presidential candidate.  In 
a second round of voting three months later, voters pick among the presidential 
tickets.  If no team wins more than 50% of that vote, the two top-scoring teams 
progress to a third and final round of voting26.    As during Orba, Indonesians hold 
their national elections regularly every five years.  
 
The time for the next national elections was 2004, and the parliamentary elections 
took place on April 5 with the results shown in Figure 1 (page 127).  Only five parties 
chose to field presidential tickets.   
 
                                                        
26 Indonesians consider their 3-round election the worlds biggest democratic exercise  much bigger than 
Indias, because Indians only go to the polls once for each election.   
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The 1999 and 2004 Elections in Yogyakarta 
Background: The City of Yogyakarta 
 
This study takes place in Yogyakarta on the South Central coast of Java.  It is situated 
at the foot of an active volcano.   The 800-year old Buddhist site of Borobudur and 
Hindu site of Prambanan are within an easy taxi ride of the city.  Yogyakarta, often 
called Yogya, was a site of the pre-Islamic Mataram Empire until the empires 
decline in the late 15th century.  The citys eminence waned until 1755 when a prince 
who split from the Sukakarta sultans decided to settle in the city and build his 
kraton27 there.  The city still has a Sultan and the 18th century palace where he lives.  
But the city has more than just geological interest and palace culture.  The citys 
political life is unique in Indonesia due to three factors:  the citys active Sultanate, its 
Revolutionary history, and the universities and huge number of students that make 
their homes there.   
 
Yogya and its environs are a special administrative district.  Since the Revolution, 
Yogya government has reported directly to Jakarta, rather than having to be part of a 
larger province.  This is seen as a rather special dispensation.  The only other special 
administrative district in Indonesia is Jakarta.  As shown on map three (p. 1) the 
actual city of Yogya is a small area in the Daerah Istemewa Yogyakarta (the 





In Yogyakarta, , the Sultanate is important because of the respect the Sultan and his 
office command.  In pre-Republican Indonesia, many chief cities had sultans.  
However, under the republic, most sultans became private citizens and even their 
informal power dwindled.  However, in Yogya from the time of the Revolution, the 
sultans have involved themselves in politics as private people, and have worked to 
maintain their personal fortunes and renown.   Thus, Yogyakarta is one of the few 
Indonesian cities that has a very vibrant, visible Sultanate.  Furthermore, due to a 
dispensation granted during the Revolution, the Yogya sultans are also hereditary 
governors of the DIY.  So aside from their power as district governors, the Sultans of 
Yogyakarta have worked to make themselves popular public figures.  
Hamengkubuwono IX was Sultan from 1940 until he passed away in 1988; his throne 
passed to his son, Hamengkubuwono X.    
 
The Sultans generally enjoy the respect of the people of Yogya; they are proud of the 
cultural traditions preserved around the Sultan.  He is a sort of local hero.  However, 
the Sultan is not above criticism; the people of an urban kampong studied by 
Guinness were dismayed in 1977 with the Sultans public support for the election 
campaign of . . . Golkar (1986: 34).  Guinness notes, furthermore, that immigrants 
from outside of the Yogya cultural orbit correspondingly have less interest in kraton28 
opinion (1986: 36).  These people from other regions29 tended to think that court-
inspired rituals and manners are too specialized and arcane.   However, it is safe to 
 
27 Kraton means palace, and was a Sultans home and center of government. 
28 Kraton is the generic word for palace 
29 Sullivan mentions Madurese and Sundanese especially 
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say that overall, the Sultan is a well-regarded public figure by Yogyanese.  The 
current Sultan, Hamengkubuwono X, especially, has earned his peoples regard.  
 
Yogyakarta also has a legacy as a patriotic town dating from the Revolution.  In 1945, 
when the Allies reoccupied Indonesia, their headquarters were in Jakarta, and 
independence negotiations took place there.  Republican troops held much of the rest 
of Java.  However, in January 1946, because of the need for a different geographical 
power base, the Republican government moved its capital to Yogyakarta.  In 
Yogyakarta, the members of government reconnected with the people carrying on the 
struggle.   As Anderson (1972: 301) observed: 
 
In a larger perspective Jakarta and Yogyakarta came to symbolize the 
opposition between diplomasi and perjuangan. . . If one lived in 
occupied, cosmopolitan Jakarta, it was hard not to become convinced 
of the imperative need for diplomacy.  But if one lived in unoccupied, 
traditional Yogyakarta, where scarcely a white face was to be seen, 
how could one not believe, watching and experiencing the citys 
turbulent vitality, that resistance was possible and necessary.  
 
The government moved to the city at the Sultan Hamengkubuwono IXs invitation.  
This won for the Sultanate a reputation for patriotism and republican values.  The 
powers in Yogya were allied to central republican powers.  This is also why 
Yogyakarta was able to get special administrative district status from the central 
government.   
 
Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX entered republican government as the countrys first 
Minister of War and Internal Security.  He was also vice-president under Suharto 
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from 1973 to 1978.  His son, Hamengkubuwono X was a lawyer and a local leader of 
Golkar from the 1980s.  Though he was a Golkar member and many Yogyanese were 
unhappy about it, his personal prestige has overcome his past association with the 
party.  Hamengkubuwono X gave up his Golkar party functions in the 1990s.   
 
The other important institutions in Yogyakarta are the universities.  Yogya has over 
40 universities, the most famous being Gadjah Mada University.  It is a student town.  
Because the university students come from all over Indonesia, Yogyakarta also has a 
quite diverse population.  And it is known for tolerance.   
 
In contrast to Jakarta, April and May 1998 were especially calm in Yogya because of 
the cosmopolitan and tolerant character of the city.  Masoed, Panggabean, and Azca 
attribute this character to the modernization endeavor undertaken [in the city] over 
the last half century (2001: 121).  They trace this modernization to the 1940s when 
Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX took a Republican stand, invited the government to sit 
in the city, and invited Gadjahh Mada University to meet in his palace before they 
were able to build facilities.  By inviting the government to Yogya, Hamenkubueno 
IX attracted many intellectuals, politicians, artists, and others to the city.  By opening 
his palace to them, he allied with these progressive elements.  Furthermore, these 
people were from all over Indonesia and even other countries.  As a result of all 
these elements, postcolonial Yogya experienced a parallel nationalization and 
cossmopolitanization of its resident community (Masoed, et al 2001: 124).  In other 
words, professionals from all over Indonesia were settling in Yogya and would 
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establish Universities, foundations and civil society groups like no other city in 
Indonesia.  Women activists established the first womens crisis center30 in Indonesia 
in Yogya in 1993 (Masoed, et al 2001: 131).  The kernel organization that joined 
with the NU and became Syarikat began in Yogyakarta (Wajidi 2004)31.   Masoed, 
Panggabean and Azca also highlight the active field of Islamic study in Yogya, 
characterized by for example, a students study group that grew into a prominent 
modernist, human-rights-oriented Islamic think-tank called LKIS (Institute for 
Islamic and Social Studies) (2001: 129).  They also note that Amien Rais, a well-
regarded intellectual and politician grew from the fertile educational ground of Yogya 
(2001: 132).  In all, Yogya is a University town.  About one-quarter of Yogyanese are 
directly or indirectly involved in university affairs (Masoed et al 2001: 125).  
These people are in touch with the open, liberal idealism of many university students.  
The city caters to a rather idealistic clientele, being full of students, professors, and 
NGOs.  These institutions give the city a different color than any other city in 
Indonesia. 
Yogya in 1998 
 
In early 1998, leading up to Suhartos abdication in May, many cities and towns 
experienced some sort of violence; Yogya, however, was markedly calm.  As 
recounted before, the first months of 1998 were characterized by growing 
demonstrations for Suharto to step down, sometimes countered by police, Army, and 
                                                        
30 See http://www.rifka-annisa.or.id for the organizations website 
31 This book was accessed online and so has no page numbers.  The full citation is given in the bibliography 
under internet resources 
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Pemuda Pancasilas containment efforts.  These demonstrations, joined with the 
effects of the Asian Currency Crisis, provocateurs, high emotion, ill-will and anger 
resulted most infamously in the widespread pogroms on Chinese Indonesians in 
Jakarta.  Protesters also burned Suharto-linked businesses, and looted stores 
belonging to ethnic Chinese people or to Suharto cronies.  Even the property of 
regular people who were not targeted was destroyed in the process. However, 
Yogyakarta was characterized by comparatively little property damage and only one 
death associated directly with the transition.   
 
Like in other cities, students spearheaded protests against Orba in early 1998, but 
Yogya did not fall into anarchy because of its tolerant atmosphere.  Masoed et al. 
(2001) highlights the fact that in Yogya, there is much less ethnic tension among 
students because they live among each other.  The most common housing for 
university students in the city is private dormitories, where an absentee landlord rents 
rooms in his compound to individual students.  Anyone who has been to university or 
who has lived in a student environment knows how casual, open, and liberal that life 
is: full of people just entering the world and curious about each other.  Away from 
family and tradition, these students make friends among themselves.  This helps to 
explain why there was so little ethnic conflict among students after this kind of 
housing became the norm in the 1980s (Masoed et al 2001: 128).  They have no 
suspicions about each other once they know each other.  Besides, they are all 





In 1998, the Sultan also publicly called for calm; because he is widely esteemed, 
people respect his opinion.  In May 1998, MPR speaker Amien Rais, Megawati, and 
Abdurrahman Wahid were enticed to gather in a town called Ciganjur to sign an 
agreement to call for elections and take part in them peacefully.  To enhance the 
appeal and repute of the agreement, the Sultan was invited to sign it.  Indeed, he did 
sign it and reinforced his image as a peaceful democrat.  Furthermore, Novan and 
Malekewi (1998) credit the Sultan with personally quelling the violence during May 
1998 by going through the streets and speaking to the students.  They relate one 
incident in which the Sultan stopped students from burning down a car dealership by 
climbing up on a car and convincing the students not to choose violent means.  So the 
students left the dealership undisturbed32.       
 
Now that this background is set, let us examine the parties in Yogyakarta in the post-
Suharto period. 
The Parties in Yogyakarta in 1999 and 2004 
 
In both 1999 and 2004 the main political parties in Yogyakarta were Golkar, PDI-P, 
PPP, PKB and PAN.  Golkar, despite the fall of Suhartos government and the 
negative actions associated with it, survived as a party.  PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia Perjuangan [Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle]) was the new name 
of the old PDI.  It was the faction headed by Megawati, and thus was the more 
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legitimate one.  PPP was, again, the same as the Orba PPP.  The National Awakening 
Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), had been founded by Abdurrahman Wahid, 
and was associated with NU-type political beliefs. PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional 
[National Mandate Party]) was new in the 1999 elections.   
 
These five are not the only parties; there are scores of smaller parties that are often 
splinters from larger parties.  They hope for even a small base of support, one or two 
seats in the national or regional parliaments  to use a metaphor common in 
Indonesian political discussion, though the splinter parties are small, they are still 
horse traders like the rest of the parties, and hope to barter their support in a 
coalition for a place in government (Sherlock 2004: 25).   
 
Indonesian political parties must be based on one of two principles: Pancasila33 or 
Islam.  Pancasila is the national, secular Indonesian ideology as formulated by 
Sukarno in 1952.  It is five simple principles which boil down to nationalism, 
humanism, and belief in one God.  From the point of view of Indonesian nationalists, 
this Pancasila should be the creed of all Indonesians, no matter their religion.  Indeed, 
it seems that Indonesian polytheists or atheists raise little objection to Pancasilas 
recognition of one God only.  In any case, a party that says it is based on Pancasila is 
a secular party.   
 
 
32 That the Sultan went among the people to calm them is not in doubt; however, there is another version of 
this car dealership story which will be related in the next chapter.   
33 We have seen the word Pancasila before in the Golkar-affiliated satgas Pemuda Pancasila.  The choice 
of that name marks the group as one sincerely dedicated to the principles of Indonesian nationalism.   
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Islam-based parties in the Indonesian context generally means parties that perhaps 
advocate a more official role for Islam in official life perhaps or whose legislators can 
be expected to rely on religiously-derived morals when making laws.  Amien Rais, 
leader of PAN, for example, has said he could never vote to legalize prostitution or 
gambling, for example, as they are against Islamic principles (Zenzie 1999: 250).  In 
2002, some PPP delegates to the MPR suggested adding a phrase to the Pancasila that 
Muslims should be obliged to follow Islamic law (Sherlock 2004: 33).  If such a 
phrase was added to the Pancasila and seriously legislated and enforced by the state, 
Indonesians would have to contend with the same tangle of double laws as 
Malaysians have experienced in Kelantan and Terengganu34.  However, it seems 
unlikely to happen.35  First, Indonesia is a unitary, secular state, not a federal Islamic 
state like Malaysia; so anything as fundamental as implementing sharia would have to 
be debated on a national level.  The PPP itself was probably divided over the policy 
position (Sherlock 2004: 33), and besides that, the party never drew up any legislative 
proposals concerning Islamic law.  And the party took a major beating in the 2004 
elections, perhaps because they may advocate a greater role for Islam in official life.   
One fairly new party, the PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera [Prosperous Justice Party]) 
does advocate sharia and won 7.34% of the national legislative vote in 2004.  
However, should this party retain its popularity, its only role would be as a swing 
party (among several others) in parliament.  Fundemental political Islam seems far 
                                                        
34 In those Malaysian states, Islamic parties were voted in in the mid 1990s and they implemented 
some Islamic laws for Muslims.  However all were voted out of power in 2004.   
35  In Aceh, for example, there could be a larger constituancy favoring political Islam, but the election laws 
in Indonesia are designed against regional-based parties, unlike the federal system in Malaysia.  Regional 
parliament regulations are secondary to national laws in Indonesia.   
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from the mainstream, though many politicians espouse basic Islamic principles in 
their work.   
 
With an understanding of the major division between Pancasila- and Islam-based 




In the 1999 elections, Golkar surprisingly came in second place nationally; in 2004 
came in first, but only with 21.6 % of the votes.  It is important to remember that for 
most of Orba, Golkar and Suharto were not as offensive as they were considered at 
the height of Reformasi.  Nostalgia for more prosperous and stable times attracted 
many voters in the nation to Golkar.  Furthermore, Golkar has always been stronger 
in the Outer Islands than in Java and Bali; the citizens of those islands often credit 
Orba with bringing more economic growth to their islands.  And in 1999 and 2004 
legislative elections, the Outer Islands had slight legislative overrepresentation for 
their population36 (Sherlock 2004: 9).  In 1998 Akbar Tanjung was elected chairman 
of the party, and had to preside over a difficult fissure between more Muslim-oriented 
and more nationalist-oriented party members (Zenzie 1999: 254).  Furthermore, in 







PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan [Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle]) is the Megawati-led faction of the PDI and it is a Pancasila-based party.  
When in 1996 Suharto tried to install a new PDI party chairman, the party split.  In 
1997 the Suryadi-led faction, known simply as PDI, was on the ballot.  Megawatis 
faction, called PDI-P, did not appear on the national ballot.  Because of this, 
Megawatis group encouraged their supporters to vote for PPP, as a protest against 
the governments manipulation of party politics.  After 1998, the faction that followed 
Suryadi withered to obscurity, and Megawatis faction retained the name PDI-P.  The 
PDI-P is perhaps still the most popular party in Indonesia.  It is an avowedly secular 
party and nationalist, and thus can appeal to people of all religions.  The party is most 




PKB is NUs official political party.  During Orba, NUs political group was part of 
PPP, the Islamic-based opposition party allowed by Suharto.  However, by 1984, NU 
had decided to stop participating in politics as an organization.  But the NU reentered 
politics as PKB in 1998. Other parties founded by other kyai claimed to represent NU 
in politics; but PKB was the most successful and is seen as the most legitimate 
(Sherlock 2004: 30).  It was led by Abdurrahman Wahid when he was elected 
president in 1999. It is a Muslim-oriented party that appeals mostly to those observant 
 




Muslim, rural voters in Java who wish to support a Islam-based party rather than a 
secular one.   The PKB is, like NU, associated with more traditional Islam, Islam as it 
has long been practiced in Java, mixed with some elements of local religion, rather 
than modern forms of Islam more in tune with the international ummah.  It is seen 
as an Islamic-leaning party, but its official ideology is Pancasila, and it is opposed to 
political Islam (ORourke 2002: 344). Its popularity waned extremely between 1999 




As discussed above, PPP started as an amalgamation of Islamic-oriented parties, 
engineered by Suharto in 1973.  It is still an Islam-based party.  During Orba, the PPP 
was the more staunchly critical of the two opposition parties.  One of their 
parliamentarians, for example, publicly criticized Petrus in a sarcastic way, saying 
that the government should begin using secret agents to execute corrupt public 
officials in the same summary fashion (Ali Imran Kadir, JP July 31, 1983, quoted in 
van der Kroef 1985: 756).   
 
In 1984, NU decided to stop participating in politics as an organization and so 
withdrew from PPP.  This hurt the party in the next two elections, in 1987 and 1992, 
when the party only won 16% and 17% of the national vote respectively.  However, it 
survived through Reformasi because  
 
and 45% in 2004.  This principle of overrepresentation was adopted at the behest of non-Javanese leaders 
who claim that the national government contains too many Javanese.   
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it retained some standing as a voice of Islamic interests and because a 
range of both modernist and traditionalist Islamic leaders who had 
participated in the party during the Suharto era decided that it was in 
their best interests to stay with the party rather than find a place in the 
new Islamic parties (Sherlock 2004: 32).   
 
Thus the PPP earned and retained credibility though it was created as faux opposition 
during Orba.   
 
The party seems to have been truly dedicated to reform.  For example, after the fall of 
Suharto in 1998, a special commission of all party representatives was convened to 
decide on electoral reform and elections in 1999.  Of course Golkar had the most 
seats in this commission and would win anything voted upon.  So the PPP threatened 
a walkout unless decisions were made by debate and consensus rather than voting 
(Zenzie 1999: 244).  In this way, the PPP brought the spirit of Reformasi into the 
deliberations. Ironically, the spirit of Reformasi here depended on musyawarah, 
coming to decisions by discussion and consensus, rather than by the explicitly 
democratic process of voting37.  
 
The PKB and PPP are known for clashing with each other because they both 
portrayed themselves as the Islamic choice, and criticized each other for being un-
Islamic (Maryono 1999).  Indeed, since NUs 1984 secession from politics and later 
re-entry, there has been a great rivalry between the parties (ORourke 2002: 334).  
Furthermore, in the 1997 election, PPP and Golkar repeatedly brawled in Java; in the 
                                                        
37 The Islamic concept of musyawarah is well-known in Indonesia and was part of Sukarnos ideas about 
guided democracy.     
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whole election season, 273 people died in campaign related violence and traffic 




Amien Rais, an intellectual from Central Java, founded PAN in 1998.  Rais lived in 
Yogyakarta at the time and was once a lecturer at Gadjah Mada University.  The party 
is more popular in Yogya than in other parts of the country because of the hometown 
connection, and perhaps because of the intellectual presence in the city.  Rais was at 
the forefront of student protests against Suharto in April 1998.  He is considered the 
first public figure to publicly support the students (ORourke 2002: 115).   His party 
and ideas appeal primarily to middle-class modernist Muslims  well educated, 
practicing Muslims throughout the archipelago.  The party supports parliamentary 
democracy, economic reform and modernism, loosely within a framework based on 
Muslim morals.  The partys official ideology is Pancasila, though PAN is seen as an 
Islamic party.  Rais supports pluralism, and tries to appeal to all segments of society.  
However, some of his critics argue that Rais is not as much a democrat or secularist 
as he chooses to appear during elections (Zenzie 1999: 250).  Indeed, during my 
fieldwork in Yogyakarta, I found that many of the middle-class, educated, nominal 
Muslims with whom I spoke did not like Rais.  They also doubted his pluralistic 





One of PANs special issues is opposition to a role for the military in the government.  
As discussed before, during Orba, the Indonesian armed forces had guaranteed, 
appointed representation in the MPR.  Those seats for the military have since been 
eliminated.  However, the concept of dwifungsi is still alive in the Army.  As 
discussed above, dwifungsi is the concept that the Army has not only the job of 
physically protecting the country, but also of overseeing civilian government.  Army 
officers are still seconded to oversee individual officeholders all over the country.  
Rais party opposes dwifungsi and militarism in all forms.   It may seem a paradox 
that such a party employs satgas, but as we will see in the next chapter, PAN satgas 
are very un-militaristic.  They do not call themselves a satgas for example.  They 




The Partai Demokrat (Partai Demokrat [PD]) owes all of its popularity to having 
been joined by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.  Yudhoyono, or SBY, as he is always 
referred to, is a retired General and former Minister of Security under Megawati.  His 
resignation from Megawatis cabinet in 2004 drew lots of media attention and made 
SBY more of a household name.  He is under no suspicion of human rights violations, 
though many Indonesians are suspicious of any military candidate.   
 
The PD was founded by a professor at the University of Indonesia in October 2001, 
but was just another small party until SBY joined.  The party's deputy secretary-
general, Ponti Pandean, says his party is "an alternative for people from all walks of 
life" who are disappointed with the current situation and the internal struggles found 
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in large, established, political parties like Golkar (JP Feb 21, 2004).  The PD argues 
that the bigger, older political parties are too concerned with sharing the spoils of 
government than with reform.  SBY has promised to tackle corruption, restore peace 
in the country, and focus on economic growth.  On the negative side, some 
Indonesians fear that SBY, as a former general, rather than an academic or politician, 
may not tackle problems with militarism in the country.  The army is in need of 
reform, and dwifungsi is not popular, and SBY may not put priority on these 
problems as much as many people would like.  But, then again, many others like his 
message of security and growth and are willing to risk government led by a former 
general.  In the final round of the 2004 presidential election, SBY beat Megawati by 
60% to 39% of the votes.  In any case, SBY beat Megawati , this shows 
disappointment with Megawati and a willingness to try SBY.     
 
The most striking 
difference 
between electoral 
results in DIY and 
the country as a 
whole is the 
popularity of 
PAN.  Had the 
2004 national 
election results 
mirrored those of 
Table 2:  1999 and 2004 Indonesian Parliamentary Election Results 
 Major Parties, % of Total 
 1999 2004 
 National Yogya DIY National Yogya DIY 
PDI-P 33.7 35.7 18.5 26.2 
Golkar 21.9 14.3 21.6 13.9 
PKB 12.6 14.3 10.6 10.1 
PPP 10.6 4.9 8.2 4.9 
PAN 7.1 17.3 6.4 17.8 
PD - - 7.4 5.6 
 
Data calculated from official election results taken from the Komisi Pemilu 
Umum, the Public Election Commission.  Available at www.kpu.go.id 
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Yogyakarta, the national government could have been dominated by a PDI-P/PAN 
coalition.  This outcome would have been a major break from Orba continuities.  As 
Nordholt and Samuel (2004) argue, a whole political system cannot change very 
quickly, and there will be continuities between Orba and post-Suharto Indonesia.  
However, the election results for DIY show that that area is ready to start to change 
faster.  The voters there rejected Golkar, the most obvious holdover from Orba 
politics, as much as they had in 1999.   
 
PKB, and PDI-P declined in Yogya between 1999 and 2004 for several reasons.  
First, the new Partai Demokrat and the PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera [Prosperous 
Justice Party]), both new, clean-seeming parties took votes from old parties.  Second 
was PKB / Abdurahhaman Wahids poor showing as president in 1999  this 
performance lost votes for the party. 
Party Interaction 1999 to 2004 
 
Between 1999 and 2004 Yogya saw a major decline in election-related violence.  In 
the 2004 campaign period, there were no satgas-related deaths (2001) or murders 
(1999, 2002) as discussed in my Introduction.  The major reported infractions were 
carrying weapons or damaging property: using anything from swords to crossbows to 
machetes, to break car windows or knock down food stands.  So, mercifully, we are 
dealing with a smaller problem in Yogya.  In February 2004, Amien Rais gave a 
speech at the National University of Singapore, and allowed a question-and-answer 
session at the end.  I was able to ask Mr. Rais his prognosis for election violence.  
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Optimistically, he said that politics in Indonesia were becoming less and less violent 
and that the 2004 would not be violent except perhaps some young people fighting in 
the street which cannot be controlled  210 million people over 5,000 miles cannot be 
controlled so tightly.  His prognosis proved correct for Yogya, but not for other 




This chapter has introduced three factors that are a major part of Yogyakartas 
political culture: the Sultanate, the universities, and the citys Revolutionary history.  
These three aspects of Yogya life have acted as moderating forces in the citys 
political expression.  Yogya has had the good fortune to have rather thoughtful, 
intelligent, humanistic men as its last two Sultans; these men have tried to make 
themselves representatives of all the people, not patrons of any one faction.  True, HB 
X and HB IX were Golkar members, and they did draw criticism for it, but they were 
never extremists.   The citys historical republican role is due to HB IXs support of 
the Revolution.  If cities have a character, Yogyas is patriotism.   
 
Second, the university communities tend to foster an environment that advocates 
dialogue rather than discord.  Yogya university graduates have founded NGOs and 
think-tanks that try to promote tolerance in the city.  Like in other cities, university 
students are first to take to the streets in protest; however, in Yogya, perhaps because 
it is a liberal college town, or because race relations are comparatively relaxed, these 




Furthermore, it has discussed the most important parties in Yogyakarta during the 
1999 and 2004 elections.  The PAN is disporportionally popular in Yogya compared 
to the rest of Indonesia, and Golkar is disporportionally unpopular in the city.  
Though the PPP has the worst history of brawling, DIY is still a more peaceful 




Chapter 4:  Yogyakartas Satgas Speak 
Introduction 
 
Having thoroughly explored the background of satgas in Indonesian history and the 
political events of the last ten years, I will now show the satgas as I saw them and let 
them speak for themselves.  These interviews showed several changes and 
continuities within satgas.  First, there is a difference of self-perception or role 
between satgas of old parties (PPP, PDI-P) and new parties (PAN).  The former have 
inherited institutional traditions and esprit.  The latter see themselves solely as 
logistic support.  Second, the leadership of the old party satgas know they have a 
public image problem and try to move away from that image.  The leadership does 
not want to appear as thugs; in fact, they are rather sensitive about that label.  Third, 
the old party satgas leadership says that they never wanted to use violence, but the 
fight against Orba demanded it.  The PPP, especially, paint themselves as old 
revolutionaries, saying that they had the courage to fight when few others did.  
Following that, all party satgas now say that they eschew violence because the 
Reformasi era is a time for working together.   
Caveats 
 
In Yogyakarta, I interviewed leaders of satgas PDI-P, PPP, PAN and a police 
commissioner in charge of relations with satgas.  I wished to speak to the police to get 
an idea of the states view of satgas.  During Orba, the police had close relations with 
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satgas, going at least as far back as Petrus.  So its important to hear their comments.  
Of course, when I called and asked for interviews, each organization matched me 
with some sort of spokesman or person of rank; I was speaking to the men with whom 
they wanted me to speak.  No one said anything very critical or unconstructive.  All 
informants wanted to make their organizations look as good as possible.  I cannot 
emphasize enough the fact that I was receiving official public relations statements and 
the best possible view of the satgas and police.   When relating the statements of the 
interviewees, I state their views in present tense and without qualifications.  It would 
be monotonous to write according to Mr. Z in every sentence.  Thus, the first 
qualification is here.  A more complete critique of my data will follow below.     
 
In this chapter, I will examine each satgas and the police one by one. First, in each 
section I will briefly give my impressions of the satgas.  I was able to better 
understand the parties, their members, and their ideas by observing their 
surroundings.  Then I will discuss the 
content of the interviews.  Next, I will 
review any corroborating evidence for 
or against my interviewees answers.  It 
is important to hear both sides of a 
story, especially in a case like this.  The 
satgas are seen by the press and middle class as negative, violent thugs.  But the 
satgas members themselves say that they are not bad at all.  Its difficult to know 
which to believe, and the truth probably lies somewhere in between.  Thus, it is 
A Note on Language
 
Standard Indonesian (Bahasa Indonesia) is the 
medium of education, government, and 
business throughout Indonesia. The language is 
used in formal situations or among people with 
different mother tongues.  However, many 
people feel more able to express themselves in 
their home language  in this case, Javanese.  




important to cross-check statements so we know which are more believable.  Finally, 
in the last section, I will explain my conclusions about the changing role of satgas.   
PDI-P 
 
I had a specific street address for the Yogya PDI-P office where I was to meet Pak38 
Seno on July 1, 2004.  The taxi went slowly, looking for the number, and he stopped 
in front of a red cinderblock building that looked like a closed shop.  The windows 
and doors were covered by aluminum shutters; there was no one stirring; there were 
no PDI-P banners.  However, the taxi stopped, and my translator peeked behind a red 
gate, cracked open just a little.  He knocked on a side door and found out Pak Seno 
was inside.  I came into the yard.  It was decorated with PDI-P paraphernalia; a man 
with a PDI-P t-shirt slept under a tree.  I went into the building. 
 
The foyer contained stacks of old newspapers, an old desk and mats on the concrete 
floor.  A young man showed me into a room with a red wall, a red naugahyde couch, 
a coffee table, and a TV showing a soccer match. (The partys color is red.) Pak Seno 
entered the room, greeted me warmly and sat on a small chair.  He motioned for the 
young man to turn off the TV.  We introduced ourselves and made a little small talk.  
Pak Seno is probably in his early forties, regular size, and a little round.  His broad 
grin revealed a few missing teeth.  When I shook his hand, I found it to be calloused, 
used to manual work. Pak Seno said he had liked PDI-P since he was very young 




Before the interview properly began, Pak Seno called in one of his associates, Mas 
Danil.   Mas Danil looked young but said he had been with the party since 1982.  He 
was tall and skinny, and wearing a sweater that swallowed him.  He shook my hand 
with a soft intellectuals hand.  Pak Seno and Mas Danil began smoking and kept it 
up during the interview.  The two men spoke Javanese at least half of the time.   
 
Before I could start asking my formal questions, Pak Seno said he wanted to make a 
first statement.  He said that Orba satgas were about militarism, but in 1999 the 
paradigm had changed to help not only the party but also to help society.   
 
Pak Seno is the Secretary of the PDI-P DPC (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang [The Board of 
Directors]) of the city of Yogyakarta. He is not the head of the satgas per se, but he 
was recommended by the central Yogya PDI-P office as a good contact man 
knowledgeable about the party. Mas Danil said he is a member of satgas PDI-P, City 
of Yogya section.    Mas Danil is clearly formally educated.  When he wanted to 
make a point very clear, he spoke Indonesian.  He laid out, almost by bullet point, the 
differences between old and new satgas, speaking of psychological and structural 
changes.   
 
Structurally, Satgas PDI-P has made some changes since 1999.  Satgas PDI-P 
Yogyakarta had been known as Pasanda in the latest literature I had read (King 2000: 
 




41), but they have since decided not to have a specific name.  They refer to 
themselves simply as Satgas PDI-P.  It is one of the psychological changes they 
wish to make; they want to emphasize that satgas are just part of the party, under the 
control of the party, not a separate organization.  In the city of Yogya (the city, not 
the whole DIY district), they have about 400 to 600 members.  In DIY there is one 
coordinator39 whose direct subordinates are the coordinators of the city of Yogya and 
the other kabupatens in the district (see table 3, p. 175).  The coordinators are 
specifically called coordinators to avoid any militaristic language.  The 
coordinators are selected by musyarwarah  discussion and consensus.   
 
In DIY, the satgas are well-coordinated with each other according to Pak Seno.  If 
there is a large job, the district satgas coordinator can call on all of the satgas in the 
district and also call his counterparts in other districts and ask for their help.  Mas 
Danil says that this is a change since Orba.  Then, each district organization had its 
own personality and they might not work well together.  But now, the satgas are 
more hierarchically organized and nationally-run.  They have become more regular 
cadres than irregulars.   
 
Membership rules have also gotten tighter in the last ten years, according to my 
informants.  First, members must be under forty, healthy and not use or distribute 
drugs.  They sign a pledge to this effect, and also pledge to obey the national 
constitution and the rules of PDI-P.  They also pledge to work for free. Again, the 
 
we will see Mas, the term for addressing men nearly of ones own age.   
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leadership is trying to move away from an image of criminality by taking a stand 
against drugs.  They also want their members to be able to say they are honest 
volunteers, not rent-a-mobs working for the highest bidder.  In PDI-P, being a satgas 
member is said strictly to be a volunteer activity, not a full time job.  Most days, there 
is nothing for satgas members to do anyway.  They only work when they are needed.  
Satgas PDI-P members may receive some small gifts (BI: oleh-oleh) when 
volunteering, such as food, or free T-shirts, but according to Pak Seno, the freebies 
are never excessive, only tokens from the party.  
 
In order to ensure that the satgas are under control, satgas members must be card-
carrying party members.  Under Orba, according to Mas Danil, some people were 
part-time party sympathizers.  They were neither in nor out of the party, and thus only 
appeared at election time, or caused trouble because of lack of discipline.  Now 
Satgas PDI-P only wants members dedicated to the party and willing to follow its 
rules. 
 
According to my interviewees, as party and satgas members, cadres under the 
Reformasi era have three jobs: first, helping the police with security and orderliness 
in the street; second, organizing turnout for party events; and third, taking a new, 
positive social role.   
 
 
39 In Bahasa Indonesia: koordinator. 
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First, when there are public events, be they political events or not, satgas want to help 
the police with security and orderliness.  Pak Seno said that the police are physically 
able to do their job, but that it is smoother when satgas help handle security  because 
the people do not trust the police.  They see themselves as an honest broker between 
police and people.  Pak Seno and Mas Danil agree that officers are more professional 
now than during Orba, but that it only takes one bad officer to mistreat the public and 
cause trouble.   
 
Furthermore, Satgas PDI-P wants to work on public and private crowd-control 
projects to show that they are well socialized, not militaristic.  For example, they 
may help direct traffic at a large wedding or funeral  always at the invitation of the 
host, according to Pak Seno.  For these services, the satgas members can expect to 
receive some token of appreciation in the way of gas, food or some money.   
 
Second are the satgas party functions: security and motivation.  As security 
officers, Satgas PDI-P members will be present at any party meeting, usually 
patrolling outside.  For example, in 2001, DPC PDI-P Yogyakarta met for an internal 
election to choose the partys mayoral candidate.  The party feared a divisive election 
and so called Pak Seno to arrange tight security; no one was to be allowed in without 
an invitation.  When the DPC chairman arrived, he did not have his invitation; he had 
not received it.  So he was turned away.  The chairman was not a divisive figure, he 
just did not have his invitation, and Pak Seno enforced the rule literally (Bernas, July 




As grass-roots party supporters, satgas cadres also help spread news of party events 
and motivate supporters to participate.  They have a tree of contacts: the district 
coordinator calls his subordinates with any news, and that communication gets passed 
down all the way to village level.  The satgas members or sympathizers who live in 
each village can then pass the partys message to individuals by word of mouth.   
 
Third, is the satgas new, positive social role.  Pak Seno gave me two examples of 
what his satgas are learning to do.  First, they want to become disaster-relief workers.  
Second, they are taking part in a tree-planting campaign.  They have set up some 
admirable, civic-minded goals.   
 
As satgas members, the cadres do not have any special position in the party.  Regular 
satgas cadres do not take part in policy-making or decision-making anymore than any 
other rank-and-file PDI-P member.  Their job is just to take instructions.   
 
Mas Danil and Pak Seno both admit that Satgas PDI-P has a bad reputation; that press 
reports call them thugs.  In fact, they argue that Satgas PDI-P have never been 
thugs, but instead people that suffered and had the courage to be satgas when 
politics was still a violent struggle (as under Orba).  For their sacrifices, the 
newspapers called them gali-gali. In other words, they lionize their satgas during 
Orba as freedom fighters but feel that they were and still are condemned by the press 




When we discussed specific incidents of PDI-P premanism after Orba, Pak Seno 
admitted that of course the satgas have not yet been able to completely transform their 
organization yet.  He said that there are honest cadres who still want to carry 
weapons, for example, but that the party and other satgas members try to help these 
men to change their ways by persuasion.  Intellectuals have gotten involved with 
satgas to teach them about image problems and Reformasi politics.  (I believe Mas 
Danil is one of these intellectuals.)  Furthermore, Satgas PDI-P neither orders, nor 
encourages, nor excuses any acts of violence, intimidation, or weapons-carrying.  If 
these things happen, they are either not satgas members, or cadres who have acted on 
their own account, according to Pak Seno.   
 
Mas Danil also mentioned, somewhat bittersweetly, that satgas are becoming more 
professional and losing their heart.  During Orba, dedicated satgas members 
worked because of what they felt in their heart, be it opposition to Suharto or support 
for Megawati or nationalism.  However, since 1998, Mas Danil feels that some people 
have joined satgas just for advancement in the party or community.  On the one 
hand, that results in a more professional organization, which is the ideal, but the 
changes cause a loss of elan or camaraderie within the organization.   
 
In the end, I asked the men what else I should know about Satgas PDI-P.  Mas Danil 
immediately replied with three bullet points:  that Satgas PDI-P is not militaristic, that 
140 
 
they have a new paradigm of being a peaceful organization, and that they are 
socializing themselves by helping the police and working in the community.   
 
With that, I took my leave of Pak Seno and Mas Danil.  As I left the building, I saw 
some probably university-age cadres, both men and women, in another room, sitting 
on a mat, doing paperwork and eating snacks.  Outside, the same man was still having 
his siesta under a tree.  The shutters on the building were still closed.   
 
Pak Seno and Mas Danil were remarkably easy to talk to and polite and open.  Their 
manner was quite affable, like ones older brothers friends.  We had no ceremony, no 
distance, and I came away thinking these men were the epitome of regular guys.  
However, they were glossing a bit.  While I believe that elements of Satgas PDI-P are 
trying to move toward civility, I also found evidence of backsliders.   
 
For example, on March 31, 2004, Kompas reported PDI-P campaign events around 
Yogyakarta city, and it seems the police were looking for anyone with weapons.  
Several PDI-P sympathizers were arrested in Kotagede for attacking a PPP posko40  
and beating up a local citizen.  An officer attempted to arrest a known PDI-P 
sympathizer for carrying a sickle in the procession, but he was mobbed before he 
could make the arrest.  PDI-P sympathizers also kicked over police motorcycles.  
After these events, the police searched some cars and found 30 bladed weapons in 
their sweep.  The head of PDI-Ps DPD delegation said that those events had nothing 
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to do with party satgas; he had had no report of such an incident from satgas leaders.  
Two weeks earlier, four PDI-P sympathizers were arrested for carrying a 60 
centimeter knife to a campaign function in the city of Yogyakarta (SM, March 18, 
2004).    
 
Part of giving up militarism is giving up a militaristic uniform; perhaps satgas PDI-P 
Yogya is doing that.  At least once they guarded Megawati wearing batik (Kompas, 
April 26, 1999). 
 
The partys official line is that they want a peaceful election.  I believe that satgas 
leadership honestly agrees.  They know in Yogya especially, tourist money is 
important, and no one wants to scare away tourists.  I believe that some of the cadres 
held for bringing weapons to PDI-P events may be loners acting on their own.  As far 
back as 1952, plain thugs were co-opting the satgas name (p.63).  Perhaps young 
people who might want to have a little trouble so that they can prove their pemuda 
consciousness  so that they can measure up to the pemuda that came before them, 
as van Dijk argues (p. 47).   Furthermore, if the press is anti-satgas as my intervewees 
suggest, journalists would be sure to note if the weapons were carried by satgas 
members.  These articles do not say the suspects are party members or satgas, 
only that they are sympathizers (simpatisan).   However, it is hard to believe that 
30 bladed weapons were gathered by thirty loners acting together.  Perhaps some 
 
40 A posko is a pos kommande, or command post.  They are tiny three-sided rooms or pavillions along the 
road where party members can gather.  All parties have them.   
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satgas rank and file, or at least some organized people would have collected that 
armory. 
 
Now, having met PDI-P, let us proceed to PPP.   
PPP 
 
I was to meet Pak Bambang at the PPP office on Mataram Street on July 2, 2004  
no further specification was available.  I gave these vague directions to my taxi driver 
and he drove down the street; we could not find the place, so he stopped and asked a 
food-seller on the sidewalk where it was.  Close by on the right, I heard.  Sure 
enough, we soon came upon a green mosque complex decorated with green PPP 
banners.  Though it had no sign, that was the place.   
 
In the complex was a mosque in a courtyard surrounded by small open rooms.  Inside 
the first room, I inquired for Pak Bambang.  He was there, greeted me warmly and led 
the way to a large, unused office  with some green couches.  The office looked to 
have been built and furnished in the 1960s with an aluminum desk and chairs.  Its 
floor was tiled and swept clean. The windows faced the street.  Pak Bambang left and 
returned with an older man wearing a white peci41 and a young man with a tray of 
drinks.  The young man left us, the men began smoking clove cigarettes, and we 
began our interview.  
 
                                                        
41 A peci is a white cap indicating a man has made the pilgrimage to Mecca. 
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Pak Bambang is the PPP satgas trainer for the city of Yogyakarta.  He looks to be in 
his early fifties.  The Hajji was Pak Sulaeman, Commandant of satgas PPP for all 
DIY.  Sulaeman seemed to be in his sixties or even older.  His wrinkled skin told of a 
life spent under the sun.  He has been with the party and its satgas since 1973, the 
year of its foundation.  He has been the Commandant since 1990. 
 
I began with straightforward questions about satgas structure and activities; Pak 
Bambang answered my questions while Pak Sulaeman smoked silently.  However, as 
I began to ask more about satgas history, Sulaeman decided to also give answers 
himself.  Pak Bambang deferred to Sulaeman; if I asked an interesting question, 
Sulaeman motioned toward Bambang with his hand and the younger man remained 
quiet.  Sulaeman would ruminate, then lean toward Bambang and whisper an answer 
to him.  Bambang would then repeat the answer before giving his own thoughts.  
Whether Pak Sulaeman wanted to cultivate an air of sagacity, or just had a sore 
throat, I do not know.  But he came across as a veteran of war would; of a man who 
has much worldly experience.   They spoke in a mix of Javanese and Indonesian. 
 
The party satgas is called the Gerakan Militan Kaabah, the Militant Kaabah 
Movement (GKM).  The Kaabah is the holy building in Mecca toward which 
Muslims face when they pray and the physical destination of the Hajj pilgrimage.  It 
is also the PPPs political symbol.  The GKM seems to be the newest manifestation of 
satgas PPP; it was launched in Sleman (outside of Yogya) in 2001 (JP, April 16, 
2001).  The name emphasizes PPPs Islamic focus, but the word militant is 
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intimidating.  In the city of Yogyakarta, they have about 300 members; in all of DIY, 
including the city, they have about 2,000 members.   
 
Structurally, the top of the GKM hierarchy ends at the district level; there is no 
national coordinator and no formal coordination among district commandants.  Below 
the district, there are commanders down to the kelurahan level of government.  
Within DIY, my interviewees report that the different commanders throughout the 
district work together well.   On each level, cadres chose their leaders by 
musyarwarah.  The GMK is a part of PPPs youth division.  The GKMs biggest 
structural problem for the future is finding good leaders that can work with the people 
as easily as with politicians other leaders. 
 
There are three steps to becoming a GMK member.  First, there is an open 
registration, and many come to register, not just PPP members.  Next, the registrants 
undergo training in discipline, religion and PPPs vision and mission (BI: visi dan 
misi).  Those that succeed in the training are chosen to join the GMK.  If a successful 
applicant is not a PPP member, his is automatically made a party member by virtue of 
being in the GMK.   
 
Being a GMK member is purely voluntary and part-time.  Like Satgas PDI-P, GMK 
are not needed every day  only at gatherings.  They also work for free, though they 
may also receive small tokens or oleh-oleh from party funds.  There is very little 
funding for security, however, so they work as volunteers.  For example, GMK 
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members must buy a uniform, and the party only subsidizes 50% of the cost.  But, 
Pak Bambang adds, having to invest money in the organization makes the members 
more dedicated stakeholders.   
 
In between party activities, members get further training as above, in discipline, 
religion, and PPP vision and mission.  As very well-vetted party members, GPK are 
qualified, dedicated people.  As such, they contribute opinions, suggestions and ideas 
to the party.   
 
When there are party events, the GMK has two jobs:  first, to gather people, second, 
to make both participants and non-participants feel secure.  To do this, they 
coordinate with the police.   
 
Bambang and Sulaeman admit that during Orba, PPP satgas were very rough and 
dangerous.  Their party was always under pressure from the government to be 
compliant.  The PDI-P also attacked and threatened them.  Thus the satgas needed to 
cultivate toughness; they needed to look scary to defend themselves in a high-
pressure environment.  They wore military-style uniforms (as all Orba satgas did).   
 
According to Sulaeman, whether or not satgas PPP was violent depends on ones 
point of view of the violence.  Orba leaders called satgas PPP violent, but in 
Sulaemans opinion, Orba was more violent, but in different ways: by corruption, by 
exploiting the people, and by running a corrupt police force, for example.   Sulaeman 
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does not deny having done violence anymore than an army would deny it.  But like an 
army, he feels they were fighting a greater evil: the Orba government. 
 
In May 1998 when Suharto was forced out of office by protesters demanding reform, 
satgas PPP finally felt that they could have a constructive role in society.  In fact, in 
1998 and 1999, Satgas PPP had more members than it does now because that was the 
high point of peoples Reformasi spirit, when they wanted to join an organization and 
help the movement.   
 
In 1998 and 1999 satgas PPP helped secure the city of Yogyakarta; they wanted to 
prevent the massive violence seen in other cities.  Satgas PPP (for they were not 
GMK yet) patrolled the streets, working with university students especially.  In 
Jakarta in May 1998, university students did not feel safe leaving their campuses 
when the police were patrolling.  However, in Yogya, satgas PPP helped escort 
students home if they felt scared.  Above (p. 118), I mentioned an incident where the 
Sultan of Yogyakarta went among the student protesters in May 1998 and convinced 
them not to destroy property.  Satgas PPP says they did the same thing.  Pak 
Bambang and his men were patrolling the streets when he saw some students 
breaking into a Timor car dealership to burn it down42.  The dealership shared a block 
with some houses, and PPP did not want to see the houses destroyed.  So, they 
convinced the students to move the cars outside to burn them but leave the building 
standing.  Pak Bambang emphasized the students determination to show their anger, 
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and so he thought they should simply burn cars but not risk damaging peoples 
houses. He acknowledged that property would be destroyed, and it was best just to try 
and limit the damage to legitimate targets.  I asked if it would have been better for the 
students to keep the cars and use them for their movement.  But Pak Bambang said 
no, that the students must have an opportunity to show their displeasure.  Novan and 
Malekewi (1998) may corroborate this story; they mention that one of the few 
incidences of property destruction being burning the contents of a Timor car 
dealership in the street (though they attribute the safety of the building to the Sultan).   
 
Pak Bambang and Pak Sulaeman also told me that during the 1999 MPR session they 
guarded the house of Amien Rais, the leader of PAN when he was the target of mob 
violence (p. 110).  This story is corroborated by the Jakarta Post (October 21, 1999).   
 
Satgas PPP also helped guard the crowds at the funeral of Moses Gatutkaca, the sole 
person to die as a result of May 1998 protests in Yogyakarta.  University students 
organized a funeral, and according to Pak Bambang, the students asked Satgas PPP to 
guard the funeral.  The students 
needed crowd control, but were 
too distrustful to turn to the 
police.  According to Pak 
Bambang, he approached the 
 
42 Timor car company is owned by the very corrupt son of Suharto, Tommy Suharto.  Thus Timor 
dealerships were targets of violence throughout Indonesia.  
Illustration 2: Satgas PPP at the funeral of Moses 
Gatutkaca.  Photo by the Associated Press 
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police with a proposal to guard the funeral.  But the police were hostile to him for 
supporting the students.  They almost dared him to take responsibility for the funeral.  
They finally threatened him, pointed a gun at him, and said if anything goes wrong 
at this funeral, you will pay. 
In fact the funeral of Moses Gatutkaca was peaceful.  The Jakarta Post (June 14, 
1998) attributes it to the Sultans plea for calm.  However, an Associated Press photo 
clearly shows satgas PPP in militaristic uniforms carrying Gatutkacas coffin. 
 
Pak Bambang and Pak Sulaeman even helped the police during the rough years of 
1998 and 1999.  Because the officials were so exhausted and so unpopular, in May 
1999, they called all satgas leaders together to ask for help with day-to-day police 
work.  But only Satgas PPP was civic-minded enough to help the hated police, 
according to the interview.   
 
With regard to goals, Satgas PPP has not changed since Orba:  their job has always 
been to provide security for party events and help achieve the aims of the party and of 
the people.  But since 1998, they have been able to change their tactics.  For example, 
they want to appear more friendly.  They have changed their uniforms to 
something less paramilitary.  They have a new slogan that they 
teach to cadres:  Senyum, Sapa, dan Salaam means smile, a 
greeting, and salaam, the well-known Arabic word for hello.  
Pak Sulaeman says it is time for Satgas PPP to retire from the 
physical struggle and just be security guards, that it is time for them 
enyum 
apa S alaam 
Illustration 3:  




to show their human side (BI: lebih humanis).  They too are getting involved with 
civic activities such as public health work and environmental work.  
 
Pak Sulaeman and Pak Bambang seem a little resigned about their bad reputation.  
They say during Orba, people turned to them for help because they police could not 
be trusted.  In 1998 and 1999 too, they showed how reliable and civic-minded they 
were. But now, they have a bad reputation due to the proliferation of bad, 
unprofessional satgas from other parties.  Before, Satgas PPP had a reputation as a 
Godfather among satgas, but that memory is forgotten by Yogyanese, they say.  
However, Pak Sulaeman mentioned that foreigners seem to know and appreciate 
Satgas PPP because reporters and writers from Thailand, Australia, Japan, and 
Malaysia had come to interview him to ask the recipe for a good satgas.       
 
When I asked them for any final thoughts on satgas PPP that I should know, Pak 
Sulaeman replied that a party with no satgas makes no sense because satgas gives 
the party color.   
 
In all, GMK has a stronger corporate identity within the party than Satgas PDI-P.  
The GMK has a name, first of all.  Next, the GMK takes its members from the public 
and makes them PPP members.  The GMK members also seem to be more than just 
rank-and-file cadres; as Pak Sulaeman said, as well-vetted men, GMK members 
contribute ideas and opinions to party debate.  Also, Pak Sulaemans sheer longevity 
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in the organization may make him feel a great corporate identity which would show 
in his answers.     
 
And indeed, Pak Sulaeman and Pak Bambang seem civil, and I have examples in 
which Pak Sulaeman was a public spokesman for PPP against corruption.  First, he 
and another PPP Yogya city comrade publicly demanded the resignation of a party 
leader that had been convicted of corruption (Kompas, March 21, 2003).  Sulaeman 
also headed a PPP team in 1996 that independently investigated the murder of a local 
journalist, Fuad Muhammad Syafruddin (SPD, September 18, 1996).  The journalist 
was seen as a martyr; he wrote articles detailing financial corruption in a regency in 
DIY, and many people thought he was killed for that reason.  The police never 
convicted anyone of the crime.     
 
However, Pak Sulaeman may be civil, and his words may be conciliatory, but there is 
still a definite problem with Satgas PPP, and PPP supporters.   
 
According to the Jakarta Post, Sleman area citizens were wary when PPP decided to 
have a rally in their neighborhood; they were worried about violence.  The local 
police commander dispatched 1,160 officers to the area.  Apparently, after the rally 
broke up, a car windshield was broken and a restaurant was damaged by the party 




A group of youths appearing to be PPP supporters attacked a group of PDI-P 
supporters in Yogyakarta, resulting in one PDI-P supporter being stabbed to death in 
1999 (JP, March 22, 1999).  In response to this incident, party leaders in Yogyakarta 
signed a peace agreement called the Malioboro Declaration, and pledged to control 
their supporters.  However, a month later, another PDI-P supporter was stabbed to 
death in a clash with PPP supporters on a street that is a PPP stronghold (JP, April 
26, 1999).  Sultan HBX strongly denounced the parties and said he personally would 
demand an explanation (Ibid).   
 
Later, in 2002, another series of clashes between satgas PPP and PDI-P left at least 
one man dead and houses and properties damaged and burnt.  The clashes were said 
to have been the fault of PPP.  The Jakarta Post (February 25, 2002) notes that often 
local police are afraid to investigate inter-party conflict as suspects are protected by 
their own parties.  Party leaders on both sides claimed this was not a party-sanctioned 
fight, and that the parties were at peace with each other.  A police representative said 
that parties must be more selective in picking satgas members that will not use the 
organization as a personal gang.  This implies that the people involved in these 
clashes were known satgas.  Both the police and the parties implied that these were 
rogue satgas, using the organization to settle their own scores.   
 
In another interesting case, in 2000, a student named Suradji from the State Islamic 
Institute, Sunan Kalijaga was kidnapped by a radical Islamic group for having written 
something in the student newspaper that was allegedly insulting to Islam.  The 
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interesting thing is that the Islamic group, Front for the Defense of Islam (FPIY), is 
said to have shady links with the PPP (Berita Indonesia, august 21, 2000, FPI 
Thugs Abduct Student Press Activist).  Also interesting is that the students 
colleagues asked for protection from further attacks from Banser, the NUs youth 
group.  It does not seem that FPIY is directly linked to PPP or GMK, but it does show 
that those parties probably have contact with more radical elements. 
 
Satgas PPP epitomizes the blurry line between public and private security in 
Indonesia.  They, rather than the police, were approached to guard the public funeral 
of Moses Gattukaca.  They took to the street to prevent violence in 1998, and guarded 
Amien Rais house.  However, they also protect their members from police 
investigations.  They also decide for themselves if someone deserves a punishment.  
They were correct to identify Orba as an enemy, but post-Reformasi, a private group 
should not enforce its idea of the law on others.   
 




Pak Rudi told me to meet him 200 meters north of Toms Silver Shop in Kotagede.  
Everyone knows Toms Silver Shop, and the wide road leading north from it. July 1, 
2004, I set out.  One hundred, two hundred, three hundred meters north of Toms 
Silver, there was no PAN office  not that I had been told the meeting would be in an 
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office, but I supposed it would.  Again, the taxi driver asked a food seller on the 
sidewalk for the PAN office.  She said it was on the road leading northwest of Toms 
Silver.  So, we went there, and were faced with a new, big sign in front of the PAN 
office.  The office is a fine building in a former house, perhaps a restored colonial-era 
home.  It is set back from the road and has a clean paved yard ringed with potted 
plants.  I asked the gardener for Pak Rudi; he told me to inquire inside.   
 
I stepped into a large room with high ceilings and shining tile floors.  A few office 
workers were gathered around their desks and computers, gathering their things to go 
home.  These people were far from the jeans-wearing, chain-smoking men I had 
already interviewed.  They were dressed like office workers from any cubicle in the 
world; men in pressed shirts and trousers; women in business suits with jilbabs43.  I 
asked them for Pak Rudi.  They told me he was working, guarding a party meeting 
being held at the Muhammadiyah office  200 meters north of Toms Silver Shop.   
 
Around the corner I went, to the Muhammadiyah office.  It was a fine new building, 
two stories tall.  I asked the man standing at the gate for Pak Rudi; but Pak Rudi had 
already seen me and was coming to greet me.  He and the gatekeeper and a few other 
men were wearing their satgas uniform:  grey trousers, medium blue oxford shirts, 
wingtip shoes, and, with a nod to their task, black vests with many pockets.     
 
                                                        
43 A jilbab is a womans head scarf that covers just the hair, ears, and neck.   
154 
 
Pak Rudi greeted me warmly and escorted me to a meeting room upstairs.  Young 
men were finishing the preparations for the evenings meeting: setting up chairs and 
testing microphones.  Pak Rudi brought me a plate of the snacks that had been 
prepared for the meeting and we began our interview, almost completely in 
Indonesian.   
 
Pak Rudi has been with PAN almost since it was founded in 1998.  Before that, he 
was an active PPP supporter, but he decided the PPP was too polarizing and he 
thought Amien Rais was a better Reformasi leader than anyone in PPP, so he changed 
parties.  Pak Rudi is officially the Chief Commander of Satgas PAN for DIY; the 
organization has about 60 members in the city. 
 
However, satgas PAN does not use the word satgas  they do not want to have a 
satgas in the common sense.  Instead, they have SYMPATIK, which means 
congenial in Indonesian.  SYMPATIK is an acronym meaning Peacemaking and 
technical activities system (Sistem Pengamanan dan Teknik Kegiatan).  SYMPATIK 
members have never been allowed to carry weapons, and they have never wanted to 
cultivate a militaristic image.  They just want to be a logistics sub-committee.  They 
consider themselves a different kind of organization from other party satgas; they 
are a modern organization.     
 
To join SYMPATIK, a man must first be a PAN member, then pass a physical fitness 
test.  SYMPATIK members are all volunteers; they receive no pay.  They are 
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dedicated party members who want to help the party by doing a little extra work, no 
different from the members that brought snacks to the meeting.  
 
As people that are especially active party members, SYMPATIK members have do 
contribute to party debate more than rank-and-file members, but not by virtue of 
being in SYMPATIK.  Pak Rudi likened SYMPATIK to just a logistics office, just a 
sort of sub-committee in the party.  They have offices organized down to the 
kecamatan level.   
 
SYMPATIKs two jobs are protecting Amien Rais person and to collaborate with the 
police to make sure party events go smoothly.  Also, on the small scale, SYMPATIK 
members should also help publicize party activities by calling their local offices.   
 
Between 1999 and 2004, SYMPATIK made a few reforms structurally and 
financially.  When the party was first started, SYMPATIK did not have very good 
vertical coordination; for a large area such as a kapubaten in a large province there 
might only be one coordinator.  Now, however, there are local coordinators.  Next, 
Pak Rudi admitted (as though it was a sin) that in 1999 SYMPATIK sometimes 
worked privately for money.  Now that is forbidden.   
 
As our interview ended, the party meeting inside the room began.  We moved outside, 
and chatted with the other SYMPATIK members for a moment.  This was 
SYMPATIK in action, guarding a party meeting.  They stood in small groups, 
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smoking a little.  It was a quiet evening.  No threat seemed to overhang the meeting 
that night.  One of the men asked me if I was a professor, and I told him not yet.  He 
had just gotten his first professorship at a local university, and like any academic in 
the world, commenced to tell me about his research.   
 
This interview with Pak Rudi was most illuminating as a contrast with the other two 
satgas.  He had little to say about elan, spirit or organizational history. He kept 
emphasizing the modern and non-militaristic character of his organization.  In fact, I 
have found very little evidence of SYMPATIK, or even PAN supporters being 
involved in violence or property destruction in Yogyakarta.   
Polri 
 
To hear the official government position on satgas parpol, I made an appointment 
with the police Commissioner in Yogyakarta in charge of coordinating the satgas with 
police activities for July 1, 2004.   
 
When I arrived at the police station in central Yogyakarta, a ceremony was taking 
place to announce promotions in the department.  The police officers looked like 
military police to me in boots and fatigue-like uniforms.   They stood in ranks with 
their wives in a separate formation  each wife was wearing an identical pink suit, the 




The ceremony broke up, and I went inside, asked for Pak Sumitro; a young officer led 
me through a dusty courtyard, past a roomful of men practicing martial arts, and into 
the tiny anteroom of the commissioners office.  And I started waiting.  A friendly 
clerk came in and I told him I had an appointment.  He said Pak Sumitro would arrive 
shortly.  And I waited.  Eventually a harried, irritated looking Pak Sumitro came in 
and said he had no appointment with me.  My translator, however, talked him into 
giving a half hour to someone who came from so far away to talk to him.  
Begrudgingly, Pak Sumitro opened his office door and said he would take a few 
questions.  But he asked a few questions first. 
 
He asked my name and my addresses in Singapore, in the United States and in 
Indonesia.  He asked for proof that I was a student with permission to research in 
Indonesia.  He took a picture of me without asking!  But finally he relaxed some and 
let me ask a few questions.   
 
Pak Sumitro has worked with Polri since 1984.  He started specifically working with 
satgas in 1990.  This surprised me.  I would have thought that the police would not 
want to coordinate with private security; that the police would see satgas as 
encroachers and amateurs.  However, he said the police have always been happy to 
work with the satgas.   
 
Pak Sumitro said that structurally, most satgas are similar.  They are organized 
parallel to government structure from generally the DIY provincial level down to the 
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kelurahan level.  Small parties may omit some levels or divisions. Each party has a 
satgas, and each party has its own ways of choosing satgas members.  Being a satgas 
member is not permanent, a satgas member can always quit, but he cannot be 
expelled on a leaders whim; he must break a rule before he can be told to leave.  The 
satgas members also work solely as volunteers.  Pak Sumitro likened them to 
supporters of a football team.   
 
Pak Sumitro believes that satgas parpol are responsible for electoral violence.  He 
argues that the parties cannot control the satgas, and thus the satgas do things (such as 
carry weapons) that the parties do not condone but are powerless to check.  Thus, 
violent acts are associated with the parties, but in fact the parties are not in control.  
However, he does say that the police have a harmonious working relationship with 
the satgas.  At party activities, the police watch the satgas and the satgas takes care of 
the people.  This fits with Pak Senos comment that the people do not trust the police 
and would rather see the satgas.   
 
In Yogyakarta, Pak Sumitro agrees that the elections are safer and more calm than 
during Orba because the people are now more aware of laws and proper political 
practice and are more able to accept differences.  Furthermore, the people are now 
aware that they themselves posses the city, so now they obey the rules.   
 
At this point our interview was ended; however, Pak Sumitros most important 
argument is that the satgas are not under the control of the parties.  He argues that 
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even now, they still act autonomously.  However, all the satgas had argued that they 
are strictly under party control, but it is only renegade cadres that cause trouble.  
Furthermore, there is the idea that the troublemakers are not even satgas members; 
they might just be unbalanced party supporters.   
 
Pak Sumitro compared party supporters to football team supporters.  This analogy is 
apt on many levels.  First, it illustrates that supporting a political party in Yogya for 
many people is something like supporting the local football team.  Its not an 
intellectual activity  its something done for fun.  Second, like football supporters, 
some party supporters can become too fierce and have to be dealt with by the police.  
Third, football supporters often choose their team on qualities other than players 
skill.  Maybe his family or most of his neighbors are dedicated to one team; or 
perhaps he picks an underdog.  Finally, like football supporters, Indonesian party 
supporters like to have a party.  Just as some football fans paint themselves different 
colors and camp outside of the stadium before a match, some party supporters in 
Indonesia also paint themselves and organize parades through the streets, in the pesta 
democrasi.  However, the analogy 
breaks down when we want to 
distinguish between simple party 
supporters and satgas parpol.  Football 
teams have nothing like paramilitary 
supporters/guards that provide security 
to the team.  The team would hire Illustration 4:  PDI-P Satgas in Surabaya, 
June 6, 2003.  Photo by liputan6.com 
160 
 
private security for that.   
 
From these interviews we can draw a few conclusions about post-Suharto satgas.   
 
First, the satgas of new parties are less militant than old parties satgas.  Though PDI-
P and PPP satgas leaders say they reject militaristic uniforms, for example, we can 
still see them in other parts of the country.  SYMPATIKs uniform, however, is 
hardly militaristic.  SYMPATIK refuses to even use the satgas name.  SYAMPATIK 
seems to have less of a reputation for carrying weapons44.  In 2004, there were at least 
two incidents of PDI-P (SM, March 18, 2004) and PPP (JP, March 28, 2004) 
supporters bringing weapons to party rallies in Yogyakarta, but I found no examples 
of PAN members being arrested for that offence.  King (2000: 52) also notes that 
unlike in other parties, SYMPATIK only takes orders from the partys executive 
board; the head of SYMPATIK in each district is formally and actually subordinate to 
non-SYMPATIK party members.  King notes that the system has no dwifungsi (see p. 
76).  SYMPATIK cadres and leaders are ultimately subordinate to, not equal to, their 
non-SYMPATIK counterparts.  Furthermore, because they are strictly hierarchically 
organized, SYMPATIK units do not cooperate horizontally, just as two units in an 
Army do not cooperate horizontally unless ordered to by a higher commanding 
officer.  In the case of SYMPATIK, the ultimate commanding officer is a non-
SYMPATIK person.  PPP and PDI-P do not have such a strict vertical command; 
                                                        
44 This applies only to DIY / Yogyakarta; in other regions, it seems to be less true. See Posos PAN 




local leaders often coordinate among themselves.  Thus, if party leaders are serious 
about curbing violence, they will do well to divide the satgas into companies that 
do not coordinate with each other.      
 
Though it is clear that in Yogyakarta the 1999 and 2004 election campaigns were 
much more peaceful than previous campaigns, it is still unclear who, if anyone, could 
stop campaign violence.  If we believe the police, the satgas are not under the control 
of the party in reality  and thus the satgas do as they want.  If we believe the satgas, 
then only a few rowdy party supporters (who are not necessarily satgas) act 
independently and cause trouble.  The cause lies between the two answers.  Whether 
or not the satgas are under party control or not is unimportant; a party could convince 
its cadres to use violence (as satgas PPP admittedly in their interview that did during 
Orba).  Indonesians under the age of forty had had no experience of politics except 
coercion under Orba; the peace and tolerance preached under Reformasi is a new 
concept which may take time to spread to cadres and parties both.  Thus, I do not 
think strong party control is the sole solution to political violence.  Furthermore, as 
tight a screening as the parties may have for satgas candidates, some fanatics, 
paranoiacs, or simply young men with a pemuda consciousness could get into the 
organization and start carrying a weapon.  As quoted above, Amien Rais said rather 
dismissively that the biggest problem of violence in the 2004 elections would be 
some uncontrollable young people fighting in the street.  And in Yogyakarta, his 
prediction was true; however, one would like to know how to stop people from 
fighting in the street.  Also, satgas and party cadres have a bad reputation among 
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some Yogyanese.  The people from the neighborhood in which I lived in Yogya 
universally revile satgas and wild campaigning for the noise, trouble, and fright they 
cause.  Frightening campaigning is not proper and should be stopped.  However, 
neither the parties nor the satgas can control this Indonesian tradition (p. 46) of some 
youths acting fanatically in politics.   
 
However, there is also evidence that at least satgas leadership is willing to participate 
in peace initiatives.  In January 2004, the satgas of all major parties in Yogyakarta 
attended a meeting held by the city mayor and head of the police to meet each other 
and plan peaceful resolutions to problems (Kompas, January 12, 2004).  Even earlier, 
in 1999, all city satgas agreed to a nondenominational prayer meeting as a place to 
pray for peace and also build trust in each other (Jateng Pos, November 1, 1999).   
 
One reason why the violence is declining is perhaps because satgas leaders and some 
cadres are unwilling to be violent  they are taking Reformasi peace rhetoric to heart.  
One of the structural prerequisites to violence mentioned in Chapter one is youths 
willing to do this violent work.  But given all the talk of a cleaner political system 
after Orba, it seems some men in Yogya are at least giving the new system a chance 
and trying to work with each other peacefully.  Indeed, the vote-counting I witnessed 
in Yogyakarta was exceedingly civil and friendly; monitors from different parties sat 
by each other chatting.  If post-Reformasi Indonesia can deliver some economic 
growth, perhaps people will learn to have enough faith in this system to forget about 




Many people have called for disbanding the satgas as a way to end political violence; 
this is an excellent idea, however, I do not think this is the complete solution to 
political violence.  First, as I argued above, I am not convinced that the satgas per se 
are the cause of the violence.  Finally, I am not convinced that the parties can or 
would disband their satgas.  For example, PAN denounces the old order and 
militarism, so it is not clear why they would have a satgas.  Also, satgas do provide 
useful services in crowd control and form a buffer between the people and the hated 
police.  Most difficult to understand, but perhaps most importantly is a satgas 
tradition. Pak Sulaeman of PPP mentioned at the closing of our interview that a 
party with no satgas makes no sense because satgas give parties their color.  I 
cannot say that I appreciate what he means by color, but I do understand that he 
means satgas are an integral part of a partys personality, not just its structure.      
 
Furthermore, Pramono (2001) argues that a militia is not bad per se, because many 
are deployed on humanitarian operations and do social work. He suggests, rather, that 
militias be barred from supporting political parties.  This idea is praiseworthy, but it is 
not practical because political satgas feel they must be involved in politics. 
Conclusion 
 
From these interviews we can see the difference between the satgas of old parties and 
new ones.  The lack of institutional history in PAN satgas seems to be a major 
difference between them and satgas PPP and PDI-P.  The leadership of the satgas of 
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old parties that I talked to say that they are moving towards modernization.  It is yet 
unclear if the old parties really will modernize, or if they can modernize  
organizational inertia in the satgas may be too much.  Political violence cannot be 
ended simply by disbanding the satgas; they are too much of an institution in 
Indonesian political parties to be closed down now.  Besides that, it is difficult to 




First Round of the Presidental 
Election:  July 5, 2004 
Illustration  5:  A happy voter 
Each polling place served between about 200 and 300 voters.
The guards in the background are non-partisan Abri guards.  
Two Abri or Polri officers were present at each polling place.  
At the higher-level vote-tallying centers, there were 
progressively more officers.   
 
 
Province:  DIY 
Kabupaten:  Sleman 
Kecamatan:  Godean 
Kelurahan:  Sumbersari 
Polling Station (TPS):  03 
A village public building 
becomes a polling place.  
The man at the desk 
checks the voters 
registration cards before 
they go in to vote.  Early 
in the morning, the chairs 
had been set out to 
accommodate the long 
line.  The kids, 
meanwhile, are learning to 




Province:  DIY 
Kabupaten:  Sleman 
Kecamatan:  Godean 
Kelurahan:  Sumbersari 
Polling Station (TPS):  05
Illustration  6:  Kids at a polling 
station 
Photo by:  Maggie Lee 





The primary focus of this thesis has been to examine the role of satgas parpol in 
Indonesian politics.  This study has aimed to uncover the origins of satgas in 
Indonesia, and in Yogyakarta in particular, the reasons why parties use satgas, and 
changes in satgas operations since Reformasi. Certainly law-enforcement and 
economic problems have helped explain the the phenomenon of satgas parpol.  
Indonesia remains underpoliced, and the people generally do not trust the police to do 
anything about community problems.  Furthermore, as unemployment in Indonesia 
remains high, the few perks one can get from joining a satgas are attractive.  This 
confirms what Robinson (1995) found in interviews with Bali satgas members.  For 
example, he revealed that satgas provided a small insurance program that was 
attractive to many members.  Even small networking opportunities are a reason why 
men would join satgas, even if the job involves some violence.     
 
However, in this thesis, I have argued that the satgas phenomenon also has to be 
examined from a historical perspective.  In order to understand why neither old 
parties nor modern post-Reformasi parties disband their unpopular satgas, it is 
necessary to understand the history of political militias in Indonesia.  Not only is 
being a satgas cadre an attractive proposition for many unemployed young men.  And 
not only do corrupt or understaffed police fail to suppress them.  But also, joining a 
satgas is a way of expressing ones pemuda consciousness.  Once in the 
organizations, especially those of the older parties, one absorbs a sort of 
organizational pride or élan which one is loathe to lose.  Thus, the satgas 
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organizations have a sort of life of their own which can not be easily suppressed.  
Parties also have satgas for color and appearance.  For a presidential candidate in 
Indonesia today, a few satgas members in uniform are as much a part of the entourage 
as campaign advisors and strategists.  The satgas members in uniform add to the 
pesta demokrasi atmosphere at campaign time.  They are unusual, dressed 
strangely, and acting a role.  The satgas are not festive, but they are always present at 
the festivities, someone to curse at, or smile at, depending on ones point of view.  
Furthermore, in a country where the police are understaffed and unpopular, parties 
indeed need some professionals to provide security.  It is common to see pictures 
where satgas form a human barrier between a popular politician and mobbing 
supporters.  At rallies, satgas work help keep crowds within bounds.  At party 
meetings, satgas keep out splinter groups or ousted members.   
 
However, the color aspect of satgas goes beyond simple appearances  it is 
something hinted at by Pak Sulaemans comment that a party with no satgas makes 
no sense.  It is something I cannot explain, though it exists.  It helps explain why a 
modern party like PAN would even have satgas, watered down though they are.  
Satgas are somehow part of Indonesian parties; perhaps something like mascots or 
talismans.   
 
Little analysis has yet been done about changes in satgas post-1998, so this case is 
also a sort of case study of post-Reformasi satgas in Yogyakarta.  In DIY, especially 
the city of Yogyakarta, satgas and politicking have become less violent since 
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Reformasi.  This is because political education seems to be more advanced in the city.  
The Sultan, a unique and revered figure, calls for calm.  Universities, think-tanks, and 
civil society groups preach a message of tolerance.  Yogya residents are a diverse 
bunch from all over Indonesia and the world; they are already rather socialized to 
living together.  Many Yogyanese are proud to be from such a fine city and want to 
set a good example by being peaceful.  Thus, political violence is becoming socially 
unacceptable very quickly. 
 
From my interviews, it is clear that the satgas of PDI-P, PPP and PAN are aware of 
the change in political expectations since Reformasi. Citizens are ready for 
paramilitarism to be eradicated. Satgas PAN (SYMPATIK), formed in 1998, was 
never a militaristic organization in the first place.  It is little more than a party 
subcommittee.  The satgas of PPP and PDI-P, veterans of Orba, both see themselves 
as retired revolutionaries.  Orbas repression of citizens basic freedoms were an 
important cause of all kinds of violence in Indonesia.  This fits with Collins (2002) 
argument attributing violence throught Indonesia to Orbas example and tactics.   
Indeed, these satgas sy that frustration made them take up weapons.    
 
Satgas leaders belivable argue that they no longer accept fighting as a means of 
political expression.  They claim they want to be simple security guards and public 
servants.  The leaders of satgas PPP and PDI-P kept repeating that they want to 
socialize their members and make them into community-minded volunteers. 
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My impression from field interviews is that satgas leadership probably does 
genuinely want peace; and they periodically have confidence-building meetings to 
meet each other.  Indeed, there has been no party-rivalry related death in the city of 
Yogyakarta since perhaps 2002.  However, cadres are still caught carrying weapons, 
sometimes in large enough amounts to imply much coordination.  
 
Meeting satgas leaders convinced me that there are elements in each party that do 
want peaceful politicking.  From my research, I believe that most incidents of 
weapons-carrying and property destruction are perpetrated by deviant party 
supporters, be they satgas members or not.  Parties seem to sometimes let preman 
elements into satgas; after all, no one is barred from political opinions.  However, I 
think the satgas are genuinely interested in helping their members reform if they need 
to.  To that end, PPP puts its satgas members through religious training, and PDI-P 
use gentle persuasion to try to reform their comrades.   
 
However, I also realized that satgas of old parties especially have a strong corporate 
identity.  Satgas do not want to be disbanded, parties do not want to disband them, so 
they will exist into the forseeable future.  Yogyakarta will remain peaceful, however, 
because of its special political culture.  Furthermore, satgas are not responsible for 
every knife-carrying incident or damaged car during a campaign; some of the 
problem is with fanatic cadres.  However, as long as people have any reason to feel 
scared of satgas, they are inappropriate in politics.  Fear has no place in politicking.  
Satgas leaders say they want to evolve into groups that all citizens can trust. In the 
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parties, perhaps they could evolve into simply symbolic leaders.  If satgas will not be 
disbanded, this is the second best option. 
 
Civil society groups have called for the parties to discipline their satgas.  It is unclear 
who exactly controls the satgas; there is no sure rule.  Satgas PAN in Yogya are under 
the control of the party.  Both satgas PPP and PDI-P claim that they are under party 
control, but their organizations history and esprit de corps seems to beggar that 
argument.  Pak Sumitro of the Yogya city police said that the satgas are categorically 
not under party control; that they act as they want.  The satgas claim that the only 
problems are caused by rogue cadres that refuse to take party orders.  Thus, I heard 
three different theories from three different sources.  I conclude that the parties are all 
different.  Some satgas are controlled by the parties and some are not.  There is no 
generalization I can make about who controls the satgas.   
Prospects for Peace 
 
More likely though, politicking throughout Indonesia may come to resemble that of 
Thailand   Thai vote-delivery has become very monitized; local notables or citizens 
themselves are often paid to vote a certain way.  According to McVey (2000) 
physical coercion happens less and less often.   This has happened because the 
sponsors of the violence, the chao pho or political fixers have realized that simple 
payment works more easily than coercion.  So, there are still sponsors, but they no 




However, unlike Thailand, Indonesian incomes are low and unemployment is high. 
As long as unemployment remains high in Indonesia, there will be young men willing 
to rent themselves out as a mob.  This may continue to be the more cost-effective 
solution for vote-delivery in Indonesia.  Economic growth and equality will prevent a 
large part of political violence. 
 
The Philipines anti-Communist militias had a specific enemy and have not remained 
active in politics; thus, we learn from them that Southeast Asian societies are not 
inherently violent or disorderly.  The violence can have an end. Kerkvliet and 
Mojares (1991) documented peaceful political life in two Philippino towns.  They 
also note that as communities become larger and more diverse, patron-client 
relationships in politics decline.  It is no longer possible for one man of prowess to 
deliver goods.  Capitalistic exchange is easier for everyone. If Indonesia follows the 
Philippines example, it will be through the practice of vote-buying, rather than vote-
bullying.  Capitalism is working its way into the political facet of life.   
 
To try to predict if Indonesia will follow a path of money politicking like the 
Philippines and Thailand, a case study could be made among comparable cities in the 
three countries.  If we look at the development of politicking in the Philippines since 
1986 or Thailand since 1992, we could look for similarities in post-Reformasi period 
in Indonesia.  Or, to see if a positive political culture can overcome money 
politicking, a comparasion could be made among Yogyakarta and comparable cities 




Earlier I argued that one of the prerequisities to politicial violence are willing 
sponsors and willing workers.  Thus, the greatest break in the cycle of political 
violence will come when elite politicians and satgas members (or just fanatic 
supporters) no longer accept violence in politics.  Though poverty and unemployment 
make a job even as a thug look appealing, poverty is no barrier to peace.    
 
A tourism official in Yogya has suggested election season become a tourist attraction 
where party supporters can compete artistically for the most outlandish and 
interesting party display (Kompas, January 12, 2004).  This political Carnivale or 
Mardi Gras would be an excellent idea.  The students would still be able to stop 
traffic, make noise and revel for a few days, though there would still be the problem 
of violence, as any police officer in Rio de Janeiro or New Orleans could attest. 
 
Political education and positive examples of civil politicking will make the end come 
sooner.  From a young age, parents and teachers must make children take it for 
granted that political changes are made by debate, voting, and some festive 
campaigning, not by fighting.  However, many Indonesian children are not wealthy 
enough to have much formal education.  So they, and their parents, must learn from 
examples.  These examples should accumulate with time.  Not only were the 2004 
national elections rather peaceful, but they were family events in Yogya.  I visited 
four polling stations in the city of Yogyakarta and Sleman, and there were children 
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hanging around and playing at each one.  During the vote counting, they clapped with 





Yogyakarta is likely to continue on a more peaceful path.  The city is lucky enough to 
have a popular, trusted public figure in Sultan Hamengkubuwono X.   It is a relatively 
small but diverse and dynamic city, in which people are proud of the uniqueness of 
their city.  They feel they own their city, as Pak Sumitro observed during our 
interview.  Thus, political socialization is faster and political education is more 
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widespread in Yogya than in the rest of the country. Eventually Indonesias politics 








Table 3:  Levels of Local Government in Indonesia 
Propinsi:  Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (DIY) 




       
       
  
               
Within the province of DIY, there are 4 large divisions called 
kabupaten, and one smaller division for the city of Yogyakarta.  
Within the kapubaten and the city, there are 74 smaller divisions 
called kecamatan.  Within the kecamatan are kelurahan, and the 




Appendix A:  Glossary 
 
AMS:  Angkatan Muda Siliwangi, The Siliwangi Young Generation, a West Java satgas associated 
with Golkar 
 
Bromotjorah:  A general term in East Java for gangs.   
 
Golkar:  The Indonesian governments political party from the late 1960s until 1998.  It is still a viable 
party today despite its negative image from Orba. 
 
Jago:  An Indonesian village bully. 
 
Laskyar:  A paramilitary group with an Islamic ideology.   
 
Orba:  Ordre Baru, New Order, the term for Suhartos government from 1965 until 1998. 
 
PAN:  Partai Amanat Nasional, the National Mandate Party.  A modernist Muslim party founded in 
1998 and headed by Amien Rais.  It is more popular in Yogyakarta than in the rest of Indonesia. 
 
PD:  Partai Demokrat, the Democratic Party.  A secular party founded in 1998, and the party of 
Indonesias current president, Susilio Bambang  Yudyohono. 
 
PDI, PDI-P:  Partai Demokrat Indonesia and Partai Demokrat Indonesia  Perjuangan.  The 
Indonesian Democratic Party and the Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle Faction.  These are 
the pre- and post- 1996 names of a major secular nationalist party in Indonesia.  It is Megawatis party.   
 
PNI:  Partai Nasional Indonesia, the Indonesian National Party.  The name of the main pre-Orba 
nationalist party.  It was later forcibly merged with Christian parties to form PDI. 
 
Pemuda:  Collective noun meaning youth. 
 
Pesta Demokrasi:  Democratic Festival, the festive campaigning for an election. 
 
PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, the National Awakening Party, a traditional Islamist party. 
 
PKI:  Partai Komunis Indonesia, the Indonesian Communist Party, which was very strong in 
Indonesia until the massacre of 1965-66.   
 
PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, the United Development Party.  A party formed by the 
forced amalgamation of Islamic parties in 1973.   
 
Preman, Premanisme:  A thug, and thuggish behavior.   
 
Reformasi:  Reform, the most popular slogan of Indonesias democratic Revolution in 1998. 
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